Voting with Rank Dependent Scoring Rules

Abstract : Positional scoring rules in voting compute the score of an alternative by summing the scores for the alternative induced by every vote. This summation principle ensures that all votes contribute equally to the score of an alternative. We relax this assumption and, instead, aggregate scores by taking into account the rank of a score in the ordered list of scores obtained from the votes. This defines a new family of voting rules, rank-dependent scoring rules (RDSRs), based on ordered weighted average (OWA) operators, which, include all scoring rules, and many others, most of which of new. We study some properties of these rules, and show, empirically, that certain RDSRs are less manipulable than Borda voting, across a variety of statistical cultures.
Keywords : social choice voting
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Conference papers
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01497740
Contributor : Christine Okret-Manville <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 29, 2017 - 10:55:59 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, June 6, 2019 - 2:42:14 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-01497740, version 1

Citation

Judy Goldsmith, Jérôme Lang, Nicholas Mattei, Patrice Perny. Voting with Rank Dependent Scoring Rules. 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'14), Jul 2014, Québec, Canada. pp.698-704. ⟨hal-01497740⟩

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