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Voting in Combinatorial Domains

Abstract : This chapter addresses preference aggregation and voting on domains which are the Cartesian product (or sometimes, a subset of the Cartesian product) of finite domain values, each corresponding to an issue, a variable, or an attribute. As seen in other chapters of this handbook, voting rules map a profile (usually, a collection of rankings, see Chapter 1) to an alternative or a set of alternatives. A key question has to do with the structure of the set of alternatives. Sometimes, this set has a simple structure and a small cardinality (e.g., in a presidential election). But in many contexts, it has a complex combinatorial structure.
Mots-clés : social choice game theory
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Contributor : Christine Okret-Manville <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 21, 2017 - 5:06:33 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 14, 2020 - 4:01:23 AM

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Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia. Voting in Combinatorial Domains. Handbook of Computational Social Choice, pp.197-222, 2016, ⟨10.1017/CBO9781107446984.010⟩. ⟨hal-01493535⟩



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