Voting in Combinatorial Domains

Jérôme Lang (1) , Lirong Xia (2)

1 LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision
2 RPI - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

This chapter addresses preference aggregation and voting on domains which are the Cartesian product (or sometimes, a subset of the Cartesian product) of finite domain values, each corresponding to an issue, a variable, or an attribute. As seen in other chapters of this handbook, voting rules map a profile (usually, a collection of rankings, see Chapter 1) to an alternative or a set of alternatives. A key question has to do with the structure of the set of alternatives. Sometimes, this set has a simple structure and a small cardinality (e.g., in a presidential election). But in many contexts, it has a complex combinatorial structure.

Mots clés: social choice; game theory

Domaines: Informatique [cs]

Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia. Voting in Combinatorial Domains. Handbook of Computational Social Choice, pp.197-222, 2016, ⟨10.1017/CBO9781107446984.010⟩. ⟨hal-01493535⟩