Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?

Serge Blondel (1) , Louis Lévy-Garboua (2, 3)

1 GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management
2 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics

Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Ashley Piggins for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-garboua, (2011) ''Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3158-3168. Contact: Serge [e-mail], Louis Lé[e-mail].

Mots clés: vote; election

Domaines: Economies et finances

Serge Blondel, Louis Lévy-Garboua. Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?. Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (4), pp.3158 - 3168. ⟨hal-01476363⟩