On the efficiency of decentralized conservation policy
Résumé
Because the environmental and rural benefits or harm can be localized, it could be argued that the decentralization of agri-environmental policy is required to promote a better allocation of public funds. The purpose of this article is to study how the decentralization of conservation policies affects social welfare. We develop a model of competition among jurisdictions where local governments seek to design and implement agri-environmental programs to maximize a welfare function. The location choice of individuals and the rural amenity supply are endogenous. We find that the decentralization of the agri-environmental policy leads to (i) inefficiently low payment for the production of environmental goods from global welfare viewpoint and (ii) a rise of the consumer’s welfare at the expense of farmer’s income. These results hold when consumers are heterogeneous.
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...