Algorithmic Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks and Power Analysis for RSA-CRT

Abstract : In this work, we analyze all existing RSA-CRT countermeasures against the Bellcore attack that use binary self-secure exponentiation algorithms. We test their security against a powerful adversary by simulating fault injections in a fault model that includes random, zeroing, and skipping faults at all possible fault locations. We find that most of the countermeasures are vulnerable and do not provide sufficient security against all attacks in this fault model. After investigating how additional measures can be included to counter all possible fault injections, we present three countermeasures which prevent both power analysis and many kinds of fault attacks.
Type de document :
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, Springer Verlag (Germany), pp.111-129, 2016, 〈10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_7〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [27 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01461208
Contributeur : Projet Dissemin <>
Soumis le : mardi 14 février 2017 - 09:34:55
Dernière modification le : mardi 22 mai 2018 - 20:40:06
Document(s) archivé(s) le : lundi 15 mai 2017 - 12:21:49

Fichier

article.pdf
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Ágnes Kiss, Juliane Krämer, Pablo Rauzy, Jean-Pierre Seifert. Algorithmic Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks and Power Analysis for RSA-CRT. Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, Springer Verlag (Germany), pp.111-129, 2016, 〈10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_7〉. 〈hal-01461208〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

135

Téléchargements de fichiers

217