Algorithmic Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks and Power Analysis for RSA-CRT

Abstract : In this work, we analyze all existing RSA-CRT countermeasures against the Bellcore attack that use binary self-secure exponentiation algorithms. We test their security against a powerful adversary by simulating fault injections in a fault model that includes random, zeroing, and skipping faults at all possible fault locations. We find that most of the countermeasures are vulnerable and do not provide sufficient security against all attacks in this fault model. After investigating how additional measures can be included to counter all possible fault injections, we present three countermeasures which prevent both power analysis and many kinds of fault attacks.
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Ágnes Kiss, Juliane Krämer, Pablo Rauzy, Jean-Pierre Seifert. Algorithmic Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks and Power Analysis for RSA-CRT. Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, Springer Verlag (Germany), pp.111-129, 2016, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_7⟩. ⟨hal-01461208⟩

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