The World on Show, or Sensibility in Disguise.
Philosophical and Aesthetic Issues in a Stanza by Abhinavagupta (Tantrāloka I 332, Locana ad Dhvanyāloka I 13)
Lyne Bansat-Boudon

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Abhinavagupta is undoubtedly the most famous Kashmirian medieval intellectual: his decisive contributions to Indian aesthetics, Śaiva theology and metaphysics, and to the philosophy of the subtle and original Pratyabhijñā system are well known. Yet so far his works have often been studied without fully taking into account the specific context in which they are embedded – an intellectual background that is not less exceptional than Abhinavagupta himself. While providing fresh interpretations of some of the great Śaiva polymath’s works, the nineteen essays gathered here attempt to map out for the first time the extraordinary cultural effervescence that took place in the little kingdom of Kashmir around Abhinavagupta’s time.

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Around Abhinavagupta
Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir from the Ninth to the Eleventh Century

edited by
Eli Franco and Isabelle Ratié
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The World on Show, or Sensibility in Disguise.

Philosophical and Aesthetic Issues in a Stanza by Abhinavagupta

*(Tantrāloka I 332, Locana ad Dhvanyāloka I 13)*

LYNE BANSAT-BOUDON

The stanza I examine here belongs to two texts by Abhinavagupta: the *Tantrāloka* (henceforth TĀ) and the *Dhvanyālokalocana* (henceforth Locana). It is amenable to different interpretations according to the text in which it appears, its context and its exegesis. The stanza must have been famous, since it is quoted again by Bhāskara, commenting on Abhinavagupta’s *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini* (henceforth IPV) ad *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (henceforth ĪPK) I 1, 14.¹

Jayaratha, the author of the *Viveka* (henceforth TĀV), comments on the stanza in the TĀ. In the *Locana* [ad Dhvanyāloka I 13], it is Abhinavagupta who offers a self-exegesis of it. I give here a provisional translation, in conformity with the context in which it is employed as well as with the analysis of the TĀV.²

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¹ Bhāskarī ad IPV I 1, 4; see Appendix-4.

² See below, § 1, for the detail of Jayaratha’s analysis.
bhāvavrāta hatthāj janasya hrdayāṇy ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgibhir
vividhābhīr ātmārdhayam pracchādyā samkrādase

yas tvāṁ āha jádam jádad sahrdayamanyatvadāhāśikṣito manye 'musya
jadāmatā statipadaṁ tvatsāmyasambhāvanāt ||

O whole of things! Since you play at forcibly4 grabbing hold of the hearts
of men, as does an actor with his various costumes, and at hiding your
heart that is the Self, he who calls
you unconscious is himself uncon-
scious: wrongly believing that he is endowed with a heart (sahrdaya), he
has not completed his education. Nevertheless, his very unconsciousness,
I think,5 is praiseworthy, since we do imagine him (sambhāvana) as identi-
tical to you.

The stanza is explicitly organized by the theatrical metaphor. We
will see how remarkable it is in its complex construction and in the
different levels of meaning that inform it.6

Being an apostrophe to the bhāvavrāta, the “whole of things,” or
phenomenal diversity, the stanza appears as a drama with three cha-
acters: the bhāvavrāta, the jana (the ordinary man whom the TĀV
turns into a vādin, an “interlocutor,” that is, here an adversary; see
below, p. 38), and the “I” of the main verb, manye, through which
Abhinavagupta, exponent of the Trika, makes his voice heard. The
“I” of manye thus addresses phenomenal diversity as he would the
deity – this is the interpretation of both the TĀV (below, pp. 40, 45-
47) and the Locana (below, p. 60) – and introduces an effect of mise
en abyme with the reported speech attributed to the jana.

The meter is śārdūlavikrāṭita, frequent in lyrical poetry, and such
is indeed the tone of this address to the bhāvavrāta, which amounts
to a celebration – a lyricism that again expresses itself through the
“I” of manye, in which Abhinavagupta manifests himself as the re-
presentative of the Śaivas.

3 Sanskrit texts are quoted as they appear in the reference edition – I have not
corrected the sandhi.

4 Note that hathāḥ has the double meaning: “by force” and “invincibly.”

5 Compare D. Shulman’s paper in this volume on the use of jāne: according to
Abhinavagupta (commenting on a verse quoted in the Dhvanīālokavṛtti ad III
43), jāne “is often a marker of the figure upreksā, ‘flight of fancy,’ but [...] here
 [...] its literal meaning is what matters.”

6 For examples of Tantric usages of the theatrical analogy, see J. Törzsők’s con-
tribution to this volume.
Moreover, as Jayaratha observes as if in passing, the stanza is organized by the aprastutapraśamsā figure. This is a remark that Jayaratha exploits only partially, focussing on the denoted meaning, which is the aprastuta, or non-pertinent topic, whereas the Locana gives the aprastutapraśamsā all its meaning and weight, as we shall see (see below, pp. 48ff.).

Among figures of speech, the aprastutapraśamsā is one of those in which suggestion is in operation: while something non-pertinent or irrelevant (aprastuta) to the speaker and the listener is being described (praśamsā), what is really meant, that is, the suggested meaning, is something pertinent or relevant (prastuta) to them; besides, the relationship between the non-pertinent and the pertinent can be of three types (in the case of our stanza, similarity – sārūpya).

That stanza (as well as its commentaries by Abhinavagupta, Jayaratha or Bhāskara) plays, in particular, on the polysemy of the adjective jāda, since jāda means, among several equivocations i) insentient, ii) unconscious (Jayaratha glosses it by acetana), iii) devoid of reason, that is stupid, or even iv) insane (as we shall see about the Locana’s analysis).

In the light of its commentaries, the stanza appears as a remarkable illustration of the way Śaiva thought merges philosophical and aesthetic registers within one another. One can see here a movement, a turn of mind, inherent in that system of thought which offers us the essential lineaments of Indian aesthetic theory.

I would like to show that, in the two occurrences of the stanza, aesthetics and poetics (to which the Locana explicitly refers) serve as a speculative paradigm for the doctrine of which Abhinavagupta is one of the foremost exponents.

Jayaratha goes no further than a philosophical interpretation of the stanza, which coincides with the expressed meaning alone: everything is sentient. And in order to establish that fundamental truth of Kashmirian non-dualist Śaivism, Jayaratha develops the dramatic metaphor of the first hemistich.

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7 See Gerow 1971, p. 317: “mention made of a topic irrelevant to the subject” and Ingalls et al. 1990, who understands: “praise by means of the extraneous,” and identifies it as the allegory.

8 The three types of relationship between aprastuta and prastuta being that of cause and effect, general and particular and similarity; see Dhvanyāloka I 13 and Locana.
The Locana proposes the same reading of the stanza: everything is sentient, including, first and foremost, the object wrongly said to be insentient, but the Locana goes beyond this statement by hinting at a second meaning, more esoteric, and for that very reason only suggested, thus taking the aprastutapraśamsā as an example of dhvani, specially, vastudhvani (see below, p. 50).

Nevertheless, since Jayaratha identifies the stanza as an aprastutapraśamsā, there should be a suggested meaning, which would be the prastuta. Although Jayaratha does not emphasize it, I propose to find that suggested meaning in the avataranikā to the exegetical passage and in its conclusion (see below, p. 37). On the basis of an understanding of that aprastutapraśamsā as organized by similarity (as shown by the Locana, which gives two examples of the figure and refers to our stanza as a case of aprastutapraśamsā based on similarity; see below, p. 48), the expressed aprastuta would be, beyond the apostrophe to the bhāavārāta, the postulation of the equal sentience of the subject (here the paśu) and the object (in the form of all the objects, the bhāavārāta). The suggested prastuta would be – by means of Jayaratha’s rather unexpected identification of the paśu with the vādin, the “opponent” – the Śaivas’ non-dualist attack against all opponents of their doctrine, with the ultimate intention of ridiculing all of them and establishing the Śaiva non-dualism as supreme.

Now, the question remains that, in the TĀ’s context and according to Jayaratha’s exegesis (who cares little, it seems, for the subtleties of Abhinavagupta’s reasonings in the Locana), the aprastutapraśamsā is here to be understood as a mere figure of speech, and not as a case of vastudhvani, as claimed by Abhinavagupta in his Locana quoting the same verse. If one follows Ānandavardhana’s exposition in the vr̥tti ad I 139 and Abhinavagupta’s commentary thereon, this means that, in the context of the TĀ, the direct expressed meaning (the apostrophe to the bhāavārāta) is considered predominant (the criterium for such a distinction being that it is the expressed meaning that, in this case, creates camatkāra, “wonderment”), whereas the suggested meaning (the ridiculing and defeat of the adversaries) is subordinated. We shall see the whole process in detail further on (pp. 48ff.).

I admit, with Ingalls, that Ānandavardhana is as well the author of the vr̥tti; see INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 25-27.
Thus, in the TĀ, the aprastutapraśamsā is considered as a mere figure of speech and mainly serves a polemical purpose.

It is in this way that we can understand Jayaratha’s avataraṇikā:

idānīm asya śāstrasya param gāmbhiṛyaṁ manyamāno granthakṛt, etad-arthasaṭatvam ajānānaṁ api anyair anyathābodhena yatikmca utānānam eva anyathā ucyate, tāṁ prati aprastutapraśamsayā upahastītum āha..., 

Now, considering the extreme depth of the [preceeding] teaching, [and, also,] that others, though ignorant of its essential meaning, persist in making erroneous and non-sensical pronouncements, as an effect of an understanding itself erroneous, the author of the treatise contradicts them, using the [following] aprastutapraśamsā, for ridiculing them [...],

as well as the conclusion, in which sarcasm intends to denounce any other system of thought as erroneous, and to reaffirm the infailibility of the non-dualist Śaiva doctrine:

evāṁ prakṛte 'pi asya granthasya yas tatvam na jānāti mā jīhāsī, pratyuta anyathāpi yatikmca vakti ity asāv eva jaḍo, na punar asya granthasya kaścid doṣah ity arthah |

In order to come back to our subject, such is its meaning: the one who does not know the truth [expounded] in this treatise – let him not know it! And even more if he utters nonsense and falsehood, it is he himself who is the unconscious idiot; this treatise is not at fault in any way. This is the meaning.

1. THE TANTRĀLOKAVIVEKA AD TANTRĀLOKA I 332

I will limit myself to a synthesis of the analysis of the TĀV, whose text I give in Appendix-1.

The reasoning of the stanza is tightly woven and plays with paradox, as so often in this system of thought:

1. Everything is sentient. This is why (yat)...

2. ... the one who says phenomenal diversity is insentient and stupid is himself insentient and stupid, blinded by his very ignorance, that is, by his being unable to recognize the identity of the subject and the object;

3. Nevertheless, since we Śaivas imagine – by virtue of the principle of non-duality – that such an ignorant fool is similar to you, O bhāvavrāta, the blame that he puts on you and that we
have just transferred to him (since he is the fool) turns to praise.

The entire philosophical point of the stanza lies in this last statement, the locus of a paradoxical mockery: it is because the jana partakes of this consciousness which he wrongly believes to be unconscious that he is really a sahṛdaya,\(^{10}\) not for the reason he thinks (his sentence contrasting with the insentience of the objects).

The TĀV develops this line of thought and makes it clear that the stanza is a formulation of the non-dualism of the doctrine, which is precisely the main issue of the first chapter of the TĀ where our stanza appears.

The novelty of the TĀV’s interpretation consists in reading, under the jana of the stanza (who appears again in the relative clause: yas tvām āha...), a vādin, that is, an “interlocutor” and therefore an opponent of Trika monism (note that the term vādin appears three times in the TĀV ad I 332; see Appendix-1, in bold). Jayaratha gives the content of the experience, inner struggles and impotence of that vādin, through a rather enigmatic (and unidentified\(^{11}\)) stanza showing him doing battle with the dualizing thoughts (vikalpas), whatever the school in which they have been theorized:

\[
\begin{align*}
adyāsmāṃ asataḥ kariṣyati sataḥ kim nu dvidhā vāpy avam \\
kim sthāsnān uta naśvaṁ uta mithobhinnān abhinnān uta |
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
itham sadvadanaḥvalokanaparair bhāvair jagadvartibhir \\
manye maananiρuddhiyamānāhṛdayayair duḥkhena taith sthīyate ||
\end{align*}
\]

Now, will it [dialectics (according to the context of the stanza in the Í PVV)] make us existent or nonexistent, or even both? Will it make us permanent or destructible, different from each other or nondifferent? In my view, thus [confronted with such dilemmas], beings remain in pain: they who live in this world, immersed in contemplating the face of the Being, have their hearts closed by the silence [to which they are reduced,\(^{10}\)]

\(^{10}\) On this reasoning, see the Locana ad Dhvanyālokaśrti I 13 quoted below, p. 61. On the notion of sahṛdayatā in the aesthetic register, see esp. Bansat-Boudon 1992a, pp. 148-149, 151; also (for its use in both aesthetic and spiritual registers), 2012a, pp. 225-233; and below, n. 33.

\(^{11}\) Although Abhinavagupta could well be its author, due to the similarity of structure with TĀ I 332 (stanza organized by “manye”), as well as to the presence of the same stanza in another text by Abhinavagupta, namely the Iśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśini (henceforth Í PVV); see the following §.
unable as they are to see that the opposition sat-asat is meant to dissolve in the awareness of the supreme Self (paramātman).

Let us note that the ĪPVV I 1, 1, Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Utpaladeva’s Vivṛti (most of which has been lost), has already cited this stanza in a condensed form, in an extremely sarcastic passage denying dialectics (tarka) the power of attaining supreme Reality. Only “Recognition” (pratyabhijñā) of one’s identity with the supreme principle or reality can ensure one’s access to it, hence to liberation.

Thus every dualist doctrine is reduced to the level of inferior thought, tinged with very ordinary prejudices, characterizing the common man who knows nothing at all (akiṃcijñā), says the TĀV, and who can be shown to be a fool of the first order.

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12 On this implied meaning, see ĪPVV I 1, 1 (translated below) and Bhagavadgītā [BhG] II 16 [= II 17, in the Kaśmīr recension] and Abhinavagupta’s commentary thereon (in particular his gloss for antah).

13 ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 9: evam paramēśvarasvarūpe samāvīśya granthakārah sātra-vrtyartham pūrpa pakottarapakṣaḥ samudghātisyīyaṃ tarko ‘pratiṣṭhāḥ iti apratiṣṭhatāḥ, advāṣmān asataḥ karisyati satah sthānān ṣatho naśvāraṇ īti, sva-śaktipradaṃsanāmātrārātayā gomaya pāyasyāvayāiyopahāsena paramārthān- upavyogitā | aho diḥ vyāhāyātri grahah itarahevākabhiṣatam aho tarkasyāṇātāḥ kvacid api na labhayaś ca vibudhaḥ | “Having thus immersed himself in the nature of paramēśvara and preparing to reveal the meaning of the verse and its commentary through a series of prima facie views and established conclusions, the author [Utpaladeva] says: ‘Dialectics has no foundation.’ The lack of foundation [of dialectics is explicit in the verse]: ‘Now, will it [dialectics] make us existent or nonexistent? […] Will it make us permanent or destructible?’ [Trying to express] the supreme meaning [through logical terms] is pointless, according to [the verse]: ‘Alas! The understanding of dialecticians [only] results in another whim [to analyze]! Alas! For scholars, there is no end to dialectics!’ [Here the emphasis is on] the derisory nature [of dialectics when employed for the purpose of attaining the supreme meaning; it is as absurd as the reasoning criticized in the saying that assimilates ‘the cowpat and the milk’ [on the basis that they both have a bovine origin], given that the essence [of the supreme principle can only be perceived] when one sees its energy [at work behind the products that constitute empiric reality].’

14 See in particular Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthaśāra (henceforth PS) 27, which presents other systems of thought as mere practical and provisional truths (vyavahāramātram etat paramārthēna tu na santy eva, for which Yogarāja glosses vyavahāramātram by samvyavahāratāram) and as such inferior to Abhinavagupta’s doctrine (see BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 152, n. 656). See also the famous analogy used by Kṣemarāja in his PH 8 (BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 160-161, n. 689), where the different schools are described as
sees the final pirouette which consists in the reversal of blame into praise.

Already, in the *avataraṇikā*, as we have seen, the TĀV shows how the stanza partakes of the polemic construction of the Traika system. Not only does this polemical tone persist throughout the commentary, but Jayaratha shows a violence which is foreign to the stanza itself and which culminates in the final condemnation, almost an imprecation (see above, p. 37).

Thus there is no way out for the cornered adversary. And if, despite everything, he resists – so what! His position, now ruined, is of no consequence.

I would have liked to show how, in the context of such a general attack on all dualism, one could read at least a partial refutation of the Sāṃkhya. But this it is not the place for such a digression, nor for comparing the way both Trika and Sāmkhya use the theatrical metaphor. I shall limit myself to reminding the reader of Sāmkhya-kārikā (henceforth SK) 59, 61, 65-66, where *prakṛti*, unconscious yet active, is said to be playing before the *puruṣa*, conscious yet inactive – it is indeed an actress (*nartakī*; SK 59), since the Gaudapādiyabhāṣya speaks of the *rasa* she is enacting.

Intent upon his demonstration of non-dualism, Jayaratha unfolds the dramatic metaphor of the first hemistich, showing how the analogy at work in the stanza poetically condenses the underlying argument of the passage: objects are sentient (*ājāḍa*), but the deity which presides over their manifestation disguises that sentience as make-believe insentience (*jāḍatva*), so much so that it succeeds in deceiving the insensitive man (*ahṛdaya*): the world displays its splendors to the finite being who is its deluded and impotent spectator. Thus Jayaratha unfolds the web of significations associated with the notion of *sahṛdayatā*, “sensibility,” understood as an aesthetic notion.

One should observe, however, that Jayaratha forces the meaning of the stanza by making it serve his exegetic project, infringing on its morphology and syntax, and even on its metrics.

---

the many “roles” (as well as “levels” of realization of the ultimate truth, bhūmikā) taken on by the Supreme Lord as an actor and are seen as hierarchical levels arranged along the scale of the tattvas – culminating with the eleventh and highest bhūmikā or sthiti, which is that of Trika philosophers.
It seems, for instance, that he understands the present participle *nartayan* not as a causative, but as a sort of denominative (the equivalent of a *nartāyate*), inasmuch as *nartayan* is glossed by *natavat*. Similarly, he dislocates the syntax by making *nartayan* govern the group in the instrumental: *vividhābhīr bhāngībhīḥ*, when one expects that an instrumental accompanying *pracchādyatā* might more naturally express *means* (unless the instrumental is considered as the complement of *means* applied to both gerunds and also to *nartayan*); moreover, the expected syntactic order would thus coincide with the metrical organization of the stanza, namely, with the second *pāda*, whereas *nartayan*, at the end of the first *pāda*, would take a direct object: *janasya hrdayāṇī*, which is shared with the gerund *ākramya*.

Jayaratha persists in his bold interpretation, since the syntactic segment thus reorganized is again glossed by an equivalent one: *vividhābhīr bhāngībhīḥ nartayan yat samkrīḍase – natavat atāttvikena rūpena samullasasi*. Thus, *vividhābhīr bhāngībhīḥ* is explained as *atāttvikena rūpena* (“taking on a non-real form”), *nartayan as natavat, “ in the way of an actor,” and *samkrīḍase as samullasasi (“he plays”).”

In the same vein, the term *bhaṅgī* is to be understood here more as “costumes” (one of its meanings) than as “twists” or “bends” (or emotional “modes,” as understood in the *Locana*; see below, p. 61) – such costumes representing the various roles played by the actor. Let us remember that the *āhāryābhinaya – costume and make-up – although it has “to be borrowed” (*āhārya*) from the external world before the actor enters the stage, is conceived as a full-fledged register of acting (*abhinaya*).  

15 This will be the syntactical order of the stanza in Abhinavagupta’s self-exegesis of the same verse in the *Locana*; see below, p. 58: *ḥathād eva lokam yatheccham vikārakāranābhīrtārtavatii*

16 Lit., “Since (yat) you play (*samkrīḍase = samullasasi*), in the way of an actor (*nartayan = natavat*), with various costumes, i.e. with a form that is not real (*vividhābhīr bhāngībhīḥ = atāttvikena rūpena*)”


The verb itself, *samkrīḍase* (glossed as *samullasasi*), is also to be understood in the sense of dramatic acting, when it evokes the divine actor, the *nāṭarāja* – or his *śakti*, as we shall see.

We should note with what coherence the stanza and its commentary spin out the metaphor, in conformity with the essential lineaments of the aesthetic theory defended by Abhinavagupta and the Śaiva tradition, including the key notion of *sahṛdayatā* and its antonym, *ahṛdayatā*.

Both texts manifest the tension between the two protagonists of the aesthetic experience as lived out in the theatre, that is, the actor and the spectator. Nothing is left out of the process. On one side, the actor, master of himself and of the universe (if I can borrow from Corneille, *Cinna*, Vth act!), that is, master of the splendors lucidly displayed to the spectator’s eyes (since, like the divine actor, he causes the objective world to be on stage); master also of that spectator’s heart, which he moves “forcibly” (*ḥaṭṭāt*), that is, “at will” (*ya-theccham*, as we shall see in the *Locana* quoted below, p. 61), and who hides his Self in order to assume the variety of his roles. On the other side, the spectator, more specifically the unqualified spectator, the *ahṛdaya*, who sees nothing but the diversity of the world in the variety of those roles.

Such a spectator – who is a figure of the opponent in the interpretation of the TĀV – is, in fact, deceived, unable to discern the reality beneath appearances. And he is all the more deceived since he overestimates himself – wrongly believing, due to his presumptuousness (a way of translating the philosophical notion the Trika inherits from the Śāmkhya, namely *abhimāna*), the sentiment of the ego, and not of the Self), that he is a *sahṛdaya*.

On the philosophical level, the insensibility (*ahṛdayatā*) of that deceived spectator represents *avidyā* (or *ajñāna*), metaphysical ignorance, as it manifests itself in a double error (*bhrānti*) consisting, in Śaiva reasonings and particularly in Abhinavagupta’s PS (30-31 and 39-40), in taking the Self for the non-Self, that is, in forgetting the unity of the Self and in placing before itself the object, namely phenomenal diversity (to which also belong the multiplicity of the

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19 On Śiva as the unique Agent and Actor and the reasonings on the “beingness” (*astitva*) of the phenomenal world, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2014, pp. 64-73.

paśus21), before just as wrongly taking the non-Self (the body, the breath, etc.) as the Self – which amounts to being an error heaped upon error, “darkness upon darkness” (timirād api timiram idam), or a “great pustule upon a boil” (gaṇḍasyopari mahān ayaṁ śphoṭah), as PS 31 says.22

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that at some point in the ĪPVV (ad II 4 19, vol. III, p. 244)23 it is the error itself (bhrama)24 which plays on the stage:

sa ca bhrama nāyataulyasya aparāmārthhasato ‘ryakṣasvarūpāvaṣṭambhahanatākalpena paramēvasaraprakāśena pratītigocarīkṛtasya saṃsārasya nāyakah sūtraśāryaḥ pradhānabhūtah pravartayitā iti vṛtti nāyakavā, yallagnam viśvetvṛttaṃ ābhāti; tata eva prathamah |

21 On this point, see especially Spandanirṇaya I 1 (quoted and translated in BAN-SAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 330-331) which states that Śiva takes on the role of the seven pramātras and of the objects which they bring into being.

22 On the double error, see BAN-SAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 24-25, 161-169, 191-192 and n. 848; also, below, n. 24.

23 Quoted in RATIÉ 2011, pp. 559; see also J. Törzsök’s contribution to this volume.

24 Here “bhrama” must be construed as “bhrānti,” “error,” and refers to the Traika conception of a two-levelled error. According to Abhinavagupta and his commentator in the PS, the first level of error is to mistake the Self for the non-Self, i.e., in forgetting one’s own plenitude and in apprehending oneself as a finite subject, defined in relation to an object (see PS 25 and 30 in BAN-SAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011). Thereupon intervenes the second level of error: taking the non-Self (body, buddhi, etc.) to be the Self, that is, predicating the Self of the non-Self, so that we assert ‘I am fat,’ ‘I am intelligent,’ etc. (see PS 31 in BAN-SAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011). On the interpretation of bhrama here, in the ĪPVV, as an error on two levels – of which the first, more fundamental one is to mistake the Self for the non-Self – I somewhat differ from Ratié and Törzsök (see above, n. 23). See, for instance, Yogārāja’s Paramārthasāraśivīrti (henceforth PSV) ad 61: bhrāntih dvayarūpo bhramah, “the ‘error,’ i.e., the illusion formed of duality,” and PSV 39, who describes how the dissolution of the second level of error is the condition for the vanishing of the first and main grade of error: yāvad anātmanāt dehādvāt ātmābhāmāna na galitasyavat svāmaprathārāpe ‘pi jagatī bhedaprāthāmohah na vilāyate. “As long as the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self – the body, etc. – does not dissipate, so long does the delusion not dissolve that consists in valorizing difference (lit. ‘display of difference’) in this world, [the things of] which are even so but the display of one’s own Self.” (Transl. BAN-SAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, p. 192.) Here that first grade of error is described as bhedaprāthāmohah, the “delusion that consists in valorizing difference.”
The drama (nāṭya) that the world of transmigration is [i.e. the phenomenal world subjected to the cycle of rebirth] (samsāra), though ultimately deprived of reality, can only be experienced insofar as it is the manifestation of the supreme Lord who, like the actor (nāṭa), never gives up his own, immutable nature. [Metaphysical] error is the hero (nāyaka) of the drama; in other words, it is the sūtradhāra, the leader of the company, whose preeminent function is both that of instigator of the plot (itiyṛta) and protagonist of the play. It is in its close connection with metaphysical error that the plot of the universe (viśvetiyṛta) appears. This is why metaphysical error is “primary.”

Error here is nothing but nescience (avidyā), namely the mistaking of the Self for the non-Self which in turn will lead to an even deeper error, that of mistaking the non-Self for the Self. Like the sūtradhāra, both the leader and first actor of a theatre group who plays the main role (nāyaka), avidyā leads the plot of the universe (viśvetiyṛta) on the stage of the world of transmigration (samsāra). Better than viśva in the alternative analogy, that of the drama of the universe (viśvetiyṛta), samsāra is able to represent the target in the metaphor of the “world as a theatre”: in the endless flow of reincarnations, empirical beings take on one role after another. And although, in Śaiva terms, the play (nāṭya) is not ultimately “true” (aparamārtha-sat), it has enough power of illusion to fool the spectators, so long as these remain in the condition of paśu. At the source of this dramatic illusion is Parameśvara, the Supreme Agent and Supreme Agent par excellence, see BANSAT-BOUDON 2014, pp. 65-71. See also IPV II 4 19 (vol. II, p. 200): iti ciddṛṣṭasyaiva kārtārtham upapannam abhinnasya bhedāveśeśasahiṣṇuteṇa kriyāśaktiyeśasamabhavāt, “Thus, only what is
actor, who, in disguising himself, plays at being other than himself without ever being affected by it (atyakṣaṃvāpaṃvastambhaṇa). This is possible because such a change of appearance, far from being due to particular circumstances, stems from Prameśvara’s power to hide at will. This ability is one of his śaktis, his tiroḍhānaśakti, his concealment energy. Thus the disguise of the Self is a correlate of its sovereign freedom, its svātāntraśakti, the first of its energies. The notation “ātmahṛdayam pracchādyā” (TĀ I 332) is therefore an essential element of the playful process of self-subjugation which can be read between the lines of the stanza.

One can see that the stanza and its commentaries transpose metaphysical ignorance to the aesthetic register: thus the TĀV conceives of ajñāna as ahrdayatā, which implies an imperfect education (duḥṣikṣita), as opposed to the perfect education that characterizes undivided consciousness can be an Agent, for, being capable of taking on different forms, it can exercise the power of action.”

On the main characteristic of the Lord, i.e. that his essential nature cannot be altered whatever form he takes on, see in particular PSV 1 quoting Spandaśārika (henceforth SpK) I 3 (see Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011, pp. 66-67, and n. 253); also PS 34 (and PSV ad loc.) and PS 36. This is also the case with ordinary, empirical, actors who never forget that they themselves are not the characters or at least not fundamentally so. This they never – or should never – ignore, since they would otherwise risk being possessed by the deity whose role they are playing or start doing for real what should remain fiction, for example killing a fellow actor who happens to be playing the part of an enemy (see the anecdotes in Tarabout 1998, pp. 296ff.). See also IPV II 4 19 (quoted above, n. 29) which asserts that, although capable of being many, the Lord (or consciousness, cit) remains one and unaffected by the multiplicity he himself creates. It is in this context that the passage of the IPVV (vol. III, p. 244) quoted above, p. 43, uses the metaphor of the error as sūtradhāra.

See Hulin 1978, p. 308, n. 5, who translates by “énergie de cèlement.” The tiroḍhānaśakti is one of the pañcakṛtya, Śiva’s five cosmic functions (see Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011, p. 100, n. 413).

See PSV 5 commenting on “Śiva himself, who takes on the condition of a fettered soul”: “Thus, that Lord who has been described above as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and whose nature is freedom (svātāntra), Śiva himself, whose essence is now the veiling of his own true nature (svātāntrya), takes on the role (bhūmikā) of a cognizer endowed with a body, according to his own will, as though he were an actor (nātā) and, since he is [henceforth] to be maintained and treated as a domestic animal [that is, as a tethered beast], he is now distinguished by his existence as a fettered subject (paśu)”; on svātāntraśakti, see also also PS 15 (on māyāśakti) and PSV ad loc.: Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011, pp. 126-129, and n. 529.
the sahṛdaya, in aesthetics. The height of ignorance and bewilderment (moha) is to think of oneself as sensible and sensitive, as well as perfectly educated.

On the one hand, therefore, we have that deceived spectator; on the other, the sovereign actor. But who is this actor who is the object of comparison for the bhāyavrāta? “He” is, in fact, an actress, even if in veiled terms. Abhinavagupta himself gives this interpretative key in his IPv ad ĪPK I 1, 4: the actor par excellence, that is, the agent of phenomenal manifestation, is the māyāśakti, herself an hypostasis of Śiva’s Śakti, therefore indissociable from him:

... teṣāṃ “jaḍabhūtānāṁ” cinnayatve ’pi māyākhayā ēśvaraśaktāyā já-dyam prāpitānāṁ jīvantam pramālāram āśṛitya pratiṣṭhāḥ...

[...] Although made of consciousness, the “insentient entities” are made insentient by the work of the Lord’s Śakti named māyā. Their foundation depends on the living being, that is, on the cognizing subject [...].

It is that māyāśakti (who “measures” out the empirical world) that the Śaiva doctrine presents, with the organization of the thirty-six tattvas, as governing the phenomenal manifestation, called meya – a derivative of the same root mā, “to measure,” “to construct.”

In this respect, and in this respect only, māyā is comparable to the prakṛti of the Śāmkhya, who shows herself on the stage of the world by assuming, one after the other, those roles that are her “evolutes” or “products,” the remaining twenty-three tattvas – the difference consisting in that prakṛti is unconscious, whereas māyā,

33 See Abhinavagupta’s famous definition of the sahṛdaya in Locana ad Dhvanyāloka, vṛttī ad I 1 (CSS ed., pp. 38-39; Ingalls et al. 1990, p. 70): yeṣāṁ kā-vyānuśīlaniḥḥyāvāsavaśād visadibhūte manomukāre varnanīyatamayābhāvāna-yogatā te sahṛdayasamvādabhūjāḥ sahṛdayāḥ; for the use of sahṛdayatā in both aesthetic and spiritual registers, see Bansat-Boudon 2012a, pp. 225-233.

34 See the text of the stanza, ĪPK I 1, 4, in Appendix-3.

35 See, for instance, Abhinavagupta’s maṇigala to his Locana on Ānandavardhana’s avatāranikā to III 1 (CSS ed., p. 288; Ingalls et al. 1990, p. 369): smar-rāmi smarasaṃhārālaḥpāṭasaśālinaḥ | prasahya śambhor dehārdhaḥ haranāṁ paramēśvarāṁ ||. “I remember the Supreme Goddess who stole half of Śambhu’s body after he had shown his effortless skill in playing at annihilating Smara himself.”

36 See SK 59 and above, p. 40; also Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011, pp. 52-53.
Śiva’s hypostasis\(^37\) (in other words, the hypostasis of Consciousness), is conscious throughout.

This is the reason why the stanza is a hymn to the deity which sets in motion the bhāvavrāta. Besides, in this non-dualism, it makes little difference whether it is an actor (Śiva) or an actress (māyā).\(^38\)

It is worth noting that the passage of the IPV I 1, 4 that offers that interpretative key to TĀ I 332 is precisely the one a propos of which Bhāskara, commenting on it, in his turn, several centuries later, finds it appropriate to cite the same stanza, although with a tiny variant (see Appendix-4). Thus the philosophical point of the stanza, in the TĀ, at least, is strengthened by the usage Bhāskara makes of it.

Let us come back to the long-drawn-out metaphor. When it is said of this actor, or this actress, that he/she hides his/her Self, one cannot help seeing here a reference to the notion of sākṣātśārakalpapratīti (or pratyakṣakalpapratīti) a “quasi direct perception,”\(^39\) essential to the success of the aesthetic process meant to culminate in rasa.

In effect, sākṣātśārakalpapratīti is a way to condense in one term the complex process that manifests on the stage a person (or a fancy) who, being neither entirely the actor nor entirely the character, allows the spectator to see everything with impunity, in a distanciated rapture. As such, the “quasi direct perception” governs the next step of the aesthetical process when considered from the point of view of the audience, namely sādhāranīkaraṇa or “generalization.” Sādhāranīkaraṇa, the depersonalization of emotions free of any reference to a specific ego (and thus their universalization), enables the audience to enjoy a controlled and purified identification (tanmayībhāva), the source of delight and bliss.\(^40\)

As for the influence cast over the hearts of men, it is a way of alluding to rasa, the irresistible aesthetic rapture which, when transposed onto the ontological level, merges with the beatific experience

\(^37\) See PS 15 in BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 126-129, where māyā is described as devī māyāśaktiḥ; also BANSAT-BOUDON 2008, pp. 60-62.

\(^38\) See TĀV VIII 333: devītī devabhinnatvāt.

\(^39\) The notion is found at several places in the Abhinavabhāratī ad Nātyasāstra; see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 150-152; 2012, pp. 224-225.

of “repose in the Self” (ātmaviśrānti) preliminary to the experience of “liberation in this life” (jīvanmukti). I have shown several times how the aesthetic experience works as a propaedeutics to the spiritual. I shall thus not linger on this question, but we will return to it a propos the Locana (see below, pp. 50-55).

To conclude this part: phenomenal diversity in the form of the māyāśakti plays before the spectator, and plays with him as well, if he happens not to be a sahrdaya, making him wrongly believe in the dichotomy subject/object.

2. THE LOCANA AD DHVANYĀLOKAVRATI I 13

Let us come to the Locana. The broader context is that of the exposition of dhvani; the narrower context, that of the definition of the aprastutapraśāmsā, more precisely, of the third category of aprastutapraśāmsā, based on the similarity of the expressed (which is, in this case, aprastuta – what is non-pertinent to the speaker and the listener) and the suggested (which is prastuta – what is pertinent to them), in order to establish where and when the figure works as such or as a case of dhvani.

What Ānandavardhana wants to show is that he has discovered something new, not a new name for categories already recognized, and so he goes through a number of such well-known categories – alamkāras that involve an element of suggestion (including the aprastutapraśāmsā) – and shows that they are not at all identical with his new concept of dhvani. He is thus led to defend his new theory, namely that the ālamkārika register is delimited by the predominance of the literal meaning, whereas that of the dhvani is defined by the predominance of the suggested meaning. Therefore, taking the aprastutapraśāmsā as an example, he concludes (CSS ed., pp. 126-129; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 159):

41 On the notion of ātmaviśrānti, see below, p. 72 and n. 100; also BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 56, 71, 321.
... yadā tu sārūpyamātravaṇaṇaprastutapraṣaṃsāyām aprakṛtpapraṇāyoḥ sambandhas tadāpy aprastutasya sarūpyabhidhiyamāṇasya prāḍhānyenā-
vivakṣāyām dhvanāv evāntarbhāvāḥ | itarathā tv aṣṭaṃkārāṃtaraṃtvam eva |
tad aṣṭaṃ atra sanskepāḥ –
vyānīgasya yatrāprāḍhānayam vācyamārṇuṇyāvināḥ |
samāsoktyādayas tatra vācyālankṛtayāḥ sphujāḥ ||
vyānīgasya pratibhāmātre vācārhānugame ’pi vā |
na dhvanir yatra vā tasya prāḍhānayam na pratiyate ||
tatpāry eva sabdārthau yatra vyānīgam prati sthitau |
dhvāneḥ sa eva viśayo mantavyaḥ saṅkarojḥiḥāḥ ||

[...]. But when, in an aprastutapraṣaṃsā, the relation of extraneous and
germaine is based only on similarity, then, if the extraneous expressed idea
(apraṣṭuta) bearing similarity is not intended to be predominant, the case
falls in the area of dhvani. Otherwise,⁴⁵ it will just be one of the figures.⁴⁶
Here then is the summary of the matter:
“Wherever the suggested meaning (vyāṅgṛya) does not predominate, but is
merely ancillary to the literal sense (vācyya), it is clear that such instances
are only figures of the literal sense, such as samāsokta and others,”
“In places where there is just a glimmer of the suggested or where the
suggested is just subservient to the expressed, or where its preeminence
is not clearly discernible, there is no dhvani,”
“Only those instances wherein word and meaning are solely directed to-
wards the suggested should be regarded as the area of dhvani – which
admits no admixture of [any figure of speech].”⁴⁷

In his Locana,⁴⁸ Abhinavagupta goes further (CSS ed., pp. 127-128; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 162-163). For some reason, he considers
that the capacity to arouse wonder (camatkārakāritva) in the listener
is the criterion for determining which of the explicit or suggested
meanings prevails. Moreover, he seems to link or even subordinate
the ability to create a sense of wonder in the listener with the plau-
sibility of the meaning, be it literal or suggested.

⁴⁵ I.e., if it is the aprastuta that is intended to be predominant.
⁴⁶ Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 159 (slightly modified).
⁴⁷ My translation; see Locana ad loc., where anupraveśa comments on saṅkara: saṅkarenālaṅkārāṃapraṇeṣavasambhōvanāyā ujjhita ity arthāh. Ānandavardhana
and his exegete will take up the question again, in Dhvanyālokaṛṣṭī ad III 40
and Locana thereon; see below, § 3.
⁴⁸ Locana ad the vr̥tī (CSS ed., pp. 126ff.): yadā tu sārūpyamātravaṇaṇaprastuta-
prāṣaṃsāyām...
Giving the example of a stanza whose protagonist is a vetāla, Abhinavagupta argues that the believability of the literal meaning – which seems to be the source of the listener’s sense of wonder – is a factor in the decision to consider it predominant.\(^\text{49}\) That first segment of the passage (see complete text in Appendix-2) reads as follows:

\[\text{atra yady api sārūpyavaśena kṛtaṁ kaścid anyah prastuta ākṣipyate,\newline\text{tathāpy aprastutasyaiva vetālavṛttaṁ| na hy\newline\text{acetanopāambhavad asambhāvyamāṇo ‘yam artho na ca na hṛdaya iti vā\newline\text{cyasyātra pradhānatā|...}}\]

Here, although some other ingrate is suggested as the pertinent subject (prastuta), by the power of similarity, the capacity of causing wonder \(^{50}\) lies in the story of the vetāla, which is extraneous. The sense is not impossible as would be a reproach against an insentient being, and it is not without attraction. So the predominance here lies in the literal sense.\(^{51}\)

However, says the second segment of the Locana, if the literal meaning is entirely implausible, that goes hand in hand with a suggested meaning that is the source of the verse’s main charm – which would then make it a vastudhvani, namely the “suggestion of some narrative item or ‘content.’” This is where (CSS ed., p. 127; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 162) Abhinavagupta makes a self-citation of his own stanza (“bhāvavrāta haṭṭha...,” already present in TĀ I 332):

\[\text{... yadi punar acetanādinātyantāsambhāvyamāṇatadarthaviśeṣayanāprapra-\newline\text{stitena varṇitena prastutam ākṣipyamāṇam camatkārakāri iḍā vāstu-\newline\text{dhvanir asau | yathā mamaīva – “bhāvavrāta haṭṭha...” |}}\]

But if the pertinent subject [of the utterance] (prastuta) [i.e., the speaker’s intention which he wants to convey to the listener, therefore, the suggested meaning he has in his mind] is a source of wonder (camatkārakārinī), [although] suggested (ākṣipyamāṇa) by means of [another] that is non-pertinent (or irrelevant) (aprastuta) to the speaker and the listener – insofar as that [other irrelevant subject] is insentient, etc., or described in such a way that its particularities are entirely unimaginable (atyantāsambhāvyamāṇa) for such a result [namely, suggesting the real meaning] – then, we have a

\(^{49}\) The point is further discussed below, Dhvanyālokavṛtti III 40; see below, p. 67, and n. 91.

\(^{50}\) Underlined passages are my emphasis.

\(^{51}\) Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 162 (slightly modified).
case of vastudhvani, as in this verse of my own: “O whole of things, forcibly...”

Let us examine these two stanzas, which Abhinavagupta gives as examples of the category of aprastutapraśāmsā based on similarity.

1. The first one, which shows a vetāla killing his benefactor, ironically celebrates the former as the Prince of gratitude. That is the expressed/explicit meaning. The suggested meaning aims at some other ingrate, of whom we know nothing in the absence of context, or at any other ingrate. Nevertheless, it is the expressed meaning, the colourful story of the vetāla, which is a cause of wonder (camatkārakārin), while it is all the more credible (hence convincing) as vetālas’ stories are a recurrent motive in narrative literature.

Thus, as one may infer from the next passage of the Locana, one can recognize here an instance of aprastutapraśāmsā, since ingratitude is common to the explicit and implicit subjects of the utterance, but it is an aprastutapraśāmsā pertaining to the ālāmkārika register, since there is something striking and convincing in the description of the non-pertinent vetāla, which makes that literal meaning predominant (vācyasyātra pradhānatā).

2. The second stanza given as an example, which Abhinavagupta says that he composed himself, without giving its source, is the stanza under examination: “bhāvavrāta hathāj...” Abhinavagupta explains that, the expressed meaning being completely impossible, i.e., implausible (how to address the mass of the objects and to consider them as sentient?), the suggested meaning prevails over it, thus creating wonder and establishing the stanza as a case of vastudhvani.

52 My translation. See below, p. 57, for an extended translation of the same passage, which applies to the verse itself (“bhāvavrāta,” etc.) and shows its implications once the suggested meaning has been identified.

53 Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta will take up the question again in III 40; see below, § 3.

54 The verse, which addresses the vetāla (a sārdālavikṛdita, with two irregularities: the 8th syllable is long; there is one syllable too many, at the beginning of the second pāda; it should read “kandhe” instead of “svakandhe”), reads as follows: prāṇā yena samarpitās tatra balād yena tvaṁ utthāpiṭaḥ svakandhe yasya ciraṃ shtiḥ ‘si vididhe yas te saparyām api | tasyāsya smitamātrakena janayan prāṇāpahārikriyāṃ bhrātaḥ pratypakārānāṃ dhūri paraṁ vetāla līlāyase ||.

55 See the passage of the Locana quoted immediately above, which emphasizes that the “particularities” ascribed to the aprastuta (the bhāvavrāta) are “entirely unimaginable” (atyantāsambhāvyamāna).
Otherwise, it would indeed be a case of aprastutapraśamsā based on similarity, but this aprastutapraśamsā would pertain to the rhetorical register alone (as in the stanza of the vēṭālā).

This is what Ānandavardhana teaches (CSS ed., pp. 128-129, quoted above, p. 49). It is, as well, what Abhinavagupta develops (CSS ed., p. 128; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 163):

“ītārāthaḥ tv iti” | itarathaiśv anyalankārāntaravam alankāraviśeṣa-
tvam na vyaṅgayasya kathāṃ cid api prādhānīyaḥ iti bhāvah |

“But, otherwise...” – Otherwise, it will just be another figure of speech, that is, the particular figure of speech [named aprastutaprasamsa]; but this is not the case when the suggested meaning is prevalent in any way whatsoever. Such is the deeper meaning.56

Now, what is this suggested meaning? Abhinavagupta reveals it first, immediately after quoting his stanza: under the description of the bhāvavrāṭa, one should read the detailed and very lively evocation of a mahāpuruṣa, a “great being” – a “great being” who puzzles Ingalls (see, below, p. 63), and in whom I propose to recognize the figure of the jīvanmukta, who is “liberated while living.” In effect, all the epithets qualifying that mahāpuruṣa might apply to the jīvan-
mukta.

Here comes the third part of the passage, which deals with the figure of the jīvanmukta, i.e., the unfolding of the suggested meaning:

... kaścin mahāpuruṣo viñārāgo ’pi sarāgavad iti nyāyena gādhaivekālo-
kāturaskrtimāraṇaḥ ’pi lokamādye svātmānam praccchādayāṃ lok-
am ca vācālayam ātmān apratibhāsam evāṅgikarvaṃs tenaiva lokena mārkha ’yam iti yad avajñāyate tadā tadiyam lokottaram caritaṃ prastu-
tam vyāpanyayā prādhānīyena prakāśyate...

I summarize the passage, which is given entirely in the Appendix. The statement that first gives the key to such correspondences is that the mahāpuruṣa, “although living in this world” (lokamādyeye; precisely what makes the jīvanmukta a living oxymoron), has dispelled the darkness of metaphysical ignorance (gādhaivekālokatiraskrti-
ūrīmāraṇaḥ ’pi). He nonetheless hides his Self (svātmānam praccchā-
dayān), in conformity with the modes of life of a renunciate: although dispassionnate (viñārāgo ’pi), he behaves as if still in the grip

56 My translation. Note that the topic will be taken up again by Ānandavardhana and his exegete in III 40, and further clarified (see below, § 3).
of ordinary passions (sarāgavad); by so doing he is the object of innumerable comments and gossips (lokam ca vācālayan), which he accepts without trying to deny them (ātmany apratibhāsam evānig-kurvan). This is why people regard him as a fool or madman (mūrkha) and despise him (avaiñāyate) for it. Such is, Abhinavagupta concludes, the extraordinary, supra-mundane conduct (lokottaram caritam) of so extraordinary (kaścit) a man.

This is a remarkable text, probably one of the most complete descriptions of the jīvanmukta, whose main feature is that he is lokottara. In which way? Although living in this phenomenal world, he sees through it and accedes to ultimate reality, as taught by Bhagavadgītā (henceforth BhG) II 71 (according to the numbering of the Kashmirian version; see Lakshman Joo’s edition), which Ānandavardhana quotes as an example for Dhvanyālokavṛtti ad III 1 (see below, p. 56):

\[
\text{yā niśā sarvabhūtānām tasyām jāgarit samvami} \\
\text{yasyām jāgrati bhūtānī sā rātrīḥ paśyato muneḥ} \\
\]

That which is night (night) for all beings, in that the self-controlled ascetic is awake. That in which all beings are awake is night for the sage who sees. In this way, “supramundanity” is associated with supralucidity, with the result that the jīvanmukta remains indifferent to the ordinary world, its affects, prescriptions and prohibitions. We observe many ways of referring to the jīvanmukta’s alaukika or lokottara character, besides the use of the term itself, among which are the recourse to paradox, as in the verse of the BhG just quoted, and such exclamations as “iti citram,” “how wonderful!”, by which the Gīrthasamgraha comments on it – another way of expressing that everpresent camatkāra, “wonder,” “wonderment,” which is also a criterion, as we have seen, for determining which of the explicit or

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57 On this connotation of kaścit, see notably D. Shulman’s paper in this volume.
58 “Night” is a metaphor for māyā, as explained by the Gīrthasamgraha. See the entire passage ad loc.
59 See also Locana on Dhvanyālokavṛtti ad III 1 (quoted below, p. 56), commenting on BhG II 71.
60 Gīrthasamgraha ad BhG II 71: ... paśyata eva sā rātrir iti citram | vidyāyām cāvadhatte yogī yatra sarvo vimūḍhāḥ | avidyāyām tv abuddhāḥ yatra janaḥ prabuddhāḥ – ity api citram.
suggested meanings prevails, hence, whether the verse belongs to the dhvani register or to that of the alaṃkāras.61

All similar features specific to the jīvanmukta are variously emphasized in the texts, especially in Śaiva texts.

The way the jīvanmukta makes others talk about him (lokam ca vācālayan), without trying to explain himself — so much so that he is, for ordinary men, an object of scandal and contempt — is described in Gitārthasamgraha ad BHG XIV 26:

yas tu phalam kimcid apy anabhilasyan kim etad alikam anutiṣṭhasi iti paryanuvajyamāno ‘pi nirantarabhagavadbhaktivedhavidrūtaṁkāraṇata-yā kaṇṭakitaromavān vepamānatanar visphārtanayanayaugalaparivarta-mānasalilasampātaḥ tāśnimbhavenaivottaram prayacchati

Harassed by his circle, who cannot bear not to understand him: “Why such an untrue behaviour?” (which is in some way an echo of “hiding his Self” – svātmānam praccchādayan — of the Locana), the yogin answers through silence to the crowd of the paśus, immersed as he is in the mystical experience of bhakti, whose symptoms are thrilling with joy, quivering and an uninterrupted flow of tears from his wide open eyes.

This is of course more than what the common man can understand and tolerate. Therefore the jīvanmukta is harassed, mocked and despised for being stupid (mūrkha), insensible or insentient (jaḍa), or even insane (unmatta).62

Similarly, kārikā 71 (an āryā) in the PS, also a work of Abhinavagupta, asserts:

madadahṣakopamammantaviṣadabhayalobhamohaparivarajī|
nihstotrasaḍāko jada iva vicared avādamatiḥ ||

Living without self-deception, excitement, anger, infatuation, dejection, fear, greed, or delusion; uttering neither praises [of the gods] nor ritual formulae and having no opinions whatever, he should behave as one insensible (jada).

This vision of the jīvanmukta is the same as in the Locana and the Gitārthasamgraha. It is worth noting that the “jāḍa” of the stanza is glossed by Yogarāja as “unmatta” — “insane” in the eyes of the world

61 On camakāra, see Bansat-Bouden and Tripathi 2011, p. 320.
62 See below.
– which implies that “having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is brahman, he should disport himself for purposes of play.”

Such a description of the jīvanmukta, although marked as Śaiva, is nonetheless shared by other schools, as the Vedāntic Āgamaśāstra (II 36b-37) clearly shows.

In the same vein, the Bālapriyā subcommentary of the Locana cites a stanza, probably a proverb, which describes the way the world (or the common man) and the jīvanmukta (here the “one who knows the reality” – jñātatattva) consider each other as a piśāca, conventionally perceived as insentient (jaḍa) and insane (unmatta):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{jiḥatattvasya loko 'yam jadonmattapiśācavat |} \\
\text{jiḥatattvō 'pi lokasya jadonmattapiśācavat ||}
\end{align*}
\]

For the one who knows the reality, this world is like an insentient and insane piśāca, but, for this world, it is the one who knows the reality who is like an insentient and insane piśāca.

Commenting on PS 71: jaḍa iva vicared avādamaṁthi, “He should just behave as one insensible, having no opinions whatever,” Yogarāja observes: pūrnavād ākāṅkṣāvīrdhāh cōmmattā ivaet kāryavartaya-tāraṇgā śāstra-ye kārmanā pramāṇopapanne va prameyasatartvāt pramāṇārbhiḥ saheded upapannam idam neti viva-bhavā-hiṣṭhānadbuddhiḥ..., iti dāntaprayo bhūtvā sarvām brahmānvalokayanā kṣārthām vihare etevi jādrava nirāpiṣaḥ |. “Since he is himself replete, due to the absence of all expectations, he is like one at a loss (unmatta); his mind has banished considerations having to do with actions taught in the injunctive treatises, such as those that specify the manner of accomplishing [rituals, etc.] or [those that involve] the existence of something to be apprehended in conformity with some mode of correct apprehension (pramāṇa) and requiring an accompanying apprehender (pramāṇā), such as ‘this [conclusion] is proven, this [one] is not’ [...]. Thus, having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is brahman, he should disport himself for purposes of play. For this reason, he has been described here as insensible (or insane).” On the ascetic seen as unmatta in Tantric texts, see J. Törzsök’s contribution to this volume.

Āgamaśāstra II 36cd-37: ... advaitam samanuprāpya jādavāṁ lokam ācaret | niśtatir nirāvatārāṁ niḥsvarā ṛkāva eva ca | ca lācālaśaṁketas ca yatir yādṛcchikā bhaveti ||. “Having realized nonduality, one should behave as a fool among people. Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing svadāḥ [i.e., not offering libations to the Manes/Ancestors], with an unfixed home, and acting spontaneously [without willing anything] (yādṛcchika), one should become an ascetic.” (Transl. BHATTACHARYA 1989, modified as to the meaning of yādṛcchika.)

Same quote in Jñānaśīrśīmitranibandhāvali, pariccheda 3, p. 419.
Nevertheless, that so-called insentience and stupidity of the jīvantā, as he appears in the eyes of the uncomprehending common man, is but the corollary of the “supramundanity” (lokottaratva/alaukikatva) that is the very mark of the accomplished yogin, the jīvantā. This runs like a red thread in Abhinavagupta’s works. In his Gītārthasamgraha, he interprets BhG II 66-70 (according to the numbering of the Kashmirian version) as referring to the sthita-prajñā, himself portrayed as the jīvantā, as made obvious by the quotation (from an unidentified source): “yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvān ’pi lokottarah” – “Extraordinary is the yogin, even when he attends to worldly transactions” –, which qualifies such a yogin as lokottara, as is the case in the passage of the Locana we are dealing with.66

That “supramundanity” (lokottaratva/alaukikatva) appears again in the Locana commenting on Gītārthasamgraha ad BhG II 66-70: [rāgadveṣyādi pratisthitety antam] yas tu manaso nīyānakah sa visayān sevāmāno ’pi na krodhādikalolair abhīhīyate iti sa eva shtāpajñā yoṣītī tātparyam | “yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvān ’pi lokottarāḥ” – iti nirāpayata paramesvarena sam śūpyasya svārāpan kathyate. “He who controls his mind is not thrown about by the waves of wrath, etc., even when he perceives the sense-objects; hence he alone is a yogin, a man-of-stabilized-intellect; such is the intended meaning. As has been said: ‘Extraordinary is the yogin, even when he attends to worldly transactions.’”

See also, in this volume, D. Shulman’s paper, examining Dhvanyāloka III 40 and III 43.

66 Gītārthasamgraha ad BhG II 66-70: [rāgadveṣyādi pratisthitety antam] yas tu manaso nīyānakah sa visayān sevāmāno ’pi na krodhādikalolair abhīhīyate iti sa eva shtāpajñā yoṣītī tātparyam | “yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvān ’pi lokottarāḥ” – iti nirāpayata paramesvarena sam śūpyasya svārāpan kathyate.

67 For in this sentence the meanings “night” and “waking” are not at all intended. What then? What is communicated is rather the attention of the sage to the knowledge of ultimate reality and his disregard for what is not
that reality. Thus the subjective force is of [the sub-type where] the literal meaning is entirely set aside.\(^{68}\)

Here is another opportunity for Abhinavagupta to comment again on BHG II 71, this time in the context of the dhvani exposition, and to focus on the same lokottaratā to which he refers in his Gitārtha-saṃgraha on this verse. His Locana on Dhvanyālokavṛtti ad III 1 thus reads (CSS ed., p. 294; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376):

\[
\text{tasmād bādhitasvārtham etad vākyam samyamino lokottaratālaksanena nimittena tattvadrṣṭāv avadhānām mithyādṛṣṭau ca parāṃnukhatvam dhvanati}
\]

Therefore this sentence, its primary meaning being obstructed,\(^{69}\) suggests that the self-controlled ascetic, because of his extraordinary nature, is attentive to the perception [lit. “vision”] of ultimate reality and disregards false perception.\(^{70}\)

Let us come back to Locana ad I 13, which cites our stanza: “bhāvavrāta, etc.” It is that extraordinary conduct of the yogin which is a source of wonder (see also the use of kaścit qualifying mahāpuruṣa), and it is why the suggested meaning (the jīvanmukta) prevails over the expressed one (the bhāvavrāta), thus making the aprastupraśaṃsā a case of dhvani. Such is the meaning of Abhinavagupta’s avataraṇikā to his exegesis of his own stanza (“bhāvavrāta, etc.”), as we have seen.\(^{71}\)

Although the passage has already been quoted (above, p. 50), I come back to its interpretation, whose implications may be further developed now that the suggested meaning has been identified:

But if the true subject [of the utterance] (prastuta) [i.e., the speaker’s intention which he wants to convey to the listener, therefore, the suggested meaning he has in his mind, namely, the evocation of the jīvanmukta] is a source of wonder, [although] suggested (ākṣipyamāṇa) by means of [another subject] that is non-pertinent or irrelevant (aprastuta) [to the speaker

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\(^{68}\) Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376 (slightly modified). A similar eviction of the literal meaning, in order to establish a suggestion based on metaphoric usage, is found in Meghadūta 31, quoted by the vṛtti ad III 43, in which the word maitrī, “friendship,” applied to the breeze, must be taken metaphorically, since no breeze is ever literally “friendly” (see, in the volume, D. Shulman’s analysis of the verse).

\(^{69}\) Since “night” and “waking” must not be taken literally here.

\(^{70}\) Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 376 (slightly modified).

\(^{71}\) Note a variant, pāda c: sa tvām āha jadām tatāh...
and the listener, namely, the bhāvavrāta] – that other subject being insentient, etc., or described in such a way that its particularities are entirely unimaginable for such a result [namely, suggesting the real meaning and thus arousing a sense of wonder, as does the prastuta, i.e., the portrayal of the jīvanmukta] – then, we have a case of vastudhvani.

Now that the mahāpuruṣa is identified as a jīvanmukta, let us come to the functioning of the figure, based on the similarity of the “suggested” meaning, pertinent or relevant (prastuta) to the speaker and listener, and the “suggesting” (or “expressed”) meaning that is not pertinent to them (aprastuta), and to the examination of the expressed meaning, which consists in the description of the bhāvavrāta.

The next segment of the Locana reads as follows:

... jado 'yam iti hy udyānendādayādir bhāvo lokenāvajñāyate, sa ca prastuta kasyacid virahīna autsukyacintādāyamānāmānasaḥ tām anyasya pharasapaśvāsaḥ tām karotīti haṭhād eva lokam yathecchaḥ vikāraķaraṇābhir nartayati | ...

In Jayaratha’s TĀV (and in Abhinavagupta’s ĪPV ad I 1, 4, as we have seen, p. 46), the bhāvas of the bhāvavrāta denote the objects of experience (apparently external and internal) that are “blue” (and “pleasure,” according to the pan-Indian definition).72 Hence, the so-called materiality of the empirical world is at stake – which is the point of departure for Jayaratha’s demonstration of what is, in Śaiva doctrine, the ultimate reality: the non-duality of the subject and the object.

For its part (see the Sanskrit text quoted immediately above), the Locana limits the notion of bhāva(s) to the class of entities, apparently insentient, which are called vibhāvas, “determinants” or “stimulants” in aesthetic theory. The examples given by Abhinavagupta, the garden (udyāna) or moonrise (indādaya), belong to the subcategory named uddīpanavibhāvas, “inflaming causes.” The uddīpanavibhāvas arouse such and such vyabhicāribhāvas, “transitory

72 See (Appendix-1) TĀV I 332: he bhāvavrāta nīlādyartha[h]. “Blue” [or “yellow” (pīta), etc.] is the standard example of the external form grasped by the sense-organs, whereas sukhā, “pleasure,” is that of the internal, grasped by the antalākarana. Therefore, the syntagm nīlāsuṣkhaḍi represents the “knowable” (vedya), or “objectivity” insofar as it is an object of consciousness, whether external or internal. Such reasonings are common to Buddhist idealists and to the Trika, even though the latter (see SpK I 4) reaches the opposite conclusion: the existence of a permanent Subject, a substratum for the impermanent, incidental experiences of pleasure and pain, etc.
affects.” In other words, as taught in the *rasasūtra* (*Nātyaśāstra* VI), a given combination of *vibhāvas* (or “determinants”), *anubhāvas* (or “consequents”) and *vyabhicāribhāvas* (“transitory affects”), constitutive of a given *sthāyibhāva*, “permanent affect” (although the *sthāyibhāva* is not mentioned in the *rasasūtra*), culminates in the advent of a given *rasa*.  

For this very reason, not all *vibhāvas* are a source of delight, as Abhinavagupta underlines it (here and at other places), since the same garden and the same moonrise are capable of arousing two opposite emotions, nostalgia or exultation, according to the condition of the lover who contemplates them, that is, according to the emotional status of the *ālambanavibhāva*, the “substantial cause” that is the hero himself — whether he is separated from (viraḥin) his

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73 *Nātyaśāstra* VI, *rasasūtra*, vol. I, p. 271ff.: *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyoga-gād rasanispatitāḥ, “rasa is the result of the combination of ‘determinants,’ ‘consequents’ and ‘transitory affects.’“

74 On all these categories and the way they contribute to the whole of the aesthetic process, see BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, pp. 109-117; 1992a, pp. 141-145. On *ālambanavibhāvas* and *uddīpanavibhāvas*, see below, n. 75; also BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 113, 1992a, pp. 141-142; and, in this volume, D. Shulman’s paper.

75 Abhinavabhāratī ad *Nātyaśāstra* VI, *rasasūtra*, vol. I, p. 282 (including the corrections made by GNOLI 1968, p. 20): *tatrāṇabhāvānāṃ vibhāvānāṃ vyabhicārīnaṃ ca prathak sthāyini niyamo nāsti | bāspaṇḍer ānandāvagādājvatadārśānāt | vyādhrādeṣa ca krodhabhayādhetvāt śrāmacintātād utsāhabhayādyan-ekasahacaratvāvalokanāt | sāmāyī tu na vyabhicārīni | tathā hi bandhuvināśo yatā vibhāvah paridevitārpaṇād tv anubhāvas cintādāyādī ca vyabhicārī so vaṣayā śoka eveti. “The anubhāvas, vibhāvas, vyabhicārins, taken separately, are not restricted to a particular sthāyin, as one sees, for instance, tears caused by happiness or an eye disease; since, for instance, a tiger may create anger or fear; since one notices that fatigue and restlessness can accompany more than one sthāyin, such as arduous or fear. However, any given combination [of these three factors] is necessarily associated to one specific sthāyin [lit. “does not deviate from the sthāyin.”] Thus, when the death of a relative is the “determinant,” when lamentations and tears are the “consequents,” when anxiety and despondency are the “transitory affects,” it is necessarily the [sthāyin that is] sorrow which is at stake.” Such psychological considerations are so widespread as to be almost conventions, or *topoi*, as shown, for instance, by Gaudapāda’s commentary ad SK 12: a beautiful and virtuous woman (here an *ālambanavibhāva*) is a source of joy to all, but a source of sorrow to her co-wives and of stupefaction to passionate beings; a dharmic king (also an *ālambanavibhāva*) inspires happiness in the good and unhappiness in the wicked; clouds (an *uddīpanavibhāva*), although inanimate, generate joy in the world, when they bring rain and thus urge the ploughman to plough, but they produce stupefaction in separated lovers (… meghāḥ… jagataḥ sukham utpādayanti te vṛṣṭvā karṣakānāṃ karṣanodyogam janayanti viraḥiṇām moham).
beloved or not (CSS ed., p. 128: ... *sa ca pratyuta kasyacid virahina autsu{k{yacin{t{d}iyam{an}am{an}asat{m} anyasya prahar{sa}{parava}{sa}{sat{m} karotit}i...).*\(^76\)

This is how the essential features of Indian aesthetic and dramatic theory come through in the exegesis Abhinavagupta proposes for the expressed meaning of his own stanza.

The *Locana* thus presents the same scheme of interpretation as does the TĀV, namely, the exploitation of the dramatic analogy, but at the cost of a slight shift from the evocation of Śakti, the divine actress, to that of the vibhāvas and their “powers.”

It is nonetheless possible to recognize the figure of the deity as an actor/actress, in a more subtle way, under the web of meanings that implies, in a Śaiva context, the metaphoric notion of *hrdaya*, the Heart – in other words the supreme and unique principle of phenomenal manifestation. I shall come back to this.

For this is not all. Such an aesthetic interpretation of the bhāva-vṛata is subordinated to a superior ambition, of a philosophical order.

As is the case in the TĀV, the *Locana* wants to show that it is wrong to ascribe the status of an insentient, therefore stupid, entity to phenomenal diversity. This is demonstrated by the fact that those bhāvas, understood as apparently insentient vibhāvas (here *uddīpa-navibhāvas*), have a complete and irresistible (*hathāt*) hold over the ordinary man. Thus the dramatic metaphor is again entirely applicable here. These all-powerful vibhāvas cause men (the hearts of men) to play as they wish, as does an actor (*hathād eva lokam yas-thechchaṃ vikārakāraṇābhīr nartayati*). They are the source of men’s emotions. They move them. One thinks of Zola’s statement in *La faute de l’Abbé Mouret*: “Ils cédèrent aux exigences du jardin” – “They gave in to the demands of the garden.” There is nothing more sentient, more sensible and more intelligent than these vibhāvas.

Here, Abhinavagupta introduces an amazing development, in the form of a digression, about the “heart” (*hrdaya*) of the bhāvas, which, in his first comment of the text, he had described as the “wordly objects” of the bhāva-vṛata, the “totality” of them; here however bhāva is understood in the limited sense of the vibhāvas of the *uddīpana* category, i.e. gardens, moonrises and so on.

\(^76\) Compare Ingalls’ analysis, below, p. 64.
The ordinary man does not know anything about their hearts, since he is still unaware that they have one, whereas he allows himself a heart, convinced that he is a sahrdaya, “endowed with a heart.” However, the Śaiva thinker and mystic knows well that the object also is “endowed with a heart.”

The passage in which Abhinavagupta describes that heart, which he has the privilege to know, is of great beauty, perhaps also by virtue of its paradoxical character. That heart is “most deep” (mahāgambhīra), “very intelligent” (atividagdha), “entirely devoid of conceit” (suṣṭhugarvahīna) – the conceit, abhimāna, that characterizes the common man who claims to be a sahrdaya – and “skillful at play” (kritācaturā). In the final analysis, it means that the object is not different from consciousness, hence, not different from Śiva, himself “most deep,” etc., and “skillful at play,” just like an actor. We have come full circle.

Let us observe also that Abhinavagupta undoubtedly understands the present participle nartayan as a fullfledged causative that governs janasya hṛdayāni in the stanza— he comments on “ḥaṭṭaj janasya hṛdayāni nartayan” of his verse as: “ḥaṭṭād eva lokāṃ yathecchāṃ vikārākāraṇābhir nartayati.”

The “whole of things” (here understood as the totality of the vi-bhāvas) causes the hearts of men to play, just as it deceives or dupes them, making them feel the entire range of emotions. This is the reason why I propose, in this context, a slightly different translation of the stanza, of which I give only the first hemistich here:

O whole of things [such as the “determinants” that are gardens or moon-rise]! Since, hiding your heart that is the Self [as does an actor], you play, while you forcibly grab hold of the hearts of men, by causing them to enact (nartayan) the variety of [emotional] modes, he who calls you unconscious is himself unconscious, etc. […]”

The preeminence of suggestion (the evocation of the jīvanmukta) does not prevent the expressed meaning from being tightly coherent

77 Contrary to Jayaratha, who understands it as a kind of denominative; see above, p. 41.

78 Lit., “by causing them to enact (nartayan) through the variety of [emotional] modes…”, unless one considers the instrumental as being the complement of means applying to the gerund ākramya.
and articulated. It is even a *sine qua non* condition for establishing a term-by-term correspondence between what suggests and what is suggested. The stanza is indeed built on an *apрастутапраśaṃsā* of the third category, that of the relationship of similarity between the non-pertinent and the pertinent; yet, if one follows Ānandavardhana and his exegete, since the aesthetic balance is tilted towards the suggested meaning, it is not the mere figure of speech known as “*apрастутапраśaṃsā*,” but a case of *vastudhvani*. The following chart shows the symmetry of the two meanings (denoted and suggested; non-pertinent and pertinent):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BHĀVAVRĀTA: THE APRASTUTA</th>
<th>JĪVANMUKTA: THE PRASTUTA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchādyā (in the verse)</td>
<td>svātmānaṃ pracchādayaṃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The series of epithets qualifying the heart of the bhāvavṛata: “very deep,” “very intelligent”... (in the exegesis of the verse)</td>
<td>gāḍhavivekāloka°...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“skillful at play” (krīḍācatura) in the exegesis of the verse + hathāj janasya hṛdayāni... nartayan (in the verse) and hathād eva lokam yatheccha vikāraṇānābhir nartayati (in the exegesis of the verse)</td>
<td>lokam vācālayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The consequence being that such bhāvas are regarded as insentient and foolish, and despised for it: jado ’yam iti... bhāvo lokenāva- jñāyate... (in the exegesis of the verse)</td>
<td>With the same consequence: tenaiva lokena mūrkhō ’yam iti yad avajñāyate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I leave aside the rest of the exegesis (see complete text in Appendix-2) that focusses on the paradoxical mockery, already emphasized in the TĀV, by means of which the accusation of insentience made
against phenomenal diversity discredits the accuser, who is in his turn accused of being more than stupid:

... sa yadi lokena jáda iti tata kāraṇāt pratyuta vaidagdhyasambhāva-
naninnitāt sambhāvītaḥ | ātmā ca yata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta jádaya sam-
bhāvyas tata eva sahrdaya sambhāvitas tad asya lokasya jādo `śītī yad
ucyate tādā jádayam [jādayam corr. : jādayam CSS ed.] evaṁvidhasya bhā-
vṛtāsavyāvidagdhasya prasiddham iti sā pratyuta stutir iti | jaḍād api pā-
pīyāṇ ayaṁ loka iti dhvanyate |

Moreover, in the reversal of blame into praise, the dichotomy of subject and object dissolves.

Indeed, I am tempted to say, distancing myself from Ānandavardhana’s theory and Abhinavagupta’s exegesis, that in the Locana it is not only the suggested meaning which is camatkārakārin, but the articulation of both the suggested and expressed meanings. By means of this articulation, the deceived spectator – namely, the common man who is the subject of the directly expressed meaning (as also analyzed in the TĀV) – and the emancipated spectator79 – namely, the jīvanmukta evoked through the suggested meaning unveiled in the Locana – are turned into symmetrical figures, actually mirroring one another.80

Thus my interpretation differs from that of Ingalls, who does not seem to have understood who that mahāpuruṣa really is, except when, almost without realizing it, he identifies the mahāpuruṣa as a Pāśupata, basing himself on the sole evidence of the syntagm lokam vācalayan (“making people speak”) which qualifies the mahāpuruṣa. According to Ingalls, this mahāpuruṣa deliberately makes ordinary men talk about him, seeking to arouse their disapproval, as a provocative Pāśupata will do.81

Ingalls shows his uneasiness, or even his irritation, in his note (n. 4, pp. 163-164), which seems to miss the point, if only for the reason that he refers to a “second meaning” without identifying it explicitly:

---

79 Phrase borrowed from the title of RANCIÈRE 2008, although Rancière’s perspective is different.
80 See BANSAT-BOUDON AND TRIPATHI 2011, pp. 55-56.
81 INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 164: “But the great man does conceal his thoughts. His causing the tongues of men to wag, in the case of the Pāśupatas and I dare say of any Tantrics, was a premeditated instigation of reproach” – and, for that, Ingalls refers to INGALLS 1962. See also J. Törzsök’s contribution to this volume.
What is one to make of Abhinava’s account of his own verse? The literal meaning of the stanza is not difficult. “Men who decry, as do the non-Tantric philosophers, the delights of love and of the senses, calling them brute pleasures, are really stupider than the pleasure they run down. So I will not copy them by calling names. To call them stupid would be to compliment them.” Now it is true that the literal meaning is impossible from the realistic point of view [...]. Neither garden nor moonrise, being insentient, actually makes the heart dance, nor do they conceal their own heart, for they have none. So one is forced to look for a second meaning. To pass to that second meaning is more difficult. Abhinavagupta has thrown what seems to me a needless stumbling block in our way by the discrepancy between the plurality of delights (or stimulants, bhāavavrāta) and the singularity of the great man (mahāpurussa).  

I would object to Ingalls’ observations that i) the Locana asserts that those insentient objects do have a heart and ii) there is no discrepancy between a plural and a singular, since the term bhāavavrāta is a neuter singular, working as a collective name.

In any case, it seems to me that one can give credit to Abhinavagupta. Exegete of the Dhvanyāloka and author of several fundamental texts of his school, he knows what he wants to say, and his exegesis is perfectly articulated. Needless to say, one is free not to always agree with Abhinavagupta’s position. Nevertheless, in my view, the question is not whether we agree or not with Abhinavagupta’s interpretation, but how to understand and convey it as that of an important witness, testifying, not only to a given current of thought at a given time, but also to the way that thought results from previous debates. Hence it seems necessary to try to understand Abhinavagupta’s sometimes intricate thought.

Moreover – would it be an irrefutable argument? – he, as author of the stanza, certainly knows best what he speaks of. He is surely the most authorized to know the tātparya, the author’s intention.

82 My emphasis.
83 For there is scope as well for an antagonist position, as hold by the Telugu cātu verse mentioned to me by David Shulman in a private correspondence – a very contemporary position, indeed, quite in tune with the theory of literature: ‘The beauties of a poem, are best known by a critic. What does the author knows? The beauties of a woman are known only to her husband. What does a father know?’ Yet such emphasis on the preeminent role of the reader (a sahṛdaya compared to a husband), the Telugu verse is less radical than the view expressed by Mallarmé (Quant au livre), who goes so far as to deny any hermeneutic authority to both author and reader: “Impersonifié, le volume, autant qu’on s’en
As to Ingalls’ interpretation of our stanza, I would add that it is a bit hasty to liken those bhāvas that are vibhāvas to “delights” alone— which contradicts both the theory expounded in the Nātyaśāstra and the Locana itself: not all vibhāvas are a source of delight, as we have seen (see above, p. 59).

Thus it seems to me that Ingalls goes astray when he suggests that the stanza refers to a liberation to be obtained by the path of bhoga, “enjoyment.” Rather, in my view, and in the light of Abhinavagupta’s self-exegesis, the stanza implicitly refers to the kind of mukti which is jīvannukti, a central notion in Kashmirian non-dualist Śaivism. After all, Abhinavagupta’s point of view is that of the Trika, not of the Pāṣupata doctrine.

At the end, let us reconsider a question of chronology. Pandey asserted that Abhinavagupta’s philosophical works predated his aesthetic texts, his main reason being a reference to the TĀ in the Locana. Ingalls (p. 32) refutes Pandey’s opinion by showing that this so-called reference to the TĀ is in fact a corrupt reading: the correct reading, according to Ingalls, is Tattvāloka instead of Tantrāloka. In any case, however we resolve the question of the reading, the stanza under examination (“bhāvavrāta, etc.”) proves that Abhinavagupta cites his own TĀ, which thus must be prior to his Locana. For it would be difficult to reverse the reasoning, namely, that a stanza, composed ad hoc by Abhinavagupta for his commentary on Dhvanyāloka, would have been reused in the TĀ, in such a manner as to fit so perfectly into it.

Isabelle Ratié has suggested (personal communication) that the huge TĀ might not have been composed in one go but that here and there Abhinavagupta might have incorporated parts of his early works, possibly including one that contained the bhāvavrāta stanza; see, for instance, Ratié 2011, p. 329, about the existence of an early Bhedaviḍaviddārana, now lost, of which a segment of Chapter 10 of the TĀ seems to be a paraphrase. Obviously one cannot be categorical on this.

On jīvannukti as the main goal and concern of the non-dualist Śaiva doctrine, see Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011, pp. 32-37.

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3. Dhvanyālokavṛtī III 40ª and Locana There-On,ª Or Further Observations on the Question of the Dhvani

Allow me a last point: the text which David Shulman has given to this volume mainly deals with the Dhvanyāloka theory of subordinate suggestion and considers as well the symmetrical case of subordinate denotation and enhanced suggestion. In a post-script, the paper refers, apropos Dhvanyālokavṛtī III 40, to Dharmakīrti’s two stanzas cited and commented by Ānandavardhana (CSS ed., pp. 487-490; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626) – which announce the autobiographical verse he gives in his vṛttī ad III 43: yā vyāpā-ravatī... (CSS ed., pp. 507-510; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 653; see D. Shulman’s contribution to this volume).

In effect, Dhvanyāloka III 40ª and its vṛttī give Ānandavardhana an opportunity to come back to the aprastutapraśamsā, in this case the aprastutapraśamsā belonging to the same category as the one which characterizes our stanza, that is, an aprastutapraśamsā based on the similarity of prastuta and aprastuta (CSS ed., pp. 487-489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626).

Here is the first stanza (a śārdūlavikrīḍita) ascribed to Dharmakīrti,ª which Ānandavardhana quotes in support of his demonstration:

lāvanyadravinavayo na gaṇitaḥ kleśo mahān arjītaḥ svacchandam carato janasya hrdaye cintāvavo nirmitaḥ |
esāpi svayam eva tulyaranābhāvād varāki hatā

ª The text of the kārikā is given below, p. 68.
ª As pointed out by Isabelle Ratié (personal communication), modern philology considers that the first stanza is only “hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti” (see STICHERBATSKY 1930-1932, vol. I, pp. 35-36), since it is nowhere to be found in any of Dharmakīrti’s known works, whereas the second stanza, which has long been well-known, appears in the reference edition of the Pramāṇavārttika by Miyasaka (see PV, Parārthānāmāna 286). That the first stanza should only be “hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti” seems to have been a point of contention at the time of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta: in his vṛttī, Ānanda describes it as “commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti” (see below) whereas for Abhinavagupta it is “indubitably (nirvivāda) [the work of Dharmakīrti]”. However, it is obvious that for both the two stanzas are by Dharmakīrti, since this is the key argument in their demonstration that the second stanza is a direct expression of the first, itself a case of dhvani.
Since David Shulman has translated this intricate (and somewhat enigmatic) stanza,\(^90\) I will only summarize its meaning: what was the creator’s/Brahman’s goal when he formed such a matchless girl? For, not only have such perfections created a feverish anxiety in the hearts of men, but the girl herself, not having found a lover worthy of her, is left to languish, unrecognized and unattended.

Ānandavardhana, in his vṛtti (loc. cit., CSS ed., pp. 487-488), reveals the suggested meaning to be read beneath the expressed one, which is described as highly implausible: such words can neither be those of a lover (rāgin – since a lover could not regard himself as inferior to his beloved) nor of the symmetrical figure of the ascetic (nīrāga – since love and beauty are none of his concerns).\(^91\)

And Ānandavardhana concludes (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625):

\[
\text{... tasmād aprastutapraśamseyam} \mid \text{yasmād anena vācyena guṇībhūtātmanā nissāmānyayunāvadeśhmātasya nijamahīmotkarsajānītasattasa-} \\
\text{janajavarsaya viśeṣajñām ātmano na kaṅcid evāparam paśyataḥ paridevi-} \\
\text{tam etad iti prakāṣyate} | \\
\]

Therefore, it must be an aprastutapraśamsā, for by the subordination of the literal sense there appears [the suggestion] of a lament (paridevita) by a man puffed up with pride in his uncommon talents (nīsāmānyayuna\(^9\)), on seeing that others fail to recognize his qualities (viśeṣajñām ātmano na kaṅcid evāparam paśyataḥ) because he has fired their jealousy by the degree of his brilliance (nijamahīmotkarsa\(^9\)).\(^92\)

Thus is the aprastutapraśamsā clearly established. Moreover, according to the theorization and examplification at work in the vṛtti ad Dhvanyāloka I 13, that particular use of the aprastutapraśamsā

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\(^90\) See his contribution to this volume: “It was a huge effort, and he spared no expense./ A hungry fire now burns in the hearts of men/ who were happy before./ And as for her, poor girl, she’s left to languish/ because no lover could ever/ be her equal. So what was God thinking/ when he turned his mind/ to fashioning her body?”

\(^91\) On this important factor of the plausibility of the aprastuta, see above, p. 50. Nevertheless, Abhinavagupta ad loc. (CSS ed., p. 488; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 630-631) – nana ca rāgino ‘pi... – raises possible objections to this line of argument, but only to explain the reason why Ānandavardhana in his vṛtti unveils the implicit meaning of Dharmakīrti’s verse.

\(^92\) Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 626, with my suppletions.
in Dharmakīrti’s first stanza should constitute a case of dhvani, in the manner of the stanza “bhāvavrāta, etc.”; in both cases, the suggested meaning prevails over the literal sense.

Nevertheless, here (Dhvanyāloka III 40, with its vṛtti), Ānandavardhana’s point about the status of the aprastutapraśamsā is not explicitly stated, for Dhvanyāloka III 40 adopts a somewhat different perspective, which is that of subordinate suggestion, and refers to dhvani in this context alone:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{prakāra 'yam guṇībhātavyaṅgyo 'pi dhvanirāpatām |}\\
\text{dhatte rasādityāparyaparyalocanyā punah ||}
\end{align*}
\]

This type of poetry also, where the suggestion is subordinated, may take on the nature of dhvani when regarded from the viewpoint of its final meaning, if that meaning is rasa, etc.\(^93\)

Yet, in the course of his demonstration (CSS ed., pp. 486-487; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625), Ānandavardhana comes to deal with a more general statement, which invites the sahṛdaya to distinguish between the three areas of i) mere rhetoric, namely, the figures of speech, ii) dhvani and iii) subordinate suggestion (guṇībhātavyaṅgya):

\[
\begin{align*}
vācyavānīyaḥ prádhūnāyapraśamsāveke parah prayātino vidhi: | \\
yena dhvanigunībhātavyaṅgyayor [dhvanigunībhātavyaṅgyayor corr. : dhvanir guṇībhātavyaṅgyayor CSS ed.] alankārānām cāsāṅkīrṇo viśayaḥ sujāto bhavati | 
\end{align*}
\]

It is in that general context that Ānandavardhana cites Dharmakīrti’s first verse as a case of dhvani (although the term dhvani is not mentioned, it is undoubtedly what Ānandavardhana means, since he shows that the literal sense is subordinated to the suggested one), and not as a case of a mere (“pure” – śuddha – as stated by Abhinavagupta thereon) alamkāra.\(^94\) Moreover, the force of the previous definitions (vṛtti ad Dhvanyāloka I 13; see CSS ed., pp. 125-132; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 158-165 and above, pp. 49ff.) allows the


\(^94\) Locana ad vṛtti on III 40 (CSS ed., p. 486; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 629); vatra vyangyam nasty eva tatra teṣām śuddhānām prádbhānyam |. “Where there is no suggested element at all, the predominance is of pure figures of speech.” (Transl. Ingalls et al.)
reader of the Dhvanyāloka to come to the conclusion that Dharmakīrti’s stanza, as an aprastutapraśamsā, is indeed a case of vastudhvani.

This is confirmed by Abhinavagupta who, in his turn, goes even farther in demonstrating the soundness of Ānandavardhana’s exegesis: Dharmakīrti’s first stanza, being an example of aprastutapraśamsā in which the suggested meaning is made predominant, is to be seen as a case of dhvani (as in the stanza “bhāavavrāta, etc.”). Commenting on kārikā 40, he observes in the first place (CSS ed., p. 483; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 628):

> etad eva nirvāhyan kāvyātmavām dhvaner eva paridāpayati |

Carrying this line of argument to its conclusion, he [Ānanda] brings into full light the doctrine that dhvani is the soul of poetry. (Transl. Ingalls et al.)

For, as emphasized by Abhinavagupta, Ānandavardhana’s vṛtti makes clear that the accomplished yet neglected girl is none other than the metaphoric transposition of a man immensely talented yet entirely misunderstood as such. Methodically, Abhinavagupta relates each of the four notions forged by Ānandavardhana with each of the four pādas of the verse in order to show a term-by-term correspondence between the denoted meaning (which is anyway aprastuta) and the suggested meaning (which is prastuta).

Thus, the four pādas hint respectively at i) the uncommon perfection (nissāmānya) of that great man, for which the creator has spared no effort, nor expenses (pāda 1); ii) his extreme brilliance (nijamahimā), of which other men are jealous (= pāda 2); iii) therefore, due to this very jealousy, the non-recognition of his merits (viśeṣajñām [atmano na kaṇcid evāparam paśyataḥ]), which turns his glory into a miserable fate (= pāda 3: vārakī hatā, with the necessary transposition of the expressed feminine to the suggested masculine); iv) the bitter lament (paridevita) of such a man, who rebels against the Creator himself (= pāda 4: ko ’rtha ś cetasi vedhasa...). This shows that the suggested meaning is to be considered as prevalent.

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95 Locana (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630): nissāmānaya niṣjāmaḥmeti viśeṣajñām iti paridevitaṃ ity etaiś caturbhir vāyakhandalaih kramena pādacatuṣṭayasya tāparyāṃ vyākhyātāṃ | “By the four sentence-elements nīḥsāmānaya (uncommon), niṣjāmaḥ (his brilliance), viśeṣajñāḥ [na paśyataḥ] ([seeing that others fail] to recognize his qualities), and paridevitaṃ (a lament), our author explains the [suggested] meaning of each successive line in the stanza.” (Transl. Ingalls et al.) Compare Ānandavardhana’s analysis, above, p. 67.
Let us come back to the vṛtti. Ānandavardhana (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 625-626) immediately validates his interpretation by means of a second stanza by Dharmakīrti, which, according to him, directly expresses the suggested meaning of the first, namely the bitter and candid complaint of a man considering himself a misunderstood genius – and, what is more, that complaint is that of Dharmakīrti himself, speaking in the first person:

\[
\text{tathā cāyam dharmakīrtteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ | sambhāvyate ca tasyaiva | yasmāt –}
\]

\[
anadhyavasītāvagāhanam analpadhīšaktināpy adṛṣṭaparamārthatattvam adhikābhīyogair api | matam mama jagaty alabdhasadrśapratigrāhakam prayāsyati payonidheḥ paya iva svadehe jārāṁ ||
\]

\[
ity anenāpi ślokenaivamvidho 'bhīprāyaḥ prakāśita eva |
\]

Moreover, the [first] verse is commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti and this is just as one might expect, for in the [following] other verse he reveals the same (evamvidha) intention (abhīprāya):\(^{96}\)

No one in this world has fathomed my thought.  
Even the best minds that engaged with it  
with all their strength  
failed to see my truth.  
Not even one worthy reader  
really got it.  
Like water in the ocean,  
my ideas will grow old  
inside my body.\(^{97}\)

Therefore, not only does the second stanza work as an exegesis of the first, but it is a self-exegesis, hence unquestionable (nirvivāda\(^{9}\)), as says Abhinavagupta in his Locana thereon.

For Abhinavagupta again supports Ānandavardhana’s demonstration (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630). It is in order to contradict a fancied objector asking: “what proof is there of this interpretation?”, and again: “what if the stanza is [commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti]?”, that “with this in mind, he [Ānanda] shows the meaning of this stanza [the first one] by means of the meaning

\(^{96}\) Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 625.  
\(^{97}\) The meter is prthīvī. Transl. D. Shulman (see his contribution to this volume).
furnished by that [other] verse [the second one], which is indubitably [the work of Dharmakīrti].”

By quoting the two stanzas of Dharmakīrti, Ānandavardhana thus gives, so to speak, the “proof by author,” even though here the exegete and the author called in to help are two – himself and Dharmakīrti. So does Abhinavagupta with the “bhāvavṛūta” stanza, in his Locana ad I 13, and all the more convincingly so since the author of the commentary and that of the stanza are one and the same person.

Then, commenting on the evamvidho ‘bhiprāyah of the vṛtti on the second stanza, Abhinavagupta (CSS ed., p. 490; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 631) offers a very lucid interpretation of the respective ultimate issues of the two stanzas, showing that the first stanza belongs to the dhvani register, the second to that of the alamkāra. Moreover he gives a stunning description of the dhvani process that makes us fully grasp in which way the aprastutaprapāṣaṃsā he quoted in I 13 (“bhāvavṛūta, etc.”) is a case of vastudhvani – in other words, how dhvani is at work there, as it is at work here:

“evamvidha” iti | paridevitam viśaya ity arthaḥ | iyati cārthe aprastutaprapāṣaṃsopamālaṃkārayādhe vistārīniḥ | parasya ca... svātmanī kuśalakāriṭapradarśanayā dharmavīrasparsāvya viṣarase viśrāntir iti mantavyam |

By “the same [intention],” he means that the object [of the second stanza] is [explicitly] a “lament” [which gives the clue to the first one]. The literal sense so far [in Dharmakīrti’s two stanzas] is a couple of figures, namely aprastutaprapāṣaṃsā [in the first] and simile (upamā) [in the second]. But [in the case of the first stanza], immediately after [apprehending the figure of speech as an aprastutaprapāṣaṃsā], there is [for the listener] repose in one’s own self (svātmani viśrāntiḥ), that is, in the abhuta [rasa], the “Marvelous,” for he is filled with wonder (vismaya) [at the advent of the suggested meaning, which prevails on the literal]. As for the other [stanza], one should understand that there occurs [the listener’s] repose in one’s own self (svātmani viśrāntiḥ), that is, in the viṣarasa, the “Heroic,” for [the stanza] is concerned with [lit., “is touched by”] the [subcategory of viṣarasa which is the] dharmavīra[rasa], the heroic sentiment arising

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98 Locana (CSS ed., p. 489; INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 630) – following); nānvaatrāpi kim pramānāṃ ity āṣaṇkāyāḥ – “tathā ceti” | nānu kim iyatety āṣākyā tadāśa-vina nirvādadaññatābdhokāraṇīṣyāyavā sanvadati – “saṃbhāvyata iti”. (My translation.)

99 Note the implicit play on words: Dharmakīrti is by his very name destined to incarnate the dharmavīraraṇa, the heroic rasa based on observing dharma.
from dhārna, by showing [Dharmakīrti’s] benevolence [towards men to be instructed in the ultimate reality].

However, it is noteworthy that the statement remains somewhat elliptical since, in this passage, Abhinavagupta does not explain (contrary to his exegesis of “bhāvavrāta, etc.”) that, if the listener of Dharmakīrti’s first stanza experiences the adbhutarasa, and thus ātmaviśrānti, it is due to that capacity of “creating wonderment” (ca-matkārakārītvā) in the listener which characterizes the suggested meaning of the verse. For this very reason, the statement also implies that the suggested meaning prevails over the literal – a scheme that we have seen at play in the “bhāvavrāta” verse quoted in the Locana ad I 13, in which the emphasis was, however, put on the dhvani process rather than on the rasa process, as is the case here. Moreover, such an ellipsis is quite appropriate in connection with a commentary (ad III 40) that refers to rasas (see the text above, p. 68).

Symmetrically, the second stanza is to be read as a mere figure of speech (an upamā, in which the target is Dharmakīrti himself, the ground the ocean, where the same water flows through water, endlessly and in vain), in which no suggested meaning is to be found and therefore, neither any predominance of a suggested meaning, nor any dhvani, but only a candidly direct expression of a lament. It nevertheless leads to the experience of a given rasa, here the vīra-rasa.

Thus, my investigation has taken the paths of intertextuality and intratextuality. On the one hand, Abhinavagupta’s bhāvavrāta stanza is reproduced by Bhāskara, several centuries later, whereas Jayaratha’s TĀV quotes the full text of a stanza of which Abhinavagupta’s IPVV gives only the first hemistich in a condensed form (see above, p. 39 and n. 13). On the other hand, the bhāvavrāta stanza, originally a part of the TĀ, is later on quoted by Abhinavagupta in

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100 My translation. It seems that Ingalls misses the point by failing to recognize the key notion of ātmaviśrānti in svātmani... viśrāntiḥ. Moreover the process of aestheticization which turns the sthāyibhāva named vismaya into the corresponding rasa called adbhuta is misunderstood; this is apparent in the awkwardness of Ingall’s translation which seems to omit svātmani: “one becomes filled with amazement at the speaker himself, and so the aesthetic sense [of the reader] comes to rest in the rasa of wonder” (unless svātmani is rendered as “... with amazement at the speaker himself;” which is not acceptable).
his *Locana* ad I 13, that too, with a self-exegesis rather different from that offered by Jayaratha. Thus a web of analogies, characteristic of all Sanskrit literature, and of Sanskrit exegetical literature in particular, has taken shape. In this respect, it is a happy coincidence that David Shulman’s contribution to this volume and mine should enter into consonance with one another.

In conclusion, I would say that the question of *sahṛdayatā*, to be taken in its aesthetic as well as philosophical acceptation, has proved to be central in the whole discussion. It follows from comparing the TĀV with the *Locana* on the same stanza that the difference of interpretation has something to do with the “taste” of the listener, that is, with his degree of *sahṛdayatā* – itself, in Śaiva reasonings, the expression of one’s sovereign freedom, *svātantra*. Thus, one is free to consider the literal meaning as preeminent, like Jayaratha in support of the doctrinal (and polemical) point which he is making, or on the contrary, like Abhinavagupta, to regard the implicit sense as prevalent over the literal, thereby taking the reader into the ever-resounding domain of the *dhvani* and giving him access to an even deeper philosophical and spiritual meaning.

**APPENDIX**

1. TĀV ad I 332 (KSTS 23, pp. 305-307)

idānīm asya śāstrasya paraṃ gāmbhīryam manyamāno granthakṛt, etadarthasattaṁvam ajānānair anyair anyathābhodhena yatkimcīt uttānam eva anyathā ucye, tān prati aprastutaprasamsayā upahāsitum āha –

bhāvavrūta hathāj janasya hṛdayāṇy ākramya yan nartayan bhaṅgībhīr vividhābhīr ātmahṛdayaṃ pracchāḍya samkrādase |

yas tvām āha jādaḥ sahṛdayamanyantavadūḥsikṣito manye ’masya jādaśmatā stutipadaṃ tvatsāṃyasambhāvanāt ||

he bhāvavrūta nīlādayartha | ātmano hṛdayaṃ tena ātmatabhyam rūpam gopayīvī janasya *sarasvayāva vādino* hṛdayāṇi āśayān balāt-kāreṇa ākramya –

adyāśmān asatāh kariṣyati sataḥ kim na dvidhā vāpy ayaṁ kim sthānān uta naśvarān uta mithohbhinnān abhinnān uta |

itham sadvadanaṁavokanaparair bhāvair jagadvartibhir manye maunani-ruddhyamānahṛdayaṁ duḥkhena tāḥ sthiye |
ityādiṣṭītyā vividhābhīr bhaṅgībhīḥ nartayant yat saṃkrīḍase – na-
ṭavat atāttvikena rūpeṇa samullasasi, ataḥ sa sarvo vādī asahṛ-
yam api ātmānam saṃhrdayatvena manyamāno 'ta eva duḥśikṣito mi-
thyābhīmīnāt akṛṣṭiṣṭiḥ, tvām bhāvavṛtām, jadām – acetanam āha,
ato 'smābhīr uṭpreṣyate – yat amṛṣṭa vādino vastutes caita-
yasyasvabhāvena bhavataḥ yat sāmyam tasya saṃbhāvanāt bhāvavat-
tvam eva jadātmā iti yādy ucyate sā asya nindāsthāne stutih | bhāvā-
nām hi vastutas caitanyam eva rūpam acetyamānate hi teṣām na
kimcidrūpam syāt, atas tad eva ye na jānate te jādebhīyo 'pi jāḍāḥ iti
katham ca teṣām cetanātmakair bhāvaiḥ nindāparyavastīyā śāmyam
syāt iti bhāvah | evam prakṛte 'pi asya granthasya yas tattvaṃ na
jānāti mā jāśiṣṭi, pratyuta anyāthāpi yatākiccanā vakti ity asāv eva
jaḍo, na punar asya granthasya kaścid doṣaḥ ity arthah ||

2. Locana ad Dhvanyālokavṛtti I 13
(CSS ed., pp. 127-128)

atra yady api sārūpyavāśena kṛtagnah kaścid anyāḥ prastuta ākṣi-
pyate, tathāpy aprastutasyaiva vetālavṛttāntasya camatkārakāri-
tvam | na hy acetanopālambhavat asambhāvyamāno 'yam artho na
cā na hrdaya iti vācyasāyatra pradhānata | yadi punar acetyamānāty-
antasambhāvyamānataarlokānātavāśenāprastutena varṇitena pra-
stutam ākṣipiyamāṇaḥ camatkārakāri tadā vastudhvanir asau | yathā
mamaiva –

bhāvavṛtāḥ hathāj janasya hrdayāny ākramya yan nartayant bhaṅgībhīr
vividhābhīr ātmahṛdayam pracchādyā saṃkrīḍase |
sa tvām āha jadām tataḥ saṃhrdayammanvantaduḥśikṣito manye 'mṛṣṭya ja-
dāmatāt stutipadaṃ tvastāmyasambhāvanāt ||

kaścin mahāpuruṣo vītarāgo 'pi sarāgavaḥ iti nyāyena gādhavive-
kālokatiraktatrimirapratoṇo 'pi lokamadhye śvātmānām pracchā-
dayamḥ lokāṃ ca vācālayaṃ ātmaney apratibhāsam evāṅgikurvan

tenaiva lokena mūrkhā 'yam iti yad avajñāyate tadā tadiyam lokot-
taram ca iti caritam prastutam vyāṅgyatayā prādhyānyena prakāṣyate | ja-
dō 'yam iti hy udyānādayādīr bhāvo lokenaṃvajñāyate, sa ca pra-
tyuta kasyacid virahina autṣukyacintāṃdāyamāmānaṃstātāṃ anyasya
praharṣaparāvaśatām karotātīḥ hathād eva lokāṃ yathecchanām viṅ-
kārārāṃbhīr nartayati | na ca tasya hrdayam kenaṃ jñāyate kidṛg
ayam iti, pratyuta mahāgambhiro 'tividadhāḥ suṣṭhugarvahāno 'tī-
śayena krīḍācaturah sa yadi lokena jāḍa iti tata eva kāraṇāt pratyuta
vaidagdhysambhāvanimitīśaṃsambhāvitaḥ | āmā ca yata eva kā- 

raṇāt pratyuta jādyena sambhāvyas tata eva sahṛdayah sambhāvitas 
tad asya lokasya jālo 'sīti yad ucyate tadā jādyam evanvidhasya 

bhāvavrātasyāvidagdhasya prasiddham iti sā pratyuta stutir iti | ja-
dād api pāpiyān āyam loka iti dhvanyate | tad āhā – “yadā tv” iti | “itaraṁ tv” iti | itaraṁtvāna punar alaṁkārāntaravatvam alaṁkāravi-

śeṣatvam na vyangyasya kathāṃcid api prādhanā eva bhāvaḥ ||

3. ĪPK I 1, 4
tathā hi jaḍabhūṭāṁ pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā | 
jñānāṁ kriyā ca bhūṭāṇāṁ jīvāṇaḥ jīvanāṁ matam ||

4. Bhāskarī ad ĪPV I 1, 4
antaryāniśuddhacittattvavasenendriyānāṁ sā sakrīt astīti cet sa-

tvam, sarvātra tadvaśenaiva sāstītī sarvām jaḍam evacyatām, aja-
dām eva vetti kim viśesakalpanābhīḥ | paramārthaśvācāre tu,

bhāvavrātaḥ haṁśya hṛdayāṁ ākramya yan nartayaṁ bhāṅgbhir 
vividhābhīr āmnabhṛdayam pracchādya samkṛdāse | 
yas tvāṁ āha jaḍam svayam sahṛdayammanyatvavadhūṃśito manye ’mu-

sya jādāṃmatā stutipadaḥ tvāṁyaśambhāvanāt ||

iti nityā sarveśāṁ bhāvāṇāṁ svarūpam api cīnmayam eveti ekapra-
kāśavād eva sarvatra supratīśṭhitāḥ | yas tu granthakṛtā viśeṣa uktaḥ 
sasphutavāsphutavākṛtāḥ, athava jaḍāṇāṁ upadesānāhatvam apek-

syāvām uktaṁ iti na virodha ity alam |

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