Policy of interests and patrimonialization of public policies in Southern Europe

The case of telecommunications

South European Society and Politics Vol.2 n°1 1997, pp.36-65

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Introduction:

Is it purely a coincidence that the analyses that we have been able to carry out on the development of telecommunications policies in Southern Europe have scarcely considered the matter from the angle of being behind (Négrier et al., 1993 & 1994; Négrier, 1994)? The idea itself of being behind puts the political specialist in a predicament. Even if we agree on the fact that statistics are not a satisfactory manner of dealing with the matter, because they cannot explain the phenomena they describe, there still remains the subject of socio-political relevance of such questioning. In this field as well as in many others, it is therefore a matter of taking a stand in the thirty-year-old controversy between developmentalists and differentialists. The former accept being behind (or archaic term, traditionalism instead) and attempt to explain the causes without always being convincing in their presuppositions, while the latter refute the idea and deprive themselves of placing the policies or systems that they observe within a dynamic comparative perspective. In the field that we are dealing with, Southern Europe is certainly a fertile arena for comparaisons and critical assessment of theories considered to be dominant concerning the south's persistent lagging behind in relation to the north.

The first problem that must be resolved is, of course, how the matter is viewed. The prevailing socio-economic approach bases the south's lagging behind on a series of arguments among which can be found statistical data regularly supplied by official agencies such as the OECD, the ITU (International Telecommunications Union), the European Commission and specialized study centers. These data confirm a substantial differential between the development of infrastructures and telecommunication services in the south, in relation to the north. The number of telephone lines per inhabitant, the rate of equipping households, the rate of network digitization are among the most established quantitative criteria to qualify this lagging behind. However, this fact of being behind proves to be less significant than it seems, as shown by the example of digitization of major lines (Diagram no. 1).

Diagram n°1 : Europe : %age of Main Lines Connected to Digital Exchanges (source : *Stratlas*, Sirius 1996)

diagram sent on paper

Table n°1 : Digitalization of Main Lines per Country (1980-1994, in %) (Source : idem)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	3	8	16	22	29	37	45	48	54	60
Denmark								11	16	21	28	33	40	46	53
Finland	0	0	0	2	4	11	16	20	24	29	35	42	51	62	77
France		10	15	22	35	41	49	55	62	68	75	79	83	86	95
<i>Greece</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>31</i>
Ireland						30	40	45	50	56	58	63	68		
<i>Italy</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>67</i>
Luxembourg											33	50	70	82	
Netherlands	0	0	2	3	4	5	6	7	13	25	32	79	83	93	100
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	16	25	33	38	45	50	60	71
<i>Portugal</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>62</i>
<i>Spain</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>48</i>
Sweden		6	9	10	14	18	22	31	36	37	40	47	54	67	81
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	9	12	29	33	42	48	57
Un. Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	10	23	38	47	55	64	75	83
U S A								24	31	40	50	53	60	64	

The average hook-up time, the availability of specialized lines, the progress report for cable networks, the 'quality' attributed to the reaction time in case of break-downs are reliable measures to determine the degree that national telecommunications have modernized. In most cases, the countries of southern Europe rank lower than their northern counterparts. However, an analysis of national data highlights interesting nuances in this overall picture. As Table no. 2 shows, the cost of communications is globally higher in the south in relation to the north (column no. 5). This tends to support the theory of a correlation between the degree of

competition and the lowering of prices to the subscriber. But this overall display is not valid for all communication segments.

Table n°2 : Cost of one call (3 minutes) per distance and type of network (physical or mobile)
(personal elaboration based on datas provided by ANUIT (1995) , in italian lire 1995.

Country	Local	100 km	300 km	Mobile	Total
Greece	61	1836	2040	2081	6019
Italy	254	1875	1875	2159	6163
Spain	139	1941	1941	2104	6125
Portugal	110	2465	2465	2191	7231
Average Southern Europe	141	2029	2080	2133	6384
Average Northern Europe *	256	981	1058	2329	4723
Average other countries**	143	953	1715	2432	5242

* Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Nederland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United-Kingdom (BT and Mercury)

** Australia, Canada, Japan, New-Zealand, USA

Indeed, the prices of local communications remain much lower in the south than in the north (column no. 1). This confirms that liberalization / modernization causes readjustment effects between local and long distance communication, shown by a hike in the price of local calls. Now, we know that the distribution of calls by population segment is not random. Households with low or medium incomes are over-represented in local communications and they are greatly under-represented in long distance or mobile communications (where firms are over-represented). This occurs in such a way that this readjustment appears as a social cost transfer between public and private concerns which inevitably poses the problem of social fairness.

The lagging behind of southern European telecommunications, long considered as a minor problem, has taken on a new dimension the moment new political issues have emerged.

- the innovative ability of telecommunication systems during a period of technological upheavals. During the 1980s, national policies began to be systematically screened for their efficiency in integrating or even anticipating changes under the banner of 'new communication technologies' such as the following: integrating different methods of communication into a one and same technology: wide-band networks; modifying the prevailing methods of sending messages: network digitization ; extending forms of communication: cable networks, data communications, portable and cellular telephones, etc.

The globalization of exchanges, interpreted as a dual phenomenon of opening up to economic exchanges on new markets (former Eastern block countries, Latin America, Far East, etc.) and of opening up to competitive exchanges between previously 'regulated' sectors (financial services, and notably telecommunications), is largely based on the potential of these new communication technologies. This sector has therefore been one of those the most systematically subjected to deregulating pressures, with repercussions on the techno-economic organization of the networks and particularly the fact that telecommunication services and social practices have been called into question.

- consequently, the ability of institutional systems to integrate the new telecommunication regulation standards and organization, as advocated by the supporters of a new equation: technological innovation + European integration = liberalization and privatization. This equation is based on critical feedback of a natural monopoly, through which network savings were believed to be economically (and not politically) founded on the unjustifiability of private systems within the network sectors. On a European scale (which we will come back to later), the denaturalized monopolies were then subjected to new justification criteria, among which was their respect...for rules of a competitive market.

The lagging behind of southern European telecommunications only becomes a political problem if these new global and sectorial objectives are considered to be desirable and if the standards and general strategies to achieve them are considered to be imagined¹ This new interest in economic and social realities of the south also poses several problems² which will be the subject of our paper:

1. the overall status of southern Europe in the development of Community telecommunications policies. It is all the more interesting to point out that the European Union has become, if not the regulator, then at least the major megaphone of new recipes for public actions in this sector.
2. Southern Europe's unity and diversity with regard to the problems of 'sectorial modernization', beginning with the originality (historically and to date) of its organization methods.
3. finally, the 'qualitative' explanation for the differential of public actions, where we will evaluate the scope of two possible hypotheses: sectorial over-politization and the patrimonialization of public policies.

1. Southern Europe as a framework for Community adaptation

First of all, let us place ourselves within the set of problems that southern European countries have in integrating new recipes for public actions which are injected into or reflected in the Community sphere. Remember that these are based on transforming a sector from a public monopoly into a competitive sector. As far as institutions are concerned, this implies a certain number of changes among which are:

- establishing rules for competing in monopolistic domains,
- separating telecommunications from post office activities,
- separating operator activities from regulation activities,
- opening up markets for supplies, services and telecommunications networks, including basic telephone service, beginning in 1998.

¹ to express this in a different way, "A problem appears when the social actors perceive gaps between what exists, what could exist and what should exist. Then follows a ranking process which brings in a qualification which belongs to the competence of public authorities" J.G. Padioleau : "L'Etat au concret" PUF Paris 1982 p.35, So that the problem of being behind is here the problem...

² here, the notion of being behind is considered as being relatively independent from the notion of progress, especially social progress. **IN THE SAME TIME, Great Britain APPEARS AS ONE OF THE MOST ADVANCED COUNTRY, IF WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ITS STATE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE, AND A SOCIAL LAGGING COUNTRY IF WE CONSIDER THE INCREASE IN BASIC TELEPHONE FEES (WHICH AFFECT ESSENTIALLY PEOPLE WITH MORE MODEST INCOMES). ON THE CONTRARY, the TECHNOLOGICALLY 'backward' countries of the south have advantageous fees on this same market segment**

In exchange for such upheavals which affect the prevailing organizational structures and principles for action (notably: public service also referred to as *à la française*), the European definition for universal service should compensate for the probable effects of inequality brought about by market play³.

In the "service public" model, each segment of the policy domain is related to the other by three types of link :

- an industrial one, where public grants and R&D efforts, regulated by the public authority, are benefiting to all operating actors in the same way;
- a financial one, where each service is linked to the other by cross-subsidies, so that user could not be defined by either his level of use or the location (central, peripheral) of such a use;
- a political one, where, at the top, the "industrial policy" finality is supposed to have a best value than a "competition policy" finality, and at the bottom, the risk of generating, by the market competition, a two (or three) speed society is best valued than the advantage of proximity to the user represented by such a competition.

In the universal service model, each link is contested. Each priority is reversed, and the universal service is based on the isolation of a type of user who would not be able (for social, geographical...reasons) to own modern services. To not to isolate him from the rest, several rules must be defined in which have to be precised :

- the financial cost and technological content of such a universal service;
- its way of evolution, or its revision related to technological progress;
- the contribution of each market actor (including the national and european public bodies) to its financing.

Each part of this new model generates a high political debate, and hard negotiations at european and national levels.

The fact that this liberalization policy has been placed on the agenda is due to a number of factors, among which is the concerted action by operators and private firms in the telecommunications sector. In the early 1980s, they pressured several political centers (national , such as in Great Britain; international, such as within GATT and ITU; European, within the Commission) to modify the rules of the game and to make them compatible with their entry into new markets. In this sense, European telecommunications policy making must be analyzed from several angles:

- that of an internal conquest of political and administrative positions which has resulted in a DG XIII being set up by Etienne Davignon, director of the first Telecommunications Task Force (Carpentier et alii., 1990). However, an overly excessive interpretation of this dynamic risks leading to over-estimating the autonomy of the European Commission in its ability to draw up game rules when faced with the various networks of players.
- that of concerted efforts among the Member-States to create a modernization policy. The policy's political costs, if they were to be assumed on a national scale, would be too direct and too heavy. This is the theory of Europe as a 'new framework for policy adaptation' (Lequesne, 1993; Cohen, 1992). This theory under-estimates the purely inter-governmental dimension of the political process, as well as saving the inter-state divisions and compromise dynamics which involve many players, which has been observed even within the committees responsible for managing these policies (Stevens, 1990).
- that of building arenas which would enable private economic players to reach a compromise while harmonizing their various interests (Esser & Noppe, 1996). This theory has undeniable

³ The nature and scope of this compensation are elements of a debate which we are unable to deal with here.

descriptive and analytical assets. It justifies the European strategy of industrialists, who do not have such powers within their own states, conquering influential positions in issues. It incorporates conflicts and contradictions within the European Commission itself (especially between Directorate General) which are the foundations for building and developing Community policies (Fuchs, 1994). These conflicts cannot be simplified to a series of adjustment problems between industrial interests. More generalized and political problems are also involved, such as the definition and extent of the concept of universal service. The European arenas are partially dependent on a more and more global structuring of interests and policies which leads to new methods, recipes and regulations.

Within this new intellectual matrix of telecommunication policies, the countries of southern Europe have initially played only a minor role, for three sets of reasons:

- firstly, the new recipes may be compared to economic situations and an abundance of network technologies and services. In most cases, an announcement of network and services saturation makes it easy to understand how the national field is opening up to new perspectives. Whether it has led to national disappointment such as in the case of the French cable Plan, or to brutal changes in regulations such as in the case of the United Kingdom, this opening up initially sparks the interest of organizations and governments needing to develop networks beyond their traditional borders. In this domain, the countries of southern Europe are much farther from a saturation point than their northern counterparts.

- when national interests of the south occur on a European scale, they are in two forms: that of protection-resistance when faced with the Commission's deregulating dynamics, as illustrated (however, accompanied here by France who plays a pivotal role) by the litigation on how the Commission uses its direct regulatory powers to open up the sector to competition (Gilles, 1995; Simon, 1994). The other form is that of disorganized pressure. Italian and Spanish firms, particularly, intercede on a European scale with a view to represent their own interests. In addition, as we shall see later, public organizations are made up of several institutions, with divergent statuses, which adds even more to the cost of a unit representation in a determined policy project. In this respect, Italy is emblematic (Négrier, 1997).

- as a consequence of these first two factors, the national call for sectorial reform is most often at the fringes of the system, such as the Italian *professori* as described by E. Brenac (1995), or in a precarious situation linked to their lack of historical roots (the Spanish DGTel, the state regulatory body of the sector, created in the mid-1980s), or because of their political instability (the Mitsotakis government in Greece up to 1994).

These three circumstances enable an understanding of the political situation of dependence / resistance / opportunism on the part of southern European players. In turn, this can explain why the interests of the southern European telecommunications, taken on a global scale, have not played a pivotal role in the intellectual development of new standards for national and European public actions. The dynamics themselves of these changes which took place within these arenas tend to increase the loss of influence of southern European countries, such as those organizations with non-economic interests (Esser & Noppe, 1996).

Then, implementation of Community policies endeavored to integrate this development differential. This was done in two manners which officialize the idea of having to catch up:

- through two-tier liberalization policies. These have enabled most southern countries to benefit from moratories to adapt their contexts to the new rules of competition. Such mechanisms can have perverse effects. Allowing operators and industrialists of the south to keep brutal confrontation with their future competitors (who are able to get to know the ropes of the new rules within the same time frame) at bay may, on the contrary of the anticipated equal opportunities, deepen the economic gap between north and south. This may leave only

one alternative to protectionism (now impossible) which is that southern European players could cash in on their influence that remains strong within national sanctuaries by creating alliances between weaker players and stronger ones.

- through structural policies to develop infrastructures and specific services for countries lagging behind and, for the most part, located in southern Europe. The STAR and TELEMATIQUE programs are two major examples of this policy. The former is more specifically focused on infrastructures and the latter on applications and services. An assessment could be contrasted. For STAR, three domains can be highlighted:

- the leverage effect which has enabled these operators to commit such voluntarist dynamics upon areas which would not have necessarily been provided for to such an extent. In particular, these funds allow investment advances to be made, especially in digitizing networks.

- the heterogeneity of program impacts on the targeted public. Small and medium-sized firms, who were the direct recipients in the beginning, were not always the principal beneficiaries of programs which were limited by specific zoning: Objective 1 zones of the EC, lagging behind in development, notably prevented know-how or technology from being transferred through its networks to more highly-developed regions of the Community.

- through this program, the creation of an environment whose structure has otherwise remained largely dependent on national and infra-national frameworks in organizing public-private relations. Take the case of Spain, where the autonomous regions have played a driving force in this environment organization.

Even though its volume has been modest, in relation to operators' total investments in these zones (2-3%), the STAR program has played an important role in spreading telecommunications development practices on a European scale.

The TELEMATIQUE initiative is in line with STAR. It was initially created to be based on the framework of

the first program, particularly in its definition which focuses on infrastructures. The second program, complementary to the first, was adopted in January 1991 by the Commission and had a nearly identical framework. It was financed by structural funds⁴, with nearly all operations reserved for Objective 1 regions. The program framework was set up and managed by the DG XIII and the DG XVI. TELEMATIQUE's qualitative evaluation brought out a loss of momentum in the territorial development dynamics of the TIC, in their initially designed form.

Beyond these two specific programs, a number of specific operations have been supported by the Commission in order to force the south to adapt to the new action standards. The 'Crash program' for Greece is particularly interesting. The reorganization, which aimed to bring the Greek network to the level of the other Member-States, involved the Commission's services to an extent never before seen. The emergency Plan was set up in close cooperation between the Greek authorities and the Commission. It was based on a preliminary application of the Community institutional framework (separation of operating and regulating functions, setting up consulting and regulating bodies, etc.).

Its implementation was based on the participation of a multinational firm of consultants which managed a group of Greek and international specialists. The principal objective of the studies was essentially to 'propose relevant policies and specific commercial actions that would make Greece a competitive partner in the European telecommunications sector' (Deriziotis, 1992).

⁴ Financed up to 50% of the operation when there is a private partner, 75% for the others, especially in the public sector, according to the FEDER regulations.

This Plan, its engineering, the compromises reached between institutional development and co-financing (up to 104 million ECUs) and the fact of turning to expertise multinationals well illustrates a logic of importing institutional and political recipes⁵.

The consequence was political conflict, first based on trade unions protests, strikes and then on the support they obtained from PASOK (Kosmidis, 1996). Telecommunication policy became one of the main political clivage subject during the campaign, so that the pasok, returning to power in 1994, announced the cancellation of the project (but without renouncing to european funding). The privatization turned into a new political debate (see below).

These two Community instruments (implementation moratorium, specific structural policy) are based on a dual exchange hypothesis: time availability in exchange for an agreement on a single channel of sectorial transformation, allocation of additional clauses for public resources in exchange for regulation privatization. However, it is not easy for these exchanges to be equal. Aside from the perverse effects potentially induced by the time frames agreed to and the subsidies allocated, these policies can only control a small share of the financial and regulatory flow as well as economic relations between international players in the sector. Acclimatizing to the new rules presumes, at least initially, acceptance of a loss of national political control on behalf of the major players (and not only the governments), that does not go without saying. Like the regional structural policies (for the Objective 1 regions) which do not compensate for the effects of unequal development of other European Union policies (especially competition policies, as well as those for research & development, etc.), sectorial policies for macro-regional cohesion may not be able to remove the meaning from other sectorial trends, if not at least the contrarities.

2. The Southern European telecommunications mosaic

Assuming that southern Europe can be approached in a homogeneous manner, we must now examine saving convergences and divergences that leave their mark on any comparative analysis. Beyond an exercise in style, this type of comparison supplies a number of interesting points on the 'modernity' as compared with institutional systems and, last but not least, certain paradoxical results.

a) Unique histories

We want to show, in this part, that a brief look at the genesis (and first evolutions) of each national southern sector has its own specificity, but can highlight several similarities.

The development of Italian telecommunications owes much to the Mussolini period for its structuring. The regime's initial move, beginning in the 1920s, was to form an institutional system based on a dividing-up of zones which were then turned over to private firms (one of which, the SIP (Società Idroelettrica Piemontese) was still in operation up to 1994, when Telecom Italia was founded). From this initial fragmentation, based both on the idea of creating structural links between the regime and many industrialists as well as on making it possible for the government to control them (which would have been more delicate with only one private monopoly) there ensued a diverse organization where there were at least 6 firms, with different statuses. Each one was responsible, within its own domain, for managing the telecommunications infrastructures and services. The relative shortcomings of private firms as well as the rejection in extremis of the ITT solution by the Einaudi government at Italy's liberation for reasons of national independence, led to a progressive and pragmatic nationalization of the sector as each private concession ended (up to 1958). But this

⁵ We can refer to these recipes as being European, except for a certain idea of subsidiarity. The Greeks, being under-represented within the structure, are a notable exception.

nationalization, contrary to the French nationalization of 1923, did not lead to unification of the sub-sets into a single administration. It merely brought about a juxtaposition of these divided parts, within the State's contributions, leaving most of their statutes, assignments and prerogatives relatively unchanged. The public / private relations as well as the unions' competition / cooperation was based around this fragmented framework. In particular, the role played by Siemens in Italtel, formally public but closely linked to his ex-owner, could be mentioned as the symbol of both the persistent private order of the public policy, as well as the political cover of the private sector (this paradox will be developed in next section). The concentration of links uniting all the protagonists in Italian politics around this framework can partially explain the singular difficulty in reforming the system in the 1980-90s.

Since 1892, the Greek telecommunications have been under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State. In 1926, an 8-year concession was granted to the New Antwerp Telephone and Electrical Works, which soon became a subsidiary of SIEMENS. In 1930, the government granted exclusive rights to SIEMENS-HALSKE AG to develop and manage the Greek urban network. However, the peripheral regions and non-profit zones are managed directly by the State, similar to the Post Office administration. It was only in 1949 after World War II that the Greek public company, OTE, was formed. At the outset, it was separated from the Post Office administration.

Till 1989, the sector remained under the status of public monopoly. The first attempt to privatize was launched by Mitsotakis' conservative government, and is still, after political stop-and-go, in debate.

Management of the Spanish telecommunications has shown a similar development. Between 1924 and 1946, the TELEFONICA company was a subsidiary of ITT. It was partially nationalized by the Franco regime and was created as a separate entity from the Post Office. However, the Compania Telefonica Nacional de Espana has formally kept the statutes of a private company. The Spanish State, the largest shareholder, up until 1987 only held 47% of the shares, then 34%, and finally 30%. At this time, the CNTE became Telefonica de Espana S.A. During this time, the Gonzalez government supported both a reform of the sector's internal rules of organizing and a voluntarist policy of international investments, especially in Latin America. The separation between regulating and operator activities came about in 1985 when the General Directorate of Telecommunications (DGTel) was formed within the Transport Ministry, well before the deadline date established by the new Community rules.

In 1887, the Portuguese telecommunications were turned over by the State to three companies who had a geographic monopoly: the Anglo-Portuguese Company for Lisbon and Porto up until 1968. Correios e Telecomunicacoes de Portugal became a State administration in 1911 and supplied the remainder of services and infrastructures until 1922 when its shortcomings, notably financial, were noted in the international domain. The Companhia Portuguesa Radio-Marconi obtained the concession for this portion of the activities. From then on, the telecommunications landscape was split up into three operators, two of which were public (TLP and CTT) and one which was a mixture (DPRM, with only 51% public). The reorganization of telecommunication sector began in 1991, by separating postal service and telecommunication within CTT. Then the creation of Comunicacoes Nacionais, SGPS-SA as the state-holding company for telecommunications (1993), and the merging of tlp with the telecommunication domain of the ex-CTT (TP) led to the privatization process, which began in 1995.

Four characteristics should be highlighted in this brief historical reminder:

- Everywhere, we noted a premature presence of non-national interests in the organization of the sector. Whether it was implicit as in the Italian case, or more directly as in the other cases, the role played by these international operators has been going on longer than in the northern countries, where champion and national administrations were more prematurely anchored in their sanctuaries.
- the statute itself of a national administration does not have the same reality as in the north. When nationalization is developed, it rarely breaks with the private statutes of companies. In addition, it often only deals with a portion of the sector's management. That way, the influence of foreign models has continued to be felt, whether it is Siemens for Italy, British organizational frameworks for Portugal or North-American for Spain.
- In view of the rules that have been established as the models of sectorial modernity (regulation / operator separations; telecommunications / post office for example), the countries of southern Europe have distinguished themselves through certain innovations, long before their northern counterparts.
- As a consequence of the preceding events, the public and private landscapes of southern European telecommunications (particularly in the Italian and Portuguese cases) have been marked by a division of interests which have altered the zoning or how the sectors share their activities. In the Italian case, the process of political exchanges has also been altered (cf. infra).

b) A differential implementation of European policies

Considered as being behind, southern European countries benefit from specific policies. Nevertheless, they are asked to implement common rules of Community policies. Here, we are interested in knowing how we can spot convergences and divergences in these implementation processes which we know represent a key moment in building public policies. Having already noted that they converge on a lack of participation in intellectually and strategically drawing up the rules, we wish to note a few principal features of their differentiated implementation in these various countries.

Table n°3 : Southern European Main Sectoral Evolutions

Country	First institutionnal design	Birth of the dominant company	Status of the dominant company	Regulatory agency (birth and level of autonomy)	Competition and privatization
Greece	Two private companies sharing the sector (C&W and a Siemens's subsidiary) under licences. The State is responsible for peripheral regions	1949 : Birth of OTE, benefiting from the monopoly	1949 : private 1983 : public company 1996 : partial privatization	1993 : creation of NTC (National Telecommunication Committee) low level of autonomy vis à vis the State	1993 : first attempt of partial privatization (49%) aborted. 1996 : new attempt of partial privatization (8%)
Italy	Regional fragmentation, then plurality of public operators	1993 : creation of Telecom Italia	Private status owned by public shareholding (except the ASST, with a public administration status)	Controversy between two solutions : a sectoral "Authority" or a regulatory task held by the (generalist) Anti-Trust. Yet Inexistent	1982 : Morganti Report on restructuring the Tlc public sector 1992 : creation of IRI-TEL integrated in the STET group 1993 : first project of privatization
Portugal	regional fragmentation	1994 : creation of Telecom Portugal	Mixed : Private status owned by public shareholding and	1989 : creation of ICP (Instituto das Comunicacoes de Portugal) average	1990 : First attempt for privatizing (49%) 1995-96 : New attempt, with a

			public status	level of autonomy	debate about a strategic alliance
Spain	unique operator (ITT, then Telefonica)	1946 : Public Company Telefonica	Private status, owned by public shareholding, then partially privatized	1993 : creation of the DGTel (within the Ministry of Tranports, Medias...) average level of autonomy	Before 1987 : the State holds 45% of the shares of Telefonica 1987 : 34% 1995 : 32% 1996 : 20%

We have already dealt with the Greek case (cf. supra) through implementation of the Commission's Crash Program. The overall reform process can be characterized by three principal features:

- the fragility of internal political support for the privatization process, accompagnied by a politization of conflicts (PASOK, then the opposition, vs. the New Democracy), followed by an attempt on the part of PASOK (restored to power) to find a more moderate path towards privatization.
- the powerful ability to mobilize unions, hostile to any deregulation. The PASOK project to privatize only 49% of OTE failed after only 6% of its capital was listed on the Stock Exchange. The government could have done this without any legislative or constitutional reform. However, this matter caused a 4-day strike. The management itself remains globally hostile to privatization, in spite of the efforts made by the government.
- the ability of industrial interests to maintain institutional relations as they are, especially on the part of OTE to efficiently resist any recourse to a strategic outside partner.

The Spanish case is almost the opposite. The government has been able to maintain an autonomous regulation of the sector, the State's pragmatic withdrawal from Telefonica's capital, as well as the remarkable efficiency of the latter in international markets and alliances. Mobilizing for modernization even integrates, in its own way, the autonomous structure by giving Catalonia a certain role in the regionalized investment policies as well as in European forums for public policies. Barcelona's mayor has thus become the Spanish representative for the Bangeman group and is in charge of putting European policies, linked to the *Information Society*, back on its feet. Three features characterize Spanish policies:

- an incremental reform logic, begining with the initial 1987 regulations, and the 1992 modifications have enabled the European standards to be integrated. Implementing a State - Telefonica Contract - Plan, installing the DGTel, setting up a consulting Council have all served to bring together the principal interests of the sector which have enabled the respective positions to be continually adjusted.
- consensual dynamics, in the measure that there are no major conflicts between PSOE and PP in this domain. There are none between the government and Telefonica's management as they are globally favorable to reform. The latter, on the contrary of many other European countries, controls a considerable share of the sector, including equipment industries. Internal and international alliances are therefore able to integrate themselves quite well within this structure.
- union opposition is principally strong on privatization. However, as in Italy, it is considered as an inevitable process and this makes the representatives prefer pragmatically negotiating problems dealing more with the consequences of privatization (social management) rather than its implementation. As in Italy and in Portugal, negotiating retirement pensions is one of the terms of political exchanges which unions deal with.

The implementation of Portuguese reforms has borrowed heavily from the Spanish model, although the structuring of the sector is a priori closer to that of Italy. The institutional split-up between operators and constitutional constraints has involved a multi-stage process with great difficulties and tricky negotiations, as much on the financial plan as from a social point of view. The installation of an autonomous regulating body in 1989 was earlier than the other southern countries. The reshaping of all the companies into one took place in 1994 with an objective of making privatization more attractive. This process showed three general characteristics:

- the consensus of the two principal governmental political forces, the Socialist Party and the Social Democrat Party, whose accord became necessary in 1989 in order to revise the constitution. The constitution, as it was written, did not allow privatization in this sector.
- the capacity of the autonomous regulatory body (Institute for Communications of Portugal) to play its regulating role in the sector, backed by political consensus, the support of companies' managements, and a position of the unions comparable to that of Spain.
- union hostility on principle which, in practice, did not result in tensions about implementation: retirement pensions, and fatalist acceptance of the ongoing process.

The process of Italian reform is undoubtedly the most complex of the four. On one hand, the splitting-up that began geographically and then continued by more or less solid blocks of activities, posed painful reshaping problems. Beyond this, interest dynamics long remained highly unfavorable to any vague desires of reform. This was because strong exchange processes established themselves on these split-ups:

- between the various industrialists and various operators which can explain, for example, the long-term maintaining of a state administration, ASST, as an operator along with the major public operator, SIP. In fact, this administration was one of the 'compensation chambers' of technological progress. It allowed suppliers to get rid of outdated equipment inventories at incomparable market prices. The affair of the Olivetti sale of telex machines in the 1980s is a good example. The ASST thus divided up the market (whose shares have remained unchanged for more than a decade) between several Italian and foreign operators (among which was Philips, Siemens, Alcatel, Italtel and Olivetti)⁶. This undoubtedly can explain the long absence of the Confindustria from the reform debate. Indeed, this company simultaneously represented the industrialists of the sector, who were globally favorable to the status quo, and the economic interests, who were a priori more interested in reshaping the dynamics of the public system.

- between the political forces, the industrialists and the unions. The telecommunications unions are themselves partly based on these split-ups, with the Christian-Democrats (CISL) hegemonic with the ASST, while the CGIL dominated in the other public branches.

The most recent reform consisted of bringing together all the operators in a single company, under the leadership of Telecom Italia. This took more than a decade during which there were many attempts and projects (Giacalone-Vergnano, 1991). The setting up of an autonomous regulating body followed the same rocky path. Recent successes in moving forward with reform seem to be due to a new "window of opportunity" opened by the role of "idea agitators" (experts, including the *professori* - a prominent member of which is the current prime minister Romano Prodi - journalists, consultants, etc. (Négrier et al., 1996)), and facilitated by certain revelations of the *Mani Pulite* ("Clean hands" corruption investigations) and the parliamentary and governmental collapse of the Christian-Democrats.

⁶ We know that such practices are far from being an Italian monopoly, particularly when you take the example of industrial 'consanguinity' between Alcatel and France-Télécom concerning over-billing of equipment.

The current debates about privatizing stet (the public holding group controlling telecommunication activities) seems, in part in appearance only (see below), to signify a loss of influence of the historical dominant coalition in this sector.

In summary, the Italian situation distinguishes itself through:

- a sectorial split-up making any attempt for global reform complex;
- a social and political concentration of exchanges based on this division, therefore reinforcing constraints when faced with changes;
- an apparent politization of sectorial management, where the positions are reversed in comparison with traditional divisions. The Christian-Democrats are more hostile to liberalization and the PDS is more favorable to such a process.

Three lessons can be retained from this second comparative table:

- i) the most contemporary development of public policies owes a lot to long-term factors. Implementing Community policies, beyond the south's own global characterizations, are largely dependent on these factors. They enable the south to be viewed as a specific theater for comparison, rather than a homogenous political forum.
- ii) among these long-term factors, the splitting-up of interests, often considered as a basic fact of southern Europe (Schmitter, 1995), cannot be systematically verified. It can especially be seen at work in the Portuguese and Italian cases, to a lesser extent in the other two countries. In particular, the consequences of this splitting up on the process of public actions greatly vary. It is a high constraint only in Italy and, to a certain extent, could appear *a contrario* as a resource in Portugal. By observing how deep this splitting up is socially anchored in political exchanges (thereby measuring the concentration of interests and values that give it long-term relevancy) a relation between the splitting-up, the style of public policies and interest representation can be established.
- iii) Finally, it can be noted that of the principal variables mentioned (institutionalization of change, degree of conflictuality / consensus of governmental parties, ideological and strategic positioning of unions, interest representation), very few are at the same level of relevance and in the same position in each country. Southern Europe, from a dual point of view of historical genesis and implementation of new European recipes for public action, is therefore both comparable and dissimilar. The only remaining element is the problem of going beyond a simple description and trying to explain the deeper reasons for these elements of internal convergence and differentiation.

Table n°4 : Southern European Main Policy patterns

Country	Public sectoral design	Unions' attitude towards liberalization	Privatization process design	International pattern	Delay in implementing Competition Rules
Greece	Unitarian* until 1949 Former territorial and sectoral fragmentation	High level of conflict	Politically driven and hardly conflictual	Low level of international strategie	Yes
Italy	Unitarian until 1993 Former territorial then sectoral fragmentation	Conflicts (within Unions too) and political exchange	Plurality of obstacles, big amount of aborted projects	Selective level of international strategy	No
Portugal	Unitarian until 1994 Former territorial	Political exchange	Gradualism and consensus between main	Low level of international strategy	Yes

	and sectoral fragmentation		Parties		
Spain	Unitarian until the beginning	Political exchange	Gradualism and consensus between main Parties	High level of international strategy	Yes

* by unitarian, we mean the fact that exist only one telecommunication operator

3. Two theories on southern Europe's lagging behind⁷

Whether these presuppositions are accepted or not, analyzing the south's lagging behind poses a crucial problem. Beyond even a fastidious interpretation of the figures or institutional processes, here it is a question of testing two methods of possible explaining the south's particularities. The first underlines the politization of interests and policies as distinction criteria . The second highlights a particularity of the State-society relationship that can be characterized by the patrimonialization of public policies.

a) politization in question

When Judge Green prepared to begin the break-up of ATT in the United States, he began a series of consultations in order to observe the way in which the various developed nations managed their telecommunications sector. For this, he met Carlo Cerutti, administrator-delegate and vice-president of the STET, and voiced his perplexity faced with the incredible complexity of the Italian system. In order to explain the way reference points could be found in the maze of structures and dispensaries, the latter had only a simple answer: 'siamo tutti amici!'

This little anecdote, which is typically Italian, sheds a particular light on the regulating conditions of the split-up system described earlier. In the case of Italy, the politization program is often considered as being central. It deals with only a portion of reality analyzed here. The splitting-up of organized interests goes hand-in-hand with the extent political and partisan divisions have penetrated them. This is even one of the most generalized characteristics of southern European policies. In the particular case of telecommunications, we would like to discuss the merits of this hypothesis of a 'generalized politization of social activity'.

First, it covers a certain number of facts which are empirically observable. The historical weight of the Christian-Democrats heading all the sector's institutions is an initial and undeniable fact. The progressive admission of certain representatives of secular and socialist parties (at the time of pentapartito) in the 1970s and 1980s has reinforced telecommunications' enrollment in the lottizzazione logic. The administrators-delegates of these parties have enlarged the basis for a broad consensus on the sector's overall organization. For the same reason as banks, the RAI, mechanical industries or the administration, telecommunications have supplied the ideal framework for this analysis in terms of politization. By observing the career development of those heading the IRI, it is obvious that this politization goes back a long way to the para-public origin of a sector set up by the fascists. Initially controlled by the National Fascist Party, the IRI was then dominated by the Republican Parties in such a way that the political field became central because it was

⁷ For reasons of space and availability of comparable field data, we cannot discuss these two theories (except for certain exceptions) here, based on all the countries. Therefore, for the moment we shall limit ourselves to dealing with Italy. However, a version of this development can be found in my article: 'Is there an Italian telecommunications policy?' to be published in QUADERNI, Paris, 1997 for the special issue on Italy.

the major place where jobs were distributed and the managers of the economy were selected-reproduced (Sormagen, 1996). This 'colonization' of the public sector is part of a politization process of the Welfare-State in which the southern European conservative parties have registered their strategies (Pappas, 1996).

The penetration of partisan division within the telecommunication unions gives a final touch to a process that seemed inevitable from that moment on. However, to us, this theory appears contradictory with certain essential aspects of conducting Italian telecommunications policies. - first of all, it is contradictory with the fact the series of micro-alternances with the Christian-Democrats and the government have never really been an element for changing the system. The remarkable permanence of the same men at the head of the five companies, then Telecom-Italia and the STET shows an obvious discrepancy between political systems and the sectorial elite.

- it is rather contradictory because of the quasi-generalized lack of partisan expertise in this domain. What is true for the Christian-Democrats is all the more for the other parties. This can explain the highly important role that experts have played (professors, specialized journalists, consultants) in intellectual problem building and inventing new recipes for public action.

This has taken place in such a way that the role played by the parties in the sector's political orientation seems secondary to us when faced with the essential management function exercised by a closely-knit elite or a 'scuola' from which have come all the true Italian telecommunications managers for over two decades (Bottiglieri, 1987). Infra-partisan by training, this group is based on much support: inside the DC even by the Opus Dei of the Vatican; within the private economic system, by the State, by certain union-backed parties, etc. A system of long-term political exchanges enabled arrangements to be made between this group of partners: markets for industrialists, representation and social conquests for unions; budgetary funds for the State; prestigious positions for parties; and legitimacy reproduction of managers for the scuola.

In addition, it benefitted from a strong ability to co-opt due to the fact that, contrary to the French model for example (Giraud, 1987), there is no single, central and prestigious training center for this elite.

Consequently, it was this closely-knit elite who managed (some people will say they did it for themselves) the regulation of the system ('siamo tutti amici') and especially the ideological adaptation to new technological, economic and political contexts.

The theory of politization from a formal point of view (occupation of positions, partisan penetration in public institutions and companies within the sector, etc.) as well as from a process point of view (political exchange logics among numerous interested and legitimate players). On the other hand, it is more difficult to spot it from a more substantial point of view. 'Politizing' policies remains a dead angle of analysis.

The best proof of this lack of substantial politization, of sectorial purpose, comparable to saving a great project typical of the French neo-Colbert period (Cohen, 1992), are undoubtedly the events which took place after the Ulivo pole victory in April, 1996. before the latter, the STET's elite and its principal manager, Ernesto Pascale, seemed to have a very coherent and long term distinct strategy about telecommunication policies. the latter was, for instance, resisting any form of sudden privatization, limiting international alliances which target italian territory to technological aspects (with ibm), promoting a specific and distinct agency of the antitrust, implementing a vast plan for installing wide-band fiber optic cables (before privatization) targeted at 10 million households as of 1999. after april 1996, the same elite shown a total convergence with the liberal theories advocated by the italian antitrust, headed by Giuliano Amato. the announcement of negotiations with CABLE&WIRELESS

about share exchanges, the integration of Stet into the fourth largest international operator center (C&W-VEBA-BOUYGUES), the announced privatization preceded by a regulatory reshaping, the questioning of the cable plan by the STET and Telecom-Italia are all significant political about-faces of the adaptability of the Italian telecommunications elite to changing environmental and political constraints.

This sort of disconnection between the three forms of politization (formal, process-oriented, substantial) is linked to the specific nature of the political delegation to this managing group. A hypothesis can be formulated that, for the political class itself, the telecommunications sector represents an expensive investment with uncertain profitability. This class has massively deserted expertise in a sector that, in spite of certain adjustment difficulties, supplies the State with a constant income like its European counterparts. Finally the political parties have delegated the regulation of the system to a specific group, in exchange for material and symbolic allowances. By doing this, they have given up actually conducting the policies.

The Italian example is useful for a profound discussion on politization's unequivocal theory. This theory has also been put forward well beyond this country, as shown by the Greek case. The dissatisfaction that this theory brings out is, of course, due to the fact that in the south it often develops from a feeling of stigmatization. There are often societal mechanics that lie behind the determining role given to policies.

b) patrimonialization of public policies

The other theory that we would like to briefly present is based on a longer-term analysis, to the contrary of that of politization. Around notions of patrimonialism (Ritaine, 1995) or neo-patrimonialism (Magone, 1997), the idea is to put southern European public policies back into a historical set of problems of State-society relations. However, this assumes that one of the Weberian interpretations of patrimony (expenses) designed, in bureaucratic analysis, as a pre-modern stage. Applying this model to societal relations would be similar to accepting a simple fact of lagging behind. On the contrary, patrimonialization should be one of the specific conditions in the south for modernization. According to J.M. Magone, "the patrimonialism has two possible forms. In one, the traditionalistic variant, the patron-client relationship permeates the entire political system (...). In the second, the modernizing patrimonial system, the greater rate and extent of social mobilization lead to potential discontinuities in the set of patron-client relationships, not only between different levels of governmental authority but between different sectors as well" (Lemarchand, Legg 1972, pp.166-167 cited by Magone 1997, in introduction).

The modernizing patrimonialist arrangements alter the basic principles of the political market (State-society distinction, alternance, economic rationality, equal access to the political market, etc.). The splitting up of the economy, political and social heterogeneity, the colonization of the State by groups which appear as essential elements of these political systems. These are the conditions for importing new market political systems which can interact with the historicity of political regimes. Evelyne Ritaine dealt with a combination of institutional realities of the rational State and contradictory practices (standard / illegality, nation / particularisms, formal / informal. She realized that it was impossible to set up a rational State, in the absence of forces which could enable a structured project to be in a position of swaying collective interests over individual interests. The consequence of this combination is that official structures are adapted to these political, social, actual industrial relations as well as adjusting to the democratic rules of the game.

Adapting such a framework to public policies means that they appear, in the long term, as the product of a combination of clientelist and rationale-legal relationship (and not the struggle

between the both). Patrimonialization, as a process, is the influential role played by private interest and clientelist relationship on modern policies and political cleavages (such as party cleavages, policy controversies).

Let us go back to the principal characteristics of southern Europe's telecommunications organization:

- in all these countries, the firm(s) having the monopoly is (are) generally private. They have generally kept this statute while being belatedly or partially integrated into the State. Certain historical analysis have tried to find the reason for this in long-term history and especially because, in these countries, the Counter-Reform would have long prevented the rise of an economic market-based policy. Industrial feudal power, due initially to the fact that entrepreneurs from a completely different creed were unable to penetrate the market, found itself consolidated by non-intervention on the part of the State in matters of competition (Pospischil, 1994).
- in the phase of public monopolies, the weight of private groups can be analyzed in a specific way in relation to the north. It has deeply penetrated the State and has blocked reform perspectives in Italy. It has put the Spanish State into a dyadic relation with the powerful TELEFONICA. It has been able to fend off the perspectives of strategic foreign penetration in Greece. It has been the cause of institutional split-up in Portugal. Its force is therefore much stronger than in the north, in its relation to and within the State. Its relational method is also. It could be tempting to reverse the French and Italian models. Alcatel's history is that of the product of public voluntarism which, today, has resulted in the company having an autonomy similar to that of an international private firm. The strength of a company is inseparable from an initial collective interest: the great industrial project, the arsenal. On the other hand, Italtel's history is that of progressively integrating a company controlled from the beginning by Siemens into the public domain. In this capacity, it must deal with numerous competitors, both national and international. In this case, public powers are the expression itself and the consequence of private influences, while the French private firms are the expression and consequence of public powers.

In other words, the south, as well as the north, has monopolies, formal institutions which are roughly similar to the sectorial role and similar laws. However, these elements do not follow the same dynamics of the State-society relations. We shall qualify the differential role of the private sector as a status and as a set of values, patrimonialism. Beyond that, patrimonialization of public policies also signifies the great importance given to appropriation logics by specific groups, in and through public action, in undermining more general notions of collective interests.

Here, in the long term, split-up, semi-collective interests within general political interests prevail. Politization is only a visible and practical phenomenon of a more fundamental process of 'privatizing' interests obeying a patrimonial logic. Then, the problem is posed about the capacity of the patrimonialization process to produce and reproduce public goods and collective services. The telecommunications State in southern Europe is neither totally patrimonial nor legal-rational. It is a compromise between the two. The nature of this compromise, which follows from analyzing political exchanges it gives rise to, can be perfectly capable of leading to great sectorial modernity or, on the contrary, to conjunctural or structural blockages in the modernization process. The Spanish and Portuguese cases illustrate the first case rather well while Italy and Greece illustrate the second. In such a situation, the 'success' of the modernization process does not necessarily involve importing standardized

recipes, as the failure of the European Crash Program in Greece well illustrated this point, nor through imitating models, for example that were believed to be applied in Italy, based on the British model. It can often be done by confronting groups which, in order to be heterodox in relation to northern standards considered to be excellent, become mandatory, and often efficient, mediators for change. One of the ultimate paradoxes of this ongoing process is that it gives the State an unprecedented capacity of monitoring Europeanization of the public action. This is the same State who was denounced in the south for its lacking, incompleteness and captivity in relation to socio-economic interests.

Conclusion:

On what conditions can modernization be based on a patrimonial economy of political exchanges? By putting this question forward as an ultimate remark, we wish to underline that the problem of being behind as well as recipes for catching up, is only one stake among other sectorial policies in southern Europe and in the European Community. The splitting-up of interests was undoubtedly the reason for great modernizing variations (you only need to mention Italian progress in portable telephones, or the Spanish in the field of international investments). As policies are in part the product of the combination between patrimonialist and rational-legal relationships, such combinations vary within each sector. The links between each sub-sector are less built on general norms than on specific political exchanges between heritages.

Politization, which is a distinctive trait of southern European politics, may seem to be a falsely obvious explanation. The links between the political system and the sectorial system are undoubtedly studied much less in northern Europe. They are not necessarily less intense than in the south, as illustrated by the strongly ideological dimension of British liberalization policies under Mrs. Thatcher, or even the discovery of 'covert links' between the large industrial firms, operators and political parties in France.

Consequently, it is the form of politization that should be highlighted in order to identify any southern European specificities. We believe that the sector's patrimonial roots as well as the development of these logics within the apparently very classical system itself can help to understand this paradox of a political system's centrality in terms of 'occupation' and its minor importance in terms of programming. In other words, the political centrality is politically hollow. Such a hollow politics is due to the combination of a high presence of the political system and its crucial lack of policy influence.

More generally, we have attempted here to reconcile two approaches which are often exclusive of each other: synchronic strategies and 'cultural' diachronies. Telecommunication changes are often considered as the product of interest short term calculations and their intermediation with (and within) the State. At the opposite, we could find some exclusive historical (the future is in the past) or cultural (past and future are fossilized into differences) explanation of the contrary. Our purpose is to combine the both, in order to pay attention to the fact that the actors influence policy patterns on the basis of a political construction of the reality. Such a reality is socially and historically built. The long timeframe offers stimulating analytical perspectives to explain dynamic elements of contemporary change, on the condition that the risks of relativism or culturalism can be controlled. These risks are often denounced as one of the flaws of this type of approach. It is even more so in a sector such as telecommunications where the globalization and increasing interdependence between the players and systems seem to disclaim any relevance to analyzing specificities. It thus becomes apparent that all the European systems, according to the often varying agendas, are confronted with the same global constraints. Public organizations are in the process of being privatized, or at least the change of their status is in debate. Introducing community regulations on competition is also on the agenda. The fact that industrial relations are now international also

affects the south. As we can see in figure 1 to 4, mobile networks and services appear as the main experimental competition sub-sector, while telephone sector remains (except for Italy) generally less dense or complex. These two features are not specific of the Southern countries.

Figure 1 to 4 : Telecoms in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
Source : Sirius “ The Stratlas 1996 ” Montpellier

place here Greece and Italy

place here Portugal and Spain

However, these converging trends do not exhaust sectorial policy analysis. Two different patterns favor the relevance of a differential analysis grid:

- at the Southern European level, the long-term structure of the State-sector relations is the foundation for implementing these changes. Now, implementation does not only involve applying standardized rules. At its level, it also produces rules for the political game which can influence, much more than the general standards, the players' strategy. At this second level, the analysis of patrimonial policy structures can add its contribution to analyzing public policies. For instance, while the sectoral penetration by extra-national interests seems to be formally similar between northern and southern Europe, it often concretely differs : international firms must generally negotiate much more their entry with public or private sectoral actors already established, in order to be integrated to the complexity of the political exchange rules, and understand them.

Taking into account patrimonialist policy patterns could also allow us to a better understanding of the diverging effects of competition policies between north and south, especially for the influence of regulation authority within its sector, the balance between market enforcement and the universal service policy, the territorial dimension of networks and services innovation. For these three goals, it is not indifferent to know that we are, or we are not in presence of a patrimonialist policy style.

- extending the scope, we could first consider that the European common regulation of telecommunications is based too on a mosaic of locations and national cultures. And secondly that such a mosaic is also partially hinged on negotiations between private and public interests in order to achieve policy compromises. The rational-legal appearance of such negotiation has already, in several cases, shown that there were, behind, a (specific ?) Form of northern clientelism⁸. This patrimonialist pattern, which has been archived too quickly with political archaisms, could be considered as one of the actual dimensions of policy implementation and analysis.

Nevertheless, we have attempted to point the fact that the Europeanisation process could, in the same movement, produce standardized recipes and highlight specific intra-European policy dimensions. With using patrimonialism in the policy analysis field, we intended to show that political construction of the agenda can differ, for each policy, between members, and that the implementation process could also differ between the north and the south of Europe, not only for economical or strategical reasons, but also for political rooted matters.

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⁸ FOR INSTANCE IN FRANCE , THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALCATEL AND FRANCE TELECOM HAS BEEN RECENTLY SHOWN AS THE PERFECT EXAMPLE OF THE "DECADENCE" OF AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY. THE LATTER HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE INCAPABLE OF ANY EFFICIENT CONTROLE OF THE FORMER'S PRICE FIXING, WHEREAS AN IMPRESSIVE SYSTEM OF CONTROLE WAS SHOWN IN EXAMPLE.

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ABSTRACT : Recent changes within European telecommunication (and related) policies stresses the idea that Southern Europe could be defined as a delayed policy space. Beyond economical and statistical analysis, such an identification is based on three different pillars. First the fact that Europe has provided Southern Europe with specific policies, with the following consequence that its delay has been partially institutionalised. Second, and more interesting for our workshop headlines, southern delay in the achievement of policy goals, such as modernization, has been explained as the consequence of a highest density of politicisation of interest groups.

Third, new attempts, such as patrimonialist design have been made to find a qualitative and common pattern within Southern European policy field, in order to avoid both a strict statistical construction of reality and problems in interpreting what politicisation means and to what extent its congruency is well established. This application aims to discuss the validity of patrimonialist pattern analysis, and its contribution to the more global analysis of the relationship between political and interest politics. Could we consider that patrimonialism is, in that way, a pattern of Southern European interest intermediation ?