Expert opinion in a tort litigation game
Résumé
We investigate the potential impact of various proposed reforms intended to improve
the quality of expert testimony while reducing its cost, and to facilitate the work of
judges in appointing experts and reading their reports. To do so, we present a unilateral
care model under strict liability in which the court cannot perfectly observe the
amount of harm a tortfeasor has caused to a victim. However, the judge may appoint
an expert to improve his chance of reaching a correct decision. In this context, we
find that the likelihood of a victim filing a lawsuit decreases with the quality of the
expert testimony and with the cost of the expertise procedure, and increases with the
non-monetary cost for the judge to appoint an expert. Moreover, we find that the
e↵ects of these parameters on the injurer’s level of precaution are ambiguous. We also
find that the injurer’s level of care is suboptimal. Finally, we make some public policy
recommendations in order to (i) increase the injurer’s level of care and (ii) reduce the
expected cost of a trial in the event of an accident. We find that the policy maker faces
a trade-o↵ between these two objectives.
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