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Board attributes and shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions: a survey of the literature

Abstract : The question of whether a “good” corporate board structure can optimize performance and minimize conflicts between managers and shareholders has been widely debated. Because mergers and acquisitions represent major managerial investment decisions that are subject to board scrutiny, the effectiveness of a board’s structure is especially visible in the context of corporate acquisitions. With that in mind, in this paper, we examine the abundant literature in the fields of strategic management, economics, and finance in order to identify which board attributes contribute to the ability of corporate boards to create value through mergers and acquisitions. In particular, we discuss the impact of four board attributes: (1) board independence, (2) board size and director-specific attributes, (3) board ownership and compensation, (4) multiple directorships. As a result of our analysis, we conclude that the impact of board attributes on shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions is specific to each firm. Therefore, board regulations that do not reflect a firm’s specific needs may in fact hinder the creation of a board that is capable of responding effectively to the firm’s unique needs and circumstances.
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Contributor : Etienne Redor Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, November 25, 2016 - 8:47:15 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, December 21, 2021 - 11:18:02 AM




Etienne Redor. Board attributes and shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions: a survey of the literature. Journal of Management and Governance, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2016, 20 (4), pp.789 - 821. ⟨10.1007/s10997-015-9328-y⟩. ⟨hal-01403410⟩



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