Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization

Sylvain Béal (1) , Eric Rémila (2) , Philippe Solal (2)

1 CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190)
2 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne

In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is used to construct a new axiom of invariance, and to provide a new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value. This characterization only invokes marginalistic principles, and does not rely on classical axioms such as symmetry, efficiency or linearity. Moreover, our approach reveals a new instructive role played by veto players.

Mots clés: Veto players; Addition invariance; Basis; Kernel; Shapley value

Domaines: Informatique et théorie des jeux [cs.GT]; Microstructure des marchés [q-fin.TR]

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal. Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization. 2014. ⟨hal-01377927⟩