



## Argument Clauses

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## Argument Clause

Some predicates take clauses as arguments, i.e., as complements syntactically and semantically necessary to have a complete predication. Such clauses are called argument clauses. They denote abstract objects and stand in relation to a wide range of abstract operations. Ancient Greek displays numerous types of argument clause. These can be classified with respect to the abstract objects they denote and the truth value/reality status of their denotation, thus giving a coherent picture.

Argument clauses are a specific case of →subordination. They are also called complement or completive clauses, which implies a ~~primarily~~ syntactic definition. They are taken to be →subjects or objects (i.e., complements in a wide sense; →complementation) of a predicate (→Predicative Constituents)→, which can be a verb (e.g. *légō* ‘say’), an adjective (e.g. *dēlos* ‘obvious’) or a noun (see the famous *thaûma idēsthai* ‘a wonder to behold’). Surprisingly, they are sometimes also defined by the category they belong to and said to be substantive clauses (Kühner and Gerth 1904:§547, Smyth 1956:§2189). Nevertheless this definition is rephrased in syntactic functional terms. Smyth (1956:§2574) mentions that these clauses are objects or subjects. Along the same lines, Schwyzer and Debrunner (1975<sup>4</sup>:645) posit an equivalence between *Substantivsätze* and *Ergänzungssätze* (completive clauses). This equivalence is motivated by the implicit idea that clauses which commute with NPs are necessarily argument clauses, i.e., that NPs occupy only argument positions (which moreover implies the disputable claim that the category determines the function, see Smyth’s (1956:§2190a) curious statement that “an adverbial or adjectival clause may assume a substantival character”(sic)). This position is cognate to the long-standing idea that complementizers are nominalizers and must be somehow treated as →determiners turning a clause, denoting a proposition, into an NP (for a recent formulation, see Roussou 2010). The argumental status common to these clauses can be shown by numerous tests which we shall take up first.

~~But~~ a second dimension ~~must~~ also be addressed, since syntax alone does not suffice to account for the term ‘argument’. As a matter of fact, it implies that the clause enters into a complementary semantic relation with its embedder. The variety of relation possibilities explains the variety of forms that an argument clause can take. For example, Schwyzer and Debrunner (1975<sup>4</sup>) flesh out the completive relation between a predicate and a clause by saying that argument clauses can function either as subjects or objects, or as dative or genitive NPs. This shift from syntactic functions to cases indicates a (pre-theoretical) way to take into account semantic roles (Crespo in Jacquinod 1999:51-53 is an attempt in the same direction, see also Jacquinod, Lallot in Jacquinod 1999). There are two views of this semantic relation with the embedding predicate. In the first view, argument clauses are taken to be *selected* by a predicate. Their syntactic dependency is the reflection of a semantic dependency and their form is determined, say, by the semantic role they play. In the other view, they are only syntactically dependent. On the semantic side, the meaning of the construction is not derivable from the meaning of its parts, but rather rises from the association of a

predicate and of a clause-type ( $\rightarrow$ Construction Grammar and Greek).

## 2. Argument clauses in Ancient Greek

Argument clauses come in numerous syntactic types that include finite and non-finite clauses. They are almost the same in Archaic (Homer) and Classical Times, despite marginal differences reviewed at the end. Finite clauses are *hōs-/hóti*-clauses (example 1) (when heading an argument clause, *hothoúneka*, *hoúneka*, *dióti* have exactly the same distribution as *hóti* and we shall treat them as variants thereof, see Lallo in Jacquinod 1999);  $\rightarrow$ purpose clauses in *hópōs* (or *hōs*) + subjunctive/future (example 2) (very rarely *hína*, see Kühner and Gerth 1904:§552, n. 8, or *hóstē* + infinitive, cf. García Ramón in Jacquinod 1999); *mē* + subjunctive (example 3);  $\rightarrow$ questions (example 4) and exclamative clauses (example 5); and marginal types that will not be addressed here, such as *ê mēn* (in oaths) and *ei* non interrogative clauses (with emotive/evaluative verbs).

Non-finite clauses are (nominative, accusative or dative) participial clauses (example 6;  $\rightarrow$ Participle) and the so-called *accusative-cum-infinitive* (ACI), i.e., infinitival clauses (example 7;  $\rightarrow$ Infinitives (Syntax)) (variant *hóstē* + infinitive, cf. García Ramón in Jacquinod 1999).

The case of participles with an aspectual verb such *diatelō* ‘continue’ or *tunkhánō* ‘happen to’ will not be taken into account. I treat such verbs as aspectual/phasal markers (Rijksbaron 2002<sup>3</sup>:120), and therefore I do not take such situations to be cases of  $\rightarrow$ subordination, i.e., of two predications, one dependent on the other, but rather of a single predication ( $\rightarrow$ Predicative Constituents). Another borderline case to which I shall return below is constituted by *hōs-/hóti*-clauses and participial clauses with emotive and evaluative verbs since they could be seen as  $\rightarrow$ adjuncts rather than arguments (besides, Smyth 1956:§2048 admits that the appositive participle with such verbs are both).

1. *Arkhaḡóras ho Argeîos légei hōs apekópēsan apò toû lóphou kai hóti tethnâsi Kēphisódōros kai Amphikrátēs*

‘Archagoras the Argive reported that the Greeks had been dislodged from the first hill and that Cephisodorus and Amphicrates had been killed’ (Xen. An. 4.2.17-18)

2. *phróntiz’ hópōs mēdèn anáxion tēs timēs taútēs práxeis*

‘take care never to do anything which is beneath the dignity of your station’ (Isoc. Or. 2.37)

3. *nûn dè phoboûmai mē tines epitimēsōsin hēmîn*

‘as things are, I fear that I might lay myself open to criticism’ (Isoc. Or. 5.105)

4. *nûn dè sù dēlōseis ei alēthē éleges*

‘now then, you shall prove if you spoke the truth’ (Xen. Cyr. 4.1.23)

5. *nûn gàr ísōs kai humeîs aisthánesthe hōs athúmōs êlthon epì tà hóp̄la*

‘for, as matters stand now, perhaps you have observed for yourselves in what dejection they came to their quarters’ (Xen. An. 3.1.40)

6. *tòn androphónon* horâi *periiónt’ en toîs hieroîs*

‘he sees the homicide frequenting places of worship’ (Dem. Or. 23.80)

7. *dikaîōs hautòn miseîn nomízei*

‘he thinks (you) are bound to hate him’ (Dem. Or. 6.18)

As said above, all these clauses share the property to be subject or object arguments of a predicate. That is why they are sensitive to syntactic operations specific to argument constituents. First the hallmark of arguments is that the predication would not be complete without them. In (4), the sentence would not make sense without *ei alēthē éleges*, while removing *nûn* would not affect the sentence’s integrity. But this test is disputable in the face of borderline cases we shall address later. Clearer are other operations. First, as objects, argument clauses can undergo passivization (→ Passive (Syntax)). In *Kúron légetai apokhōrēsai* ‘it is said that Cyrus has departed’ (Xen. Cyr. 1.4.26), the clause *Kúron apokhōrēsai* is the subject of *légetai*. This is a way to account for so-called impersonal→ passives (→ Impersonal Verbs/Constructions).

Second, argument clauses can be apposed to a demonstrative pronoun whose case is assigned by the predicate, thus proving their immediate dependency. This is the case both for finite and for non-finite clauses. Thus a verb like *oída* ‘know’ assigns accusative case to its complement, but verbs like *thaumázō* ‘be surprised’ or *epimeloûmai* ‘take care’ assign genitive as shown by the genitive pronoun *hēmôn* ‘us’ in (8). These cases are also assigned to the demonstrative pronoun *τούτου* announcing the argument clause *hópōs hathroízētai* in (9). The same demonstration can be done for infinitival clauses, as can be shown by the alternation between a bare infinitive and a nominalized infinitive. For example *parainô* ‘exhort someone to do something’ takes a bare infinitive in *soi parainô kharízesthai* ‘I advise you to grant favors (to all non-lovers)’ (Pl. *Phdr.* 234b6) but an articular infinitive in *tò speúdein soi parainô* ‘I advise speed for you’ (Soph. *Phil.* 620).

8. *kakōs gàr epemeleîsth’ hēmôn tóte*

‘you governed us too ill’ (Aristoph. *Plut.* 1117)

9. *hoi mèn kai toutou epimeloûntai hópōs hathroízētai (hē kópros)*

‘some take care to have it (the manure) collected’ (Xen. *Oec.* 20.10)

This test is not straightforwardly reproducible on participial clauses, but these clauses bear case and this case varies according to the case assignment property of the selector, thus ensuring us that the clause is immediately dependent on the predicate. Thus in (10) the participial clauses *tês Púlou kateilēmménēs* depends on and is marked in the genitive by *epúthonto*:

10. *epúthonto tês Púlou kateilēmménēs*

‘they heard that Pylos was occupied’ (Thuc. 4.6)

The phenomenon called *prolepsis* is also a cognate, reliable test. It consists in the anticipation of the subject of the argument clause’s predicate in the matrix. But it works only with finite clauses since it is based on disruption in case assignment. As subject of the embedded clause, the NP should be in the nominative, but instead, it moves up to the matrix and receives the case assigned by the main verb, which can be accusative, genitive or dative. In (11), *epimeloûmai* ‘take care’, a bivalent predicate (see above examples 8 and 9) apparently has three arguments. In fact, *tôn arkhoménōn* is the subject of *ésontai* that has risen to the matrix clause where it was attributed the genitive case. Under other explanations, it would have no (semantic) role in the matrix and the structure would be ruled out. This raising is only available for argument clauses, thus making it a *bona fide* test for argumenthood in borderline cases.

11. *deî tôn arkhoménōn epimeleîsthai hópōs hōs bélhistoi ésontai*

‘he must also take care that his men be as valiant as possible’ (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.11)

Finally, the coordination of the clause with an argument NP goes in the same direction. In (12), the NP *tên manían* ‘madness’ is what is seen along with the event described by the *hóti*-clause:

12. ... *tôn pollôn hikanōs idóntes tēn manían kai hóti oudeîs autōn oudèn hugiēs práttei*

‘... who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics’ (Pl. *Resp.* 496c7)

Binding of pronouns should help us, but it is still a poorly understood phenomenon. For example, in (13), would *sphēis* be possible if the *hóti*-clause were not an argument (→*Reflexives*)? Another well-known case is the frequent usage of the dative indirect reflexive pronoun *oi* as in Xen. (*An.* 3.4.42):

13. *eipeîn te ekéleuon hóti kai sphēis (...) éēdē àn Argeíous xummákhous pepoiêsthai*

‘they ordered him to say further that they themselves also had before this made an alliance with the Argives’ (Thuc. 5.46.3)

All these tests should help us show that subordinate clauses with emotive and evaluative verbs are argument clauses. *Hóti*-clauses can be announced by a neuter demonstrative pronoun as subjects (Pl. *Euthphr.* 4d) or as objects (Xen. *Ages.* 9, 5); they are also sensitive to passivization (Xen. *An.* 4, 6, 2) and *prolepsis* (Isoc. *Or.* 4. 94). These tests are reproducible on *ei*-clauses with such predicates.

All these syntactic tests demonstrate that these clauses have an argumental status. But they do not provide us with an explanation of why there are so many types of argument clauses. The first, most obvious answer is that these clauses do not have the same distribution, i.e., they do not all appear with the same classes of verbs. Rather, their form depends on the semantics of the verb. Thus ~~in example (7)~~ *nomízō*, a verb of thinking, is followed by an infinitival clause and never, say, a *mé*-clause. But though attractive, a one-to-one explanation between a semantic class of verbs and a clause-type is challenged by the fact that certain predicates accept several types of clauses. This would suggest either that some types of clauses are synonymous or that certain conditions enable them to be embedded by the same verb. The former path is definitely to be abandoned since there are no two clause-types that have the same distribution. For example, although *hóti*-clauses and participial clauses appear roughly in the same contexts, participials are precluded with verbs of speaking, except in a handful of cases (Fournier 1946). We shall then take the latter route by first reviewing which predicates embed which clause-types, before trying to make sense of this distribution.

### 3. Distribution of clause types

Here is the distribution of clause types for each semantic class of predicates. It is based on reference grammars (Kühner and Gerth 1904, Smyth 1956, Schwyzler and Debrunner 1975<sup>4</sup>, Rijksbaron 2002<sup>3</sup>), on Faure's (2010:Chapters 1, 8, 10) overview of argument clauses and on specific studies mentioned for each clause type, most of which are drawn from Jacquino 1999. A cognate classification can be found in Cristofaro (1996), though she has more categories and takes factivity to be limited to emotive and evaluative predicates. Note the role played by the negations in this classification. With finite clauses, the oblique →optative is always possible in past contexts.

- a. *hōs*-/ *hóti*-clauses (negation *ou*): Factive (presuppositive = entail the truth of the proposition denoted by their complement) emotive predicates (e.g. *orgízomai* 'be angry', cf. Thuc. 1.74.3) and evaluative predicates (e.g. *katēgorô* 'accuse', cf. Thuc. 1.91.1), factive cognitive predicates (including predicates of perception used as such, e.g. *oîda* 'know', *horô* 'see', cf. Thuc. 3.113.6) and veridical (presuppositive only in fully positive contexts) cognitive predicates (*dēlos* 'clear', *deîknumi* 'show', cf. Eur. *Med.* 1120), verbs of speaking (*légō* 'tell', cf. Xen. *An.* 4.2.17-18). (Cristofaro 2008)

- b. Participial clauses (negation *ou*): a) In the dative or genitive: emotive predicates (e.g. *orgízomai* ‘be angry’, cf. Dem. Or. 12.15), evaluative predicates (e.g. *katēgorô* ‘accuse’, cf. Isoc. Or. 4.53), b) in the accusative (rarely in the genitive): perception predicates (e.g. *horô* ‘see’, cf. Dem. Or. 23.80), cognitive predicates (e.g. *oîda* ‘know’, cf. Thuc. 7.70.8). (Basset, Boehm, Duhoux in Jacquinod 1999)

NB: Neutralization between class a) and b) in the nominative: when the controller of the participle and the subject of the main verb are the same, the subject of the participle is not expressed and the participle stands in the nominative.

- c. Infinitival clauses: a) (negation *mê*) Modal volitive (e.g. *boûlomai* ‘want’, cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 41) and deontic (e.g. *dei* ‘must’) verbs, verbs of ordering (e.g. *keleûô* ‘order’, cf. Pl. Phlb. 24a7) b) (negation *ou*) verbs of thinking (*nomízô* ‘think’, cf. Dem. Or. 6.18) and verbs of speaking (e.g. *légô*, cf. Xen. Cyr. 1.4.26). (Kurzová 1968 and García Ramón, Létoublon, Luraghi, Ruijgh in Jacquinod 1999)
- d. Interrogative clauses (negation *ou* with indicative, *mê* with deliberative subjunctive): a) Interrogative verbs (e.g. *erôtô* ‘ask’, cf. Pl. Prt. 351c7), b) factive cognitive predicates (including predicates of perception used as such, e.g. *oîda* ‘know’, cf. Xen. Cyr. 5.4.12, *horô* ‘see’, cf. Pl. Resp. 358d6) and veridical cognitive predicates (e.g. *dêlos* ‘clear’, cf. Xen. An. 1.4.13, *deîknumi* ‘show’, cf. Dem. Or. 18.126), verbs of speaking (e.g. *légô* ‘say’, cf. Pl. Resp. 373e4). (Briand, Chanet, Muchnová, Revuelta Puigdollérs in Jacquinod 1999 and Faure 2010)
- e. Exclamative clauses (negation *ou*): Factive (presuppositive) emotive predicates (e.g. *phóbos* ‘fear’, cf. Xen. An. 7.4.1) and evaluative predicates (e.g. *katēgorô* ‘accuse’, cf. Pl. Menex. 244e2), factive cognitive predicates (including predicates of perception used as such, e.g. *oîda* ‘know’, cf. Pl. Prt. 313a1, *horô* ‘see’, cf. Pl. Resp. 327c7) and veridical (presuppositive only in fully positive contexts) cognitive predicates (e.g. *dêlos* ‘clear’, *apodeîknumi* ‘show’, Xen. An. 1.1.2), verbs of speaking (e.g. *légô* ‘say’, cf. Xen. An. 2.5.10 ). (Faure 2012)
- f. →Purpose clauses in *hópôs* (or *hōs*) + subjunctive/future (negation *mê*): Verbs of effort (e.g. *epimeloûmai* ‘take care’, cf. Xen. Oec. 20.10), more marginally verbs of will (e.g. *aitô* ‘beg’, cf. Antiph. 1.23) or verbs of caution or fear (e.g. *phoboûmai* ‘fear’, cf. Pl. Euthphr. 4e7). (Amigues 1977)
- g. *Mê* + subjunctive (negation *ou*): Verbs of fear (e.g. *phoboûmai* ‘fear’, cf. Isoc. Or. 5.105).

Although there is much overlap between embedders of the first five categories, the last two are isolated. Actually, they are variants of the infinitival clause type with negation *mê*. This is argued for by Amigues (1977) and de Boel (1980:299) (see also Rijksbaron 2002<sup>3</sup>:59-60). Actually, every predicate selecting for *hópôs* (or *hōs*) + subjunctive/future or for *mê* + subjunctive is also attested with infinitival clauses (Goodwin 1889:§361, 372-373, Smyth 1956:§1993, §2210a, §2218, §2220, §2230, §2238). Moreover, verbs



usually selecting for infinitival clauses also appear with purpose object clauses. This is the case with *déomai* ‘beg’ in (14), which usually takes an infinitive (cf. Pl. *Prt.* 336a4), or with *boúlomai* ‘want’ (compare Thuc. 1.65.1.6-7 and Aristoph. *Vesp.* 41).

14. *deḗsetai d’ humôn hópōs díkēn mē dōi, àn humâs peíthēi, hōn ēdíkeke*

‘my brother will beg you that if he is successful, she will escape paying the penalty for her crime’ (Antiph. 1.23)

We are then left with a complete overlap between infinitival clauses negated by *mē* and purpose object clauses in *hópōs*. In fact, these two types of clauses share two properties. First, they are DTR oriented towards future ('determined time reference' in the sense of Noonan 2007<sup>2</sup>) in that “their time reference is a necessary consequence of the meaning of the embedding predicate” (Cristofaro 1996 systematically applies this concept to Ancient Greek). This means that the stem indicates only aspect and not time. Second, they display a verbal form that has virtual reference (note that the other CG construction that is DTR has actual reference: Participial clauses with perception verbs). Across languages, subjunctive and infinitive are often in complementary distribution or in alternation for these reasons, as in French, for example, where *avant qu’il vienne* ‘before he came’ (subjunctive) and *avant de venir* ‘before coming’ (infinitive) distribute complementarily, the infinitive being used when the subject of the main verb is the controller of the embedded verb.

## 4. The five main classes

We end up with five main classes. We suggested earlier that this variety is due to semantic differences. There are several routes to account for them. The first is to assume that each type of clause denotes a different abstract object in the sense of Asher (1993): “Abstract Objects are things like propositions, properties, states of affairs and facts. They have no spatio-temporal location, usually no causal efficacy and are not perceived by senses.” Asher distinguishes between two categories: eventualities and purely abstract objects. Except with the predicates of perception, all the clause types under consideration here are subject to an abstract operation denoted by the main predicate and therefore fall into the latter class (note that Cristofaro 1996: Chapter 2 takes a similar route but builds on a different typology of abstract objects, thus achieving somewhat different results).

The benefit of this idea is obvious for the difference between, on the one hand, interrogatives, which denote questions, (and maybe exclamatives), and the other types of clauses on the other hand. But it does not help us account for the difference between the three types *hóti/hōs*-, participial and infinitival clauses. Thus infinitival clauses can denote both a possibility (when negated with *mē*, e.g. with *boúlomai*) and a proposition (when negated with *ou*, e.g. with *nomízo*) (see Kurzová’s 1968 distinction between dynamic and declarative infinitives). The abstract object typology helps us understand



the difference between two usages of the infinitive, and it is a promising way to pursue in future studies. Nevertheless, it tells us neither why an infinitive is used in both cases nor why *hóti/hōs*-clauses coexist with infinitival clauses after verbs of speaking, but with participial clauses with cognitive verbs. All these clause types denote apparently proposition-like objects in Asher's sense. If this is correct, Ancient Greek does not confirm Lehmann's (1988) claim that the more a clause is syntactically merged within another clause, the less abstract the object is that it denotes (for example with infinitival clauses, there is no overt boundary between the embedding predicate and the embedded clause).

De Boel (1980) proposes that the difference might be due to the (non)presupposed status of the proposition. Whereas participial and *hóti/hōs*-clauses are presupposed, infinitival clauses are not. Thus in (6) and (12), the propositions denoted by the participial and the *hóti*-clause are presupposed, which squares well with the selection of participial clauses and *hóti/hōs*-clauses by both classes of factive predicates (see above). But de Boel admits that the use of *hóti/hōs*-clauses with verbs of speaking that are not factive is a challenge to his theory which has not received a satisfactory answer. Another tentative solution might be drawn from a statement by de Boel (1980:292): "So the infinitive expresses the notion of the verbal action pure, it indicates action in possible worlds, without specifying their relation to the actually existing one." This is reminiscent not of the presupposed/unpresupposed, but of the *realis/irrealis* distinction: "*Realis* modality is associated with complements whose propositions are asserted as a fact or commented on as a factual or actual event or state. *Irrealis* modality carries with it no such implication" (Noonan 2007<sup>2</sup>:comment on table 2.3). In this view, infinitival clauses would be *irrealis*, participial and *hóti/hōs*-clauses would be *realis*. With verbs of speaking, the alternation between *hóti/hōs*- and infinitival clauses looks like an evidential strategy (as opposed to an evidential marker, see Aikhenvald 2004), a factor that must be taken into account in the study of indirect discourse and indirect speech. *Hóti/hōs*-clauses are used for mere reports, while infinitival clauses report statements from non-reliable sources, such as rumors, or in structures where the subject cannot be specified as in impersonal passive (see above the discussion on Xen. Cyr. 1.4.26 and the passivization, and Fournier 1946).

The distinction between *hóti/hōs* and participial clauses would then have to be found in the informational status of the clauses – focused and presupposed, respectively. Ultimately, something must be said about the *hóti/hōs* distinction. The reader is referred to Cristofaro (1996, 2008) who fleshes out the conditions under which they alternate freely and those under which one is chosen over the other: with predicates allowing for such clauses, a clause endowed with the three features /+focus, -theme, -known/ takes the form of a *hóti*-clause; a clause endowed with the features /-focus, +theme, +known/ takes the form of a *hōs*-clause. In any other combination of features, both types are possible (Cristofaro 1996:74).

The proposal sketched here can possibly be rephrased in a trivalent, rather than in a binary model, i.e., in a model where the values *true* and *false* coexist with a third value

*undefined*. In this case, participial clauses will be coded ‘actual’, infinitival clauses ‘virtual’ and *hóti/hōs*-clauses ‘undetermined’. A hint that this may be true is that participial clauses may force a presupposed reading of the complement of verbs of speaking in the few cases where a participle shows up with such verbs (Fournier 1946:184-185, though that does not hold of Pl. *Phlb.* 22e2; a similar claim is made on Homer in Chantraine 1953:§478). On the other hand, the presupposed status of a *hóti/hōs*-clause depends on the semantics of the main predicate.

If this overview is right, Lightfoot’s (1975:46) general claim that all these differences in meaning and information structure are conveyed by the embedding predicate turns out correct only for *hóti/hōs*-clauses: “The constraints on the occurrence of a particular complement type are dictated solely by the markings on the governing verb, or, in the case of the participial construction, on the presupposition of the author of the sentence, and have nothing to do with the internal shape of the complement.” Ultimately, it seems that both the main predicate and the complement give a part of the information. In this case, all associations where there is no meeting of incompatible features are available, thus yielding original structures (de Boel 1980, Cristofaro 1996:39). Such a route would lead to abandon the notion of selection and ultimately compositional semantics. This is roughly Cristofaro’s 2008 constructionist approach (→[Construction Grammar and Greek](#)).

This accounts for the multiple types of complements displayed by verbs like *akoúō* ‘hear, listen to’. As a perception verb, *akoúō* is expected to be followed by a participial clause, which is born out (e.g. in Dem. *Or.* 37.10). It also has cognitive epistemic usages with participial and *hóti/hōs*-clauses (e.g. in Dem. *Or.* 19.163). More surprisingly, it also shows up with infinitival clauses (e.g. at Dem. *Or.* 1.3.1). In this case, the verb describes only the perception of a report and not an immediate access to the data and even not to the source of the data. The truth is therefore marked as virtual by the usage of an infinitive. In contrast, a verb like *boúlomai* ‘want’ conveys necessarily a virtual complement. It is incompatible with presupposed complements and is therefore never attested with a participial clause. Along the same lines of reasoning, emotive/evaluative factive verbs always trigger the truth of their complement and are therefore not compatible with interrogative clauses, which always have an uncertain part, even when they denote the answer to the question, with cognitive verbs (Faure 2010). On the other hand, emotive/evaluative predicates are fully acceptable with exclamatives since such clauses denote true propositions (Faure 2012).

Despite a tendency to juxtapose clauses paratactically (this is the alleged origin of *mē*-clauses, cf. Chantraine 1953:§422; 438), Homer does have argument clauses. According to Chantraine (1953) and to Cristofaro’s (1996) Homeric corpus, they are roughly the same as in Classical Times and their distribution with the embedding predicates is comparable: cognitive predicates embed *hōs/hóti*- and participial clauses (Cristofaro 1996:114), with the exception of *akoúō*, which accepts infinitival clauses under the same conditions as those described above for Classical Greek (Chantraine 1953:§479); verbs of speaking embed *hōs/hóti*- and infinitival clauses (Cristofaro 1996:89, 94), etc. For more details on infinitival clauses, see Monroe (1891:§237);

Chantraine (1953:§444-446; 448-452; 454-456); on participial clauses Monro (1891:§243.3-245.2); Chantraine (1953:§476-479); on *hōs/hóti*-clauses Monro (1891:§269-270; 285.2); Chantraine (1953:§423-428); on indirect questions Monro (1891:§294); Chantraine (1953:§429-435); on final object clauses Chantraine (1953:§436-439).

Nevertheless Homer's language is specific in certain respects. With verbs of speaking, slight differences occur: participial are rather frequent (Monro 1891:§245.2) and infinitival clauses are more widespread than in Classical Greek and are not reduced to unreliable sources (e.g. in Hom. *Od.* 13.173). More striking is the possibility with emotive and evaluative factives of infinitival clauses that still denote a presupposed proposition (e.g. in *Il.* 5.601, cf. Monro 1891:§237, Cristofaro 1996:105). Finally, in Homer, *hó* and *hó te* can be used like *hōs/hóti* (e.g. *Od.* 13.340, *Od.* 20.243) and Homer displays situations where the alleged causal origin of such clauses can be seen (Chantraine 1953:§423-424). As for moods, the oblique optative does not show up in all finite clauses, but only in indirect questions.

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