Multi-fault Attack Detection for RNS Cryptographic Architecture

Abstract : Residue Number Systems (RNS) have been a topic of interest for years. Many previous works show that RNS is a good candidate for fast computations in asymmetric cryptography by using its intrinsic parallelization features. A recent result demonstrates that redundant RNS and modular reduction can fit together efficiently, providing an efficient RNS modular reduction algorithm owning a single-fault detection capability. In this paper, we propose to generalize this approach by protecting the classical Cox-Rower architecture against multi-fault attacks. We prove that faults occuring at different places and at different times can be detected with a linear cost for the architecture and a constant time for the execution.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, July 19, 2016 - 12:10:56 PM
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Jean-Claude Bajard, Julien Eynard, Nabil Merkiche. Multi-fault Attack Detection for RNS Cryptographic Architecture. IEEE 23rd Symposium on Computer Arithmetic (ARITH 23), Jul 2016, Santa Clara, CA, United States. ⟨10.1109/ARITH.2016.16⟩. ⟨hal-01346597⟩

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