A middleware for securing mobile mashups

Abstract : Mashups on traditional desktop devices are a well-known source of security risks. In this paper, we examine how these risks translate to mobile mashups and identify new risks caused by mobile-specific characteristics such as access to device features or offline operation. We describe the design of SCCM, a platform independent approach to handle the various mobile mashup security risks in a consistent and systematic manner. Evaluating an SCCM implementation for Android, we find that SCCM successfully protects against common attacks such as inserting a malicious widget from the outside.
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Poster
Proceedings of the 20th international conference companion on World wide web, May 2011, Hyderabad, India. pp.9-10 <http://wwwconference.org/www2011/index.html>. <10.1145/1963192.1963198>
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01342293
Contributeur : Michel Riveill <>
Soumis le : mardi 5 juillet 2016 - 16:26:40
Dernière modification le : mercredi 31 août 2016 - 07:48:39

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Florent Batard, Karima Boudaoud, Michel Riveill. A middleware for securing mobile mashups. Proceedings of the 20th international conference companion on World wide web, May 2011, Hyderabad, India. pp.9-10 <http://wwwconference.org/www2011/index.html>. <10.1145/1963192.1963198>. <hal-01342293>

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