Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols

Jannik Dreier 1 Pascal Lafourcade 2 Yassine Lakhnech 3
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Recently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered [20], which is essentially based on copying other voter's votes. To capture this and similar attacks, we extend the classical threat model and introduce a new security notion for voting protocols: Vote-Independence. We give a formal definition and analyze its relationship to established privacy properties such as Vote-Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. In particular we show that even Coercion-Resistant protocols do not necessarily ensure Vote-Independence.
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4th Canada-France MITACS Workshop on Foundations & Practice of Security (FPS'11), May 2011, Paris, France. 2012, 〈10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_13〉
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Dernière modification le : vendredi 6 juillet 2018 - 15:06:10

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Jannik Dreier, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech. Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols. 4th Canada-France MITACS Workshop on Foundations & Practice of Security (FPS'11), May 2011, Paris, France. 2012, 〈10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_13〉. 〈hal-01338070〉

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