Formal Verification of e-Auction Protocols

Jannik Dreier 1 Pascal Lafourcade 2 Yassine Lakhnech 3
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C.. With the rise of Internet, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security requirements of these electronic transactions. We propose a formal framework to analyze and verify security properties of e-Auction protocols. We model protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus and define privacy notions, which include secrecy of bids, anonymity of the participants, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. We also discuss fairness, non-repudiation and non-cancellation. Additionally we show on two case studies how these properties can be verified automatically using ProVerif, and discover several attacks.
Type de document :
[Technical Report] TR-2012-17, VERIMAG. 2012
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Soumis le : mercredi 29 juin 2016 - 11:41:43
Dernière modification le : mardi 18 décembre 2018 - 16:38:25
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 30 septembre 2016 - 11:12:22


  • HAL Id : hal-01338031, version 1


Jannik Dreier, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech. Formal Verification of e-Auction Protocols. [Technical Report] TR-2012-17, VERIMAG. 2012. 〈hal-01338031〉



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