Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols

Jannik Dreier 1 Ali Kassem 2 Pascal Lafourcade 3
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Electronic cash (e-cash) aims at achieving client privacy at payment, similar to real cash. Several security protocols have been proposed to ensure privacy in e-cash, as well as the necessary unforgery properties. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define, analyze, and verify security properties of e-cash systems. To this end, we model e-cash systems in the applied π-calculus, and we define two client privacy properties and three properties to prevent forgery. Finally, we apply our definitions to an e-cash protocol from the literature proposed by Chaum et al., which has two variants and a real implementation based on it. Using ProVerif, we demonstrate that our framework is suitable for an automated analysis of this protocol.
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Communication dans un congrès
12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2015), Jul 2015, Colmar, France. 2015, 〈10.5220/0005544500650075〉
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Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem, Pascal Lafourcade. Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols. 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2015), Jul 2015, Colmar, France. 2015, 〈10.5220/0005544500650075〉. 〈hal-01337410〉

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