Automated Symbolic Proofs of Observational Equivalence

David Basin (1) , Jannik Dreier (1) , Ralf Sasse (1)

1 Institute of Information Security [ETH Zürich]

Many cryptographic security definitions can be naturally formulated as observational equivalence properties. However, existing automated tools for verifying the observational equivalence of cryptographic protocols are limited: they do not handle protocols with mutable state and an unbounded number of sessions. We propose a novel definition of observational equivalence for multiset rewriting systems. We then extend the Tamarin prover, based on multiset rewriting, to prove the observational equivalence of protocols with mutable state, an unbounded number of sessions, and equational theories such as Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. We demonstrate its effectiveness on case studies, including a stateful TPM protocol.

Mots clés: symbolic model; Protocol verification; observational equivalence

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

David Basin, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse. Automated Symbolic Proofs of Observational Equivalence. 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2015), ACM, Oct 2015, Denver, United States. pp.1144--1155, ⟨10.1145/2810103.2813662⟩. ⟨hal-01337409v1⟩