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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2007

Algebraic Cryptanalysis of 58-Round SHA-1

Makoto Sugita
  • Fonction : Auteur
Mitsuru Kawazoe
  • Fonction : Auteur
Hideki Imai
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

In 2004, a new attack against SHA-1 has been proposed by a team leaded by Wang [15]. The aim of this article is to sophisticate and improve Wang’s attack by using algebraic techniques. We introduce new notions, namely semi-neutral bit and adjuster and propose then an improved message modification technique based on algebraic techniques. In the case of the 58-round SHA-1, the experimental complexity of our improved attack is $2^{31}$ SHA-1 computations, whereas Wang’s method needs $2^{34}$ SHA-1 computations. We have found many new collisions for the 58-round SHA-1. We also study the complexity of our attack for the full SHA-1.

Dates et versions

hal-01336553 , version 1 (23-06-2016)

Identifiants

Citer

Makoto Sugita, Mitsuru Kawazoe, Ludovic Perret, Hideki Imai. Algebraic Cryptanalysis of 58-Round SHA-1. Fast Software Encryption, 14th International Workshop, FSE, Mar 2007, Luxembourg, Luxembourg. pp.349-365, ⟨10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_22⟩. ⟨hal-01336553⟩
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