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, * Importers who are members of the collective agreements are not only located in Rungis and Perpignan but nevertheless depend on the collective agreements with Perpignan and Rungis as registration centres

*. , We distinguish commercial risk from legal risk for two reasons. First, these two risks are not linked. The legal risk depends on public control and on the ability of public authorities to monitor and then sanction firms which fail. The commercial risk relies on a private contract between firm and retailer. The retailer can undertake safety tests; if the firm fails it faces a commercial sanction but never legal proceedings