Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks

Abstract : The conflict between cooperation in distributed state estimation and the resulting leakage of private state information (competitive privacy) is studied for a system composed of two interconnected agents. The distributed state estimation problem is studied using an information theoretic rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff model and a repeated non-cooperative game framework. The objective is to investigate the conditions under which the repetition of the agents' interaction enables data sharing among the agents beyond the minimum requirement. In the finite horizon case, similarly to the one-shot interaction, data sharing beyond the minimum requirement is not a credible commitment for either of the agents. However, non-trivial mutual data sharing is sustainable in the long term, i.e., in the infinite horizon case.
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Contributor : Elena Veronica Belmega <>
Submitted on : Thursday, April 28, 2016 - 5:12:22 PM
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Elena Veronica Belmega, Lalitha Sankar, H. Vincent Poor. Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks. 6th International Conf. on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization (NETGCOOP 2012), Nov 2012, Avignon, France. pp.64-68. ⟨hal-01309006⟩



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