A Semi-Dynamic Evolutionary Power Control Game

Abstract : In this paper, we study a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state. When choosing a higher transmission power, the chances of a successful transmission (in the presence of other interference) increases at the cost of a larger decrease in the energy state of the battery. A central feature in these games is that of the limitation on battery life. Natural questions that arise concern the behavior of mobile users in the presence of interference. How should a mobile user behave given his initial energy state? We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple non dynamic strategies that consist on choosing a given power level that is maintained during the lifetime of the battery. We identify a surprising paradox which we call the Hawk and Dove resource abundance paradox.
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Majed Haddad, Eitan Altman, Julien Gaillard, Dieter Fiems. A Semi-Dynamic Evolutionary Power Control Game. 11th International Networking Conference (NETWORKING), May 2012, Prague, Czech Republic. pp.392-403, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-30054-7_31⟩. ⟨hal-01299776⟩

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