On the Security of the (F)HMQV Protocol

Augustin Sarr (1) , Philippe Elbaz-Vincent (2)

1 UGB - Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis Sénégal
2 IF - Institut Fourier

The HMQV protocol is under consideration for IEEE P1363 standardization. We provide a complementary analysis of the HMQV protocol. Namely, we point a Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attack showing that the two and three pass HMQV protocols cannot achieve their security goals. Next, we revisit the FHMQV building blocks, design and security arguments; we clarify the security and efficiency separation between HMQV and FHMQV, showing the advantages of FH-MQV over HMQV.

Mots clés: FHMQV; HMQV; KCI At-tack; Security Model; Authenticated Key Exchange

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Augustin Sarr, Philippe Elbaz-Vincent. On the Security of the (F)HMQV Protocol. AFRICACRYPT 2016, Apr 2016, Fes, Morocco. ⟨hal-01290310⟩