Combinatorial voter control in elections

Abstract : Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally , voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters. In our setting, when we choose to add a voter v, we also have to add a whole bundle κ(v) of voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [50 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01260623
Contributor : Laurent Bulteau <>
Submitted on : Friday, January 22, 2016 - 2:13:40 PM
Last modification on : Friday, April 12, 2019 - 10:18:09 AM
Long-term archiving on : Saturday, April 23, 2016 - 10:43:24 AM

File

BCFNT-tcs15.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Laurent Bulteau, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon. Combinatorial voter control in elections. Theoretical Computer Science, Elsevier, 2015, 589, pp.99-120. ⟨10.1016/j.tcs.2015.04.023⟩. ⟨hal-01260623⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

181

Files downloads

203