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Article Dans Une Revue International Journal of Industrial Organization Année : 2015

Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly

Résumé

This paper studies rationalizability in a linear asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with a unique Nash equilibrium. It shows that mergers favors uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome. When one requires uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome maximization of consumers’ surplus may involve a symmetric oligopoly with few firms. We interpret uniqueness of the rationalizable outcome as favoring a dampening of strategic ‘coordination’ uncertainty. An illustration to the merger between Delta Air Lines and Northwest shows that a reallocation of 1 % of market share from a small carrier to a larger one has implied a lower production volatility over time, yielding a 1.5 % decrease in the coefficient of variation of number of passengers.

Dates et versions

hal-01242006 , version 1 (11-12-2015)

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Gabriel Desgranges, Stéphane Gauthier. Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015, in press, accepted manuscript. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.011⟩. ⟨hal-01242006⟩
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