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The Power of Swap Deals in Distributed Resource Allocation

Abstract : In the simple resource allocation setting consisting in assigning exactly one resource per agent, the top trading cycle procedure stands out as being the undisputed method of choice. It remains however a centralized procedure which may not well suited in the context of multiagent systems, where distributed coordination may be problematic. In this paper, we investigate the power of dynamics based on rational bilateral deals (swaps) in such settings. While they may induce a high efficiency loss, we provide several new elements that temper this fact: (i) we identify a natural domain where convergence to a Pareto-optimal allocation can be guaranteed, (ii) we show that the worst-case loss of welfare is as good as it can be under the assumption of individual rationality, (iii) we provide a number of experimental results, showing that such dynamics often provide good outcomes, especially in light of their simplicity, and (iv) we prove the NP-hardness of deciding whether an allocation maximizing utilitarian or egalitarian welfare is reachable.
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Contributor : Nicolas Maudet <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, October 13, 2015 - 10:00:32 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, February 15, 2020 - 2:06:47 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, April 27, 2017 - 4:34:04 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01212603, version 1


Anastasia Damamme, Aurélie Beynier, Yann Chevaleyre, Nicolas Maudet. The Power of Swap Deals in Distributed Resource Allocation. The 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2015), May 2015, Istanbul, Turkey. pp.625-633. ⟨hal-01212603⟩



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