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Logics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations

Abstract : We introduce the logics E(G) for reasoning about probabilistic expectation over classes G of games with discrete polynomial payoff functions represented by finite-valued Lukasiewicz formulas and provide completeness and complexity results. In addition, we introduce a new class of games where players’ expected payoff functions are encoded by E(G)-formulas. In these games each player’s aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players’ expectations over an outcome as well as their own. We offer a logical and computational characterisation of this new class of games.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, April 14, 2015 - 9:55:50 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, September 9, 2021 - 9:38:06 AM
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  • HAL Id : hal-01141906, version 1
  • OATAO : 12907



Lluis Godo, Enrico Marchioni. Logics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations. European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems - EUMAS 2013, Dec 2013, Toulouse, France. pp. 82-96. ⟨hal-01141906⟩



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