Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: The Verifier ProVerif - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2014

Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: The Verifier ProVerif

Bruno Blanchet

Résumé

After giving general context on the verification of security protocols, we focus on the automatic symbolic protocol verifier ProVerif. This verifier can prove secrecy, authentication, and observational equivalence properties of security protocols, for an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol. It supports a wide range of cryptographic primitives defined by rewrite rules or by equations. The tool takes as input a description of the protocol to verify in a process calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with cryptography. It automatically translates this protocol into an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses, and determines whether the desired security properties hold by resolution on these clauses.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-01102136 , version 1 (12-01-2015)

Identifiants

Citer

Bruno Blanchet. Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: The Verifier ProVerif. Alessandro Aldini; Javier Lopez; Fabio Martinelli. Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII, 8604, Springer, pp.54-87, 2014, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 978-3-319-10081-4. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-10082-1_3⟩. ⟨hal-01102136⟩

Collections

INRIA INRIA2
131 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More