On the Sovereign Debt Paradox

Victor Filipe Martins da Rocha (1) , Yiannis Vailakis (2)

1 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision
2 Adam Smith Business School

Bulow and Rogoff (1989) showed that lending to small countries cannot be supported merely on the country's "reputation for repayment" if exclusion from future credit markets is the only consequence of default. Their arguments are valid under fairly general conditions but they do not go through when the output of the sovereign may vanish along a path of successive low productivity shocks, or when it may grow unboundedly along a path of successive high productivity shocks. We propose an alternative proof illustrating that their renowned sovereign debt paradox holds in full generality.

Mots clés: Reputation Debt; Lack of Commitment; Sovereign Risk

Domaines: Economies et finances

Victor Filipe Martins da Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis. On the Sovereign Debt Paradox. Economic Theory, 2017, 64, pp.825-846. ⟨10.1007/s00199-016-0971-6⟩. ⟨hal-01097118v2⟩