Reducing Manipulability

François Durand 1, 2 Fabien Mathieu 2, 3 Ludovic Noirie 2, 3
1 GANG - Networks, Graphs and Algorithms
LIAFA - Laboratoire d'informatique Algorithmique : Fondements et Applications, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt
Abstract : We consider a general framework for voting systems with arbitrary types of ballots such as orders of preference, grades, etc. We investigate their manipulability: in what states of the population may a coalition of electors, by casting an insincere ballot, secure a result that is better from their point of view?We define a straightforward way to make a voting system respect the Condorcet criterion and we prove that, for a large class of voting systems, this Condorcification is at most as manipulable as the original system. Then we exhibit a sufficient condition, which is frequently met, that ensures this improvement to be strict.These results show that the investigation for a reasonable voting system with minimal manipulability can be restricted to systems that meet the Condorcet criterion.
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01095992
Contributor : Fabien Mathieu <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, December 16, 2014 - 3:54:59 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 17, 2019 - 12:36:04 PM
Long-term archiving on : Monday, March 23, 2015 - 2:16:55 PM

File

ComSoC14_Condorcet_Slicing.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01095992, version 1

Citation

François Durand, Fabien Mathieu, Ludovic Noirie. Reducing Manipulability. Fifth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (ComSoC - 14), Jun 2014, Pittsburgh, United States. 2014. ⟨hal-01095992⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

329

Files downloads

109