Improved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced LBlock

Christina Boura (1) , Marine Minier (2) , María Naya-Plasencia (3) , Valentin Suder (3)

1 PRISM - Parallélisme, Réseaux, Systèmes, Modélisation
2 PRIVATICS - Privacy Models, Architectures and Tools for the Information Society
3 SECRET - Security, Cryptology and Transmissions

Impossible differential attacks are among the most powerful forms of cryptanalysis against block ciphers. We present in this paper an in-depth complexity analysis of these attacks. We show an unified way to mount such attacks and provide generic formulas for estimating their time, data and memory complexities. LBlock is a well studied lightweight block cipher with respect to impossible differential attacks. While previous single-key cryptanalysis reached up to 22 rounds, by applying our method we are able to break 23 rounds with time complexity $2^{75.36}$ and data complexity $2^{59}$. Other time/data trade-offs are equally possible. This is to our knowledge the best (non-exhaustive search like) cryptanalysis of this function in the single-key model.

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Christina Boura, Marine Minier, María Naya-Plasencia, Valentin Suder. Improved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced LBlock. [Research Report] 2014/279, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive. 2014. ⟨hal-01068887⟩