Improved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced LBlock

Abstract : Impossible differential attacks are among the most powerful forms of cryptanalysis against block ciphers. We present in this paper an in-depth complexity analysis of these attacks. We show an unified way to mount such attacks and provide generic formulas for estimating their time, data and memory complexities. LBlock is a well studied lightweight block cipher with respect to impossible differential attacks. While previous single-key cryptanalysis reached up to 22 rounds, by applying our method we are able to break 23 rounds with time complexity $2^{75.36}$ and data complexity $2^{59}$. Other time/data trade-offs are equally possible. This is to our knowledge the best (non-exhaustive search like) cryptanalysis of this function in the single-key model.
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[Research Report] 2014/279, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive. 2014
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01068887
Contributeur : Valentin Suder <>
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Dernière modification le : samedi 27 octobre 2018 - 01:20:04
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Christina Boura, Marine Minier, María Naya-Plasencia, Valentin Suder. Improved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced LBlock. [Research Report] 2014/279, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive. 2014. 〈hal-01068887〉

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