Paying not to sell

Emanuele Bacchiega , Olivier Bonroy (1) , Rania Mabrouk (1)

1 GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory

In this paper the authors show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

Mots clés: MONOPOLY VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP

Domaines: Economies et finances

Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy, Rania Mabrouk. Paying not to sell. Economics Letters, 2013, 121 (1), pp.137-140. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.018⟩. ⟨hal-01064094⟩