Energy saving obligations—cutting the Gordian Knot of leverage?

Clemens Rohde (1) , Jan Rosenow (2) , Nick Eyre (2) , Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet (3)

1 Fraunhofer IAIS - Fraunhofer Institute for Intelligent Analysis and Information Systems
2 University of Oxford
3 CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement

Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality.

Mots clés: Energy Savings Obligation; Leverage; Financing

Domaines: Microstructure des marchés [q-fin.TR]; Sciences de l'environnement; Ecologie, Environnement

Clemens Rohde, Jan Rosenow, Nick Eyre, Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet. Energy saving obligations—cutting the Gordian Knot of leverage?. Energy efficiency, 2015, 8 (1), pp.129-140. ⟨10.1007/s12053-014-9279-1⟩. ⟨hal-01016112⟩