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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2013

Price Competition between Road Side Units Operators in Vehicular Networks

Résumé

Vehicular networks, besides supporting safety-oriented applications, are nowadays expected to provide effective communication infrastructure also for supporting leisure-oriented application including content sharing, gaming and Internet access on the move. This work focuses on Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) scenarios, where multiple content providers own a physical infrastructure of Road Side Units (RSUs) which they use to sell content to moving vehicles. Content provider/RSU owners compete by adapting their pricing strategies with the selfish objective to maximize their own revenues. We study the economics of the price competition between the providers by resorting to game theoretic tools. Namely, we formalize a simultaneous price game among the operators further studying the existence of Nash equilibria and their related quality in terms of Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. The proposed game model is finally used to assess the impact onto the game equilibra of several practical factors including the vehicles' willingness to pay, the traffic densities, and the configuration of the physical networks of RSUs.
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Dates et versions

hal-00967110 , version 1 (31-03-2014)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00967110 , version 1

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Vladimir Fux, Patrick Maillé, Matteo Cesana. Price Competition between Road Side Units Operators in Vehicular Networks. 2013. ⟨hal-00967110⟩
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