CONDORCET CONSISTENCY OF APPROVAL VOTING: A COUNTER EXAMPLE IN LARGE POISSON GAMES

Matias Nunez (1)

1 THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications

Approval Voting is analyzed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: the Myerson's Large Poisson Games. We first establish the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem which substantially reduces the complexity of comput- ing the magnitudes of the pivot outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the Condorcet Winner need not be the Winner of the election in equilibrium under Approval Voting. Indeed, a 'paradoxical' example is provided where a candidate ranked first by more than half of the voters is not the Winner of the election.

Mots clés: Approval Voting Condorcet Winner Poisson Games

Domaines: Science politique

Matias Nunez. CONDORCET CONSISTENCY OF APPROVAL VOTING: A COUNTER EXAMPLE IN LARGE POISSON GAMES. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010, pp.64-84. ⟨10.1177/09516298093⟩. ⟨hal-00917105⟩