On the Manipulability of Voting Systems: Application to Multi-Operator Networks

François Durand 1, 2 Fabien Mathieu 1, 3 Ludovic Noirie 1, 3
2 GANG - Networks, Graphs and Algorithms
LIAFA - Laboratoire d'informatique Algorithmique : Fondements et Applications, Inria Paris-Rocquencourt
Abstract : Internet is a large-scale and highly competitive economic ecosystem. In order to make fair decisions, while preventing the economic actors from manipulating the natural outcome of the decision process, game theory is a natural framework, and voting systems represent an interesting alternative that, to our knowledge, has not yet being considered. They allow competing entities to decide among different options. In this paper, we investigate their use for end-to-end path selection in multi-operator networks, analyzing their manipulability by tactical voting and their economic efficiency.We show that Instant Runoff Voting is much more efficient and resistant to tactical voting than the natural system which tries to get the economic optimum.
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Conference papers
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00874096
Contributor : Ludovic Noirie <>
Submitted on : Thursday, October 17, 2013 - 11:21:11 AM
Last modification on : Friday, January 4, 2019 - 5:33:21 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00874096, version 1

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François Durand, Fabien Mathieu, Ludovic Noirie. On the Manipulability of Voting Systems: Application to Multi-Operator Networks. 8th International Workshop on Internet Charging and QoS Technologies (ICQT 2013, collocated with the 9th International Conference on Network and Service Management CNSM 2013), Oct 2013, Zurich, Switzerland. pp.292-297. ⟨hal-00874096⟩

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