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Interpretations and functions of demonstrative NPs in indirect anaphora

Denis Apothéloz
Université de Fribourg
Séminaire de linguistique française
13, Rue du Criblet
CH–1700 Fribourg (Switzerland)

Marie-José Reichler-Béguelin
Université de Fribourg, Séminaire de linguistique française
Université de Neuchâtel, Séminaire de philologie romane
1, Espace Louis-Agassiz
CH–2000 Neuchâtel (Switzerland)

Abstract

An anaphor is said to be associative when it refers to a referent (i) which has not been explicitly mentioned in the prior context, and (ii) which can nevertheless be identified on the basis of information provided by this context. Numerous linguists consider that associative anaphora can only be introduced by definite NPs and claim that demonstrative NPs cannot take on the role of associative anaphora. In this paper, we defend the idea that demonstrative NPs are not incompatible with associative anaphora and are in fact current in French. We examine the various explanations and interpretations provided by the authors who claim that demonstrative NPs cannot take on the role of associative anaphora (polyphony effect, memory deixis, empathy, etc.). We show that, in numerous cases, these interpretations are not satisfactory. On the contrary, it is possible to describe non-coreferential demonstrative NPs by applying a dynamic model for the production and reception of discourse reference. It is based on the idea that interactors may have diverging strategic interests, a different representation of the universe of discourse, and that the selection of referring expressions may be a reflection of these diverging interests. It can also be shown that demonstrative associative NPs have various discursive and communicative functions or effects, such as avoiding a generic interpretation, signalling a problematic presupposition, signalling that the identification of the intended referent will be somewhat difficult, etc. A distinction is proposed between positive and negative function. Finally, we contend that an investigation of anaphoric phenomena should be conducted along three lines of description, to avoid over-simplification.

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Abbreviated title: Demonstrative NPs in indirect anaphora
1. Associative anaphora

1.1. Definition and divergences

1.1.1. Associative anaphora is generally defined as a referring expression with both the following two properties:
— it refers to an objet (the referent) which is new in discourse and has not, consequently, been explicitly mentioned in the prior context;
— it can be fully interpreted referentially only with the data which have been introduced at an earlier stage into the universe of discourse (such information will hereafter be called prior information); this second property justifies the term anaphora.

Associative anaphora therefore exists when a referring expression is interpretatively dependent on specific information provided in the prior linguistic context, without being coreferential with another expression. Here are some characteristic examples of associative anaphora.

(1) Cette main brune aux ongles encore pleins de terre, était là, sous ses yeux [...]. La paume à demi ouverte, les doigts repliés, elle semblait morte. (G. Bernanos, Nouvelle histoire de Mouchette. Lausanne: La Petite Ourse, 1956, p. 132)

[This brown hand, with nails still full of earth, was there, beneath his eyes [...]. The palm half open, the fingers folded, it seemed dead.]


[On morning, I read in a paper that Aurélie was ill. I wrote to her from the mountains of Salzburg. The letter was so heavy with German mysticism, that I would not have expected great success to come of it, but I also did not ask for a reply.]

These two properties can be considered as the minimal definition of associative anaphora for which there is near-universal consensus among linguists. But beyond this definition, there is much room for divergence of opinion on certain points, in particular the following two:

(i) The origin of prior information

According to some authors (e.g. Kleiber, Schnedecker and Ujma, 1994), this information must necessarily be provided by linguistic means; in other words, it should be co-textual. According to other authors (e.g. Erkü and Gundel, 1987), this information may also stem from the situation in which the statement is produced and its origin can be situational percepts or kinesic behaviour.
(gestures, direction of gaze, mimicry). The similarities between the two definitions have been observed by several authors, in particular Hawkins (1977) who calls background information ‘triggers’, be it a language segments or the speaking situation. In short, the point here is to determine whether, in the following examples, the expression underscored with a dotted line does or does not belong to the category of associative anaphora:

(3) (Speaker looking at a box) Where’s the bottom? (Erkü and Gundel, 1987: 534)
(4) (At a wedding ceremony) I wonder who the bridesmaids are? (Hawkins, 1984: 651)

When the source of prior information is a preceding linguistic sequence, several cases can occur. In (1), the information is provided by a demonstrative referring expression in French (“this hand”); in (2), it is provided by a predicative element (“wrote”). However, as can be seen with example (2), any attempt to locate this information with accuracy raises difficulties. In this example, and to account for the associative anaphor “the letter”, it is not trivial to notice that the idea in the preceding text is not simply to write, but rather to write to somebody in particular. In other words, the sequence to be taken into account as the provider of information serving as a background for the NP “the letter” is the whole sequence “I wrote to her”.

But the location and identification of the source of prior information can be even more tricky, as the following example shows:

(5) Atterrir sur la place Rouge! Certainement le jeune pilote est fou... (La Suisse, beginning of the text)
    [Land on Red Square! Surely the young pilot is crazy...]

This example refers to the young man who made the headlines at the end of the 80’s after flying over the Iron Curtain from West to East with a small tourist plane and landing on Red Square in Moscow. Two associative mechanisms operate in this example: on the one hand, there is an empirical link between the verb “land” and the noun phrase “the young pilot”. Moreover, there is a form of cohesion at a purely lexical level between the verb “land” and the noun “pilot” (what Halliday and Hasan (1976) call ‘lexical cohesion’). On the other hand, from the reader’s viewpoint, background knowledge and memories are probably activated when mentioning the place where the landing occurred (Red Square), which lead to the identification of the referent of the expression “the young pilot”. The adjective “young” in this context operates, then, depending on the nature of the information available to the decoder, either as offering assistance for the identification of the referent (by calling on background knowledge) – in which case it will have a truly determinative function – or as a confirmation for knowledge that has already been activated – in which case its function will be only descriptive or, in Damourette and Pichon’s (1911) term, ‘pictive’. Whatever the situation, we can observe that the adjective “young”, whose purpose is to modulate an

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2 The ‘trigger’ concept has been extended by Cornish (1987, 1994) to cover all types of anaphora.
associative expression, is itself external to the association process. There is indeed a shared representation making it possible to refer to a pilot after mentioning a landing, but there is none to make an inference about the pilot’s young age.

Thus, the information necessary for the interpretation of associative anaphora cannot be captured in a framework with clear-cut boundaries between linguistic and non-linguistic sources; this information can have multiple sources. A reasonable solution is probably to accept the idea that there can be functional equivalence between the information provided by the immediate utterance context, background knowledge, or a preceding statement. Our opinion in that respect is very similar to that of Erkül and Gundel (1987).

(ii) Type of NP operating as associative anaphora
According to some authors (Kleiber, 1990a), the NP operating as associative anaphor is necessarily a definite NP. This is a consequence of the semantic characteristics of the operational mode of the definite determiner, which includes the presupposition of existence and uniqueness, the referential relevance of the information contained in the lexical elements, an identification of the referent in relation to an informational frame (this frame is called ‘pragmatic set’ by Hawkins (1984), or ‘circonstances d’évaluation’ [evaluation circumstances] by Kaplan (1989) and Kleiber (1986)).

According to other authors (Brown and Yule, 1983; Charolles, 1990), personal pronouns can be used as associative anaphora as well, and other specialists (Reichler-Béguelin, 1989; Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski, 1993) maintain that any type of referring expression can work as an associative anaphor. The latter three authors illustrate their claim with example (7); (6) and (8) are also examples of non-definite associative anaphors. Such examples are very common:

(6) (An interview with Ségolène Royal, a former minister)
   Ce week-end, vous participerez aux Rencontres de Lorient, rendez-vous traditionnel des deloristes. Pensez-vous qu’il sera le candidat des socialistes à la présidentielle? (Le Figaro, 24.08.1994)

   [This week-end, you will take part in the Lorient Meetings, the traditional delorist rendezvous. Do you think that he will be the socialist candidate at the presidential election? (The delorists are the followers of Jacques Delors)]

(7) We went to hear the Minnesota Orchestra last night. That conductor was very good. (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski, 1993: 282)

[A large white cat, which belonged to the gardener, jumped onto my knees, and, with this jolt closed the book which I placed down at my side to caress the beast.]

We assume here the widest possible conception and do not accept the idea that the mechanism operating in the association is implemented only in the case of definite NPs. As we elaborate on this later in this paper, we will not go into any detail at this stage.

1.1.2. Differences in the conception of associative anaphora revert to problems of various origins. To some extent it may merely be a matter of definition. But things are not as simple as they seem to be. As Charolles (1990) has shown, there is no clear frontier between coreferential and associative anaphora. The main point, in our opinion, is that there are two pivotal factors underlying these differences: one is related to how the operational mode of the demonstrative NP is conceived; the other refers to the attitude of the linguist when observing authentic language use.

We believe that the descriptions that have been provided so far for demonstrative NPs are unsatisfactory. In particular, much still has to be said about the status of the information carried by lexical items and adnominal adjuncts – if any – in relation to the identification of the referent and the momentum of discourse. Theories applying to the demonstrative are generally offered by a descriptive practice whereby the demonstrative is contrasted with the definite article, rather than by bringing out ‘positive’ uses and operational modes. In the present state of our knowledge, it is therefore quite useful to continue collecting authentic examples of the demonstrative and to supply reports that are as detailed and thorough as possible.

Linguists may have diverging opinions as to what the standards of a so-called ‘acceptable’ sentence are or should be, wondering what attitude to take toward real data. We are not talking here of data which are blatantly incomplete or defective, or ‘hapaxes’, but rather of structures which are commonly found and show a minimum of systematicity. But linguists have a tendency to brush aside specific discursive structures as being ‘inacceptable’, even if the occurrences have been observed in regular contexts. It appears to be a way to give oneself an easy conscience (we refer the reader to Reichler-Béguelin (1993b) for the question of the evaluation of grammaticality and the epistemological consequences of some judgments). Our purpose here, on the contrary, is to examine in detail occurrences of the demonstrative NP in French that some researchers consider marginal or non-standard. If we accept to consider them with a positive rather than a normative and repressive frame of mind, such occurrences do reveal important aspects of referential procedures.

1.2. The associative relationship

When dealing with associative anaphora, the linguist considers that identifying the basis of the association itself, or the reason why an expression – which is apparently incomplete – can nevertheless be easily interpreted, is indeed the pivotal element for a proper understanding of the operation of this type of anaphora. It is generally accepted that the interpretation of associative
sequences rests, not only on prior information, but also on the solicitation of background knowledge and cultural stereotypes.

The examples offered at the beginning of this article illustrate two very frequent relations on which associative anaphora can be based. In (1) (“this hand... the palm... the fingers”), the anaphora is based on a WHOLE-PART relation; in (2) (“I wrote to her... the letter”), it is based on an ACTION-RESULTING ARGUMENT relation. These relations seem to refer to what the logician Lesniewski calls ‘ingredience’ relations (see Kearns, 1967; Grize, 1973). Consequently, we will sometimes use this expression in a generic sense.

On the other hand, these examples also show that the logic of this relation is open to change; in other words, the inference following the operation whereby a new referent is reached is not always of the same type. For instance, in (1), the existence of the palm and the fingers, given that of the hand, can be inferred by deduction (except if the hand is maimed in some way, a hand always has a palm and fingers). This does not apply to (6): strictly speaking, it is only probable, but not certain, that the pronoun il refers to Jacques Delors. This information is therefore inferred by abduction.

The distinction between deduction and abduction cannot be so easily applied in this domain. This is due in particular to the fact that inferences do not involve only referents; they also imply the meaning that speakers give to those referents, i.e. the way they categorise them by lexical selection. Moreover, an example such as (5) shows that the mechanisms at work in associative relations can be extremely complex. These mechanisms obviously refer to natural logic3.

1.3. General theoretical framework

1.3.1. The concept of associative anaphora adopted here is rather wide. Our claim is that it is impossible to specify the main classes of referring expressions (third-person pronouns, demonstrative NPs, definite NPs) on the basis of the opposition: ‘associative’ vs. ‘non-associative’ reference. The point is, on the contrary, to shed light on the various factors conditioning the in-context use of these three types of expressions, parallel to the referential function. The existence of such factors – which are both pragmatic and interactive – is quite obvious in such contexts, because taking accessibility or referential salience into account is not sufficient by itself to explain the selection made by the speaker (cf. ex. (6) to (8) where standard definite associative anaphora could have been achieved at the price of modification of the lexical component).

The study below will therefore bear on the various uses and functions of non-coreferential demonstrative NPs. The stress will be voluntarily laid on the pragmatic and interactive dimension of these expressions. Whether they can be termed ‘associative’ or simply ‘indirect’ is not essential,

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3 A proposal was made by Berrendonner (1994a) to model associative anaphora. It expands on the notion of ‘type’ and is rooted in the relation of ‘ingredience’ in Lesniewski’s mereology (Kearns 1967). Cf. also the paper by Miéville, in this very issue.
though, in our opinion, there is probably no type of non-coreferential anaphora that does not call for some inferential activity, when encoding and/or decoding. However it is important to specify the main theoretical principles underlying the way anaphorical phenomena will be dealt with in this article. These principles are as follows:

(i) Any discourse constructs a representation which operates like a shared memory ‘publicly’ fed by discourse. The successive stages of this representation account, at least partially, for the selections made, in particular for referring expressions. The idea that this representation is both the end to, and the constraint imposed on that discourse activity is now currently accepted. The various appellations given to this representation, both in discourse linguistics and in literature on anaphora, amply testify to this: ‘discourse registry’ (Hinds, 1977), ‘schématisation’ (Grize, 1982), ‘discourse file’ (Givón, 1983), ‘context model’ (Bosch, 1983), ‘discourse representation’ (Brown and Yule, 1983), ‘discourse model’ (Cornish, 1987), ‘mémoire discursive’ (Berrendonner and Reichler-Béguelin, 1989), ‘mental model’ (Garnham and Oakhill, 1990; Gernsbacher, 1991), etc. In the following, we will use the expression ‘discursive memory’ (abbreviated ‘M’) to refer to this shared representation.

(ii) M can be fed and have its content modified by three sources: (a) statements, (b) percepts linked to the utterance context (in some cases induced by kinesic behaviours), and (c) the inferences that can induce these statements and these percepts.

(iii) The discourse referents are not realities of the world; they are representations constructed by discourse, ‘discourse-objects’ (Grize, 1996).

(iv) The interpretation of an anaphoric expression consists, not so much in locating a linguistic segment (an ‘antecedent’), nor a specific thing in the world, but rather in an object or, more generally, in some information to be found in M. There is therefore no a priori reason to differentiate anaphoric expressions according to the way their referent has been introduced into M (statement, percept, inference).

(v) Studies on anaphora so far have paid too much attention to restrictions on use. The result is descriptions providing an excessively normative representation of actual facts. We hold the opinion that it is not possible to conduct acceptable semantic analyses on the basis of purely ‘negative’ facts; it is high time to pay attention to the semantic, pragmatic and interactive function of the various forms of referring expressions. This perspective is based on the assumption that all sorts of factors, besides the referential function, may condition the selection of an anaphor. Referring expressions are consequently considered here as poly-operators. Some studies have already shown that such an approach is indeed relevant, specifically in the area of pronouns (see for instance Cornish, 1987; Reichler-Béguelin, 1993a).

The consequence of the perspective adopted here is obviously a severe questioning of the theories that account for the selections made by speakers solely on the basis of referent ‘accessibility’, as is done by Ariel (1988) for example, or on ‘cognitive status’ (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski, 1993). Another consequence is that any referring expression has both, and at the same time, a constructive and an intersubjective dimension.
(vi) Though the various forms of anaphoric expressions (definite NPs, demonstrative NPs and pronouns) are distinct from one another – at least partially – by use constraints (an issue that has been largely explored in the literature), we think that these constraints are relatively flexible. Consequently it would be vain to establish a strict correlation between types of expressions and types of uses.

(vii) To understand how speakers use referring expressions, it is necessary to take on both the encoder’s and the decoder’s point of view. This implies that special attention must be paid to discrepancies, dissensions, and conflicting strategic interests which may occur between encoding and decoding.

1.4. Objectives

Section 2 in this article provides some evidences for the existence of associative demonstrative NPs and examines in detail the various forms that interpretation of the demonstrative can take, in particular in terms of polyphony. Section 3 offers a re-examination of the concepts of memory deixis and empathy, and propounds a dynamic model of the production/reception of reference, based on the idea of ‘compromise’ between divergent strategic interests. Section 4 brings to the fore various discursive and interactive forms of interpretation for the associative demonstrative, resulting in a distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ functions.

In more general terms, the aim of this study is not to provide a new theory for the demonstrative determiner. Rather, some of the arguments put forward to account for its non-coreferential uses will be examined critically, and some of their shortcomings will be pinpointed. This will be an opportunity to bring out some interesting facts and phenomena that linguists sometimes overlook as a consequence of an excessively monologic, textualistic and static stance about discursive activity.

2. Demonstrative NPs in associative use: descriptive problems

2.1. The operational mode of inference

2.1.1. According to the tradition of research on nominal determination, the demonstrative NP is different from the definite NP on the basis of the following semantic and instructional features: (i) the referent is captured in the context of occurrence, i.e. in the immediate utterance context; (ii) the lexical head of the NP is not always involved in the identification of the referent; rather, it implements a re-classification of the referent; (iii) the referent is finally captured in a process of ‘internal contrast’, in opposition to the other members of the class of which it is a member.

Another research trend, inspired by the work done by K. Ehlich, P. Bosch, D. Sperber & D. Wilson and with a strong cognitive and pragmatic tendency, prefers to emphasize the function of the demonstrative in the elaboration of M; the demonstrative is supposed to refer to “an element in focus in the ‘target’, but not in the source contextual model” (de Mulder, 1990: 153, our translation), whereas the definite determiner would refer to an element which is already in focus in M.

The defenders of the semantic approach claim that the main property of demonstrative NPs is their deictic dimension, in the traditional sense of the term. In so-called ‘textual’ uses, this property endows it with a clear – and widely accepted – tendency to implement so-called ‘coreferential’ retrieval operations. In the literature dealing with demonstrative NPs, it is generally considered that they do not lend themselves to creating associative anaphora, and various forms of evidence are then provided. However, this stance is weakened by various forms of non-standard uses that are sometimes called “divergent”, as in (9) and (10), and in (7) and (8) mentioned above.

(9) **Mais quand se décidera-t-on à imposer les gros revenus et fortunes des multimillionnaires comme sont imposés les petits revenus qui le sont jusqu’au dernier franc?**
Exemple: *si l’on percevait un impôt de 700000 francs (commune, canton and Confédération) sur un revenu d’un million (il en est qui “gagnent” encore plus), ce contribuable aurait à disposition encore 300’000 francs.* (L’Impartial, 27.12.1993)

[But when will we make up our minds to tax the large incomes and fortunes of multimillionaires in the way that small incomes are taxed to the last franc? Example: if we collected a tax of 700,000 francs (local, county and federal) on an income of one million (and there are those who “earn” even more), this taxpayer would still have 300,000 francs at his disposal.]

(10) **Le marquis de Cuevas avait épousé la petite-fille de Rockfeller. Avec cet argent, il a créé un ballet.** (Radio, France-Musique, 7.2.1993)

[The Marquis de Cuevas had married Rockfeller’s grandchild. With this money, he created a ballet.]

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5 These two types of descriptive approach applied to the demonstrative determiner, for which we provided a sketchy survey above, run up against the difficulty of properly defining what should be understood by ‘to be (or not to be) in focus’ or by ‘occurrence context’. We cannot be deluded for long with the apparent obviousness effect induced by such concepts.

6 A list of researchers having adopted this stance can be found in Kleiber, Schnedecker and Ujma (1994: 47), and the literature.
2.1.2. These uses and definite associative anaphora have in common the fact that the NP refers in all cases to a referent that was not mentioned in previous discourse; this appears clearly in (7), (9) and (10). However, though it was not introduced explicitly, this referent can be considered as inferable: (i) on the basis of a stereotype or a pre-established element of knowledge with generic value; (ii) because of a specific state of information (i.e. the state of M) constructed by the preceding verbal context. As previously mentioned, these two properties correspond to the shared definition of associative anaphora.

In the case of (9), the reader – to identify the object pinpointed by ce contribuable [this taxpayer] – has to infer a patient or ‘experiencer’ semantic role, on the basis of the script that has been activated: receiving a tax... relating to a specific income. The intended referent can also be calculated locally via a technical stereotype that establishes links between tax-payers and incomes, according to the basic rules of taxation...

Mutatis mutandis, (10) can be interpreted in the same fashion: the NP cet argent [this money] points to a referent that can be inferred by abduction, via a socio-cultural stereotype based on the mentioned event (marrying a member of the Rockefeller family). As for (8), the form assumed by the anaphor is justified by the cause-to-result relationship between the leap performed by the cat and the following jolt. The demonstrative NP cette secousse [this jolt] here does not provide an accurate reminder of the predicate sauta sur mes genoux [jump on my knees], as would ce saut [this leap]. Consequently it induces relations of causality between events and therefore works as a driving force for the progress of the text. We will return to this example in 4.3.1.

Such uses of the demonstrative can be termed associative, inasmuch as their interpretation implies calling on a stereotype and, therefore, on some inferential activity (cf. 1.2). This kind of process is probably rather complex, which may be encapsulated in the following formula: “if there is a wedding with one of Rockefeller’s grand-daughters, much money is most probably involved”; “if there is a leap, a jolt is probably felt”; etc. It is obviously the introduction of a stereotype which allows the addressee to operate the ‘right’ referential interpretation even if (as described in some analyses) the demonstrative captures the referent via the utterance context, as opposed to what happens with the associative definite NP.

2.1.3. More examples could be introduced here to provide other interesting reasons on the basis of which the boundaries between co-reference and association should be questioned. We refer here to cases related not so much to inference between objects, but rather to inference between the

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7 We clearly do not refer here to the definition which confines associative anaphora to the definite NP only (see 1.1.). In our opinion, such a restriction is inappropriate as it leads to overlooking interesting forms of generalisations (Reichler-Béguelin, 1993a; Berrendonner and Reichler-Béguelin, 1995). We will try to show in the conclusion that there are good reasons to maintain a distinction among several levels of description of referring expressions, including the level of logic where inferences are processed.

8 In (9): ‘the tax-payer who has an income of one million’; in (10): ‘the money involved in getting married’; in (8): ‘the jolt caused by the leap’. We have, roughly speaking, an argument involved in the action scheme in question.
properties of the same object. For instance, a referent introduced into M in the form of a class of elements may be extracted again by the demonstrative in the form of a type – this kind of reference is commonly termed ‘generic’, as is the case in (11).


[On planes of recent construction, computers enable us to check the good working order of the instruments on board. This marvellous and sophisticated tool is assumed to eliminate to a maximum the possibility of human error.]

Berrendonner (1994b) recommends explaining the cognitive-discursive process implemented in sequences of this type, where some clues apparently imply that there are two referents, others only one, by referring to the concept of ‘indiscrete object’. We note that the inferences of this type, as they bear on the logical mode of existence of the referent, are actualised in textual procedures characterised by a difference in number between the demonstrative and its ‘anteecedent’, as clearly marked in French: des/les N... ce N, un/le N... ces N9. Otherwise, in the case of demonstrative anaphora, moving to generic reference is often signalled (or implemented) lexically via complex NPs such as *ce type de* [this type of], *ce genre de* [this kind of], *cette sorte de* [this sort of], *cette catégorie de* [this category of], etc. These genericity operators bring out the change of logical level; they should be the object of a thorough examination.

### 2.2. Interpretation through memory exophora and empathy

2.2.1. One of the solutions that is often put forward to solve the problem posed by indirect or associative demonstratives consists in calling on the notions of ‘memory deixis’ (Fraser and Joly, 1980), ‘empathetic deixis’ (Lyons, 1977; Kuno, 1987; Conte, 1990), ‘indexical thought’ (Kleiber, 1990a), etc. These notions refer to psychological mechanisms which are partly distinct and attributed either to the speaker him/herself or to a character referred to in discourse10. We know that

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9 Symmetrical routines involving variations on grammatical number are also certified by personal pronoun usage. See Reichler-Béguelin (1993a).

10 See for instance what Lyons (1977: 677) writes about empathetic deixis:

“[...] we would draw attention to what we call empathetic deixis and its role in anaphoric reference. It frequently happens that ‘this’ is selected rather than ‘that’, ‘here’ rather than ‘there’, and ‘now’ rather than ‘then’, when the speaker is personally involved with the entity, situation or place to which he is referring or is identifying himself with the attitude or viewpoint of the addressee. The conditions which determine this empathetic use of the marked member of these deictically opposed demonstratives and adverbs are difficult to specify with any degree of precision. But there is no
the demonstrative NP can indeed operate in *in absentia* deixis, i.e. without any explicit contextual basis, be it in recollective-exclamatory uses for which the main speaker assumes responsibility, or as ‘deictics in reported speech’, or ‘represented thought’ (Banfield, 1979).

The following sequence is also an example of demonstrative reference with an object not yet mentioned, but supposedly already present in the mental representations of a character introduced into the relation. The thoughts that this character supposedly has are introduced by means of an operator of reported speech (the reflexive verb *se demander* [ask oneself]):

(12) *Enfin, la grosse Maria Gruber, 28 ans, au visage rond and dessiné au compas, mariée à Christian Moser, mécanicien, mère de famille, la simplette de la bande, et qui n’est pas loin de se demander par quel injuste coup du sort elle se trouve là, dans cette vaste salle des assises du tribunal de Vienne, aux murs de marbre, aux fenêtres hautes et où la voix de l’avocat général Kloyber résonne en effrayant écho*. (Paris Match, 28.3.1991)

[Finally, the overweight Maria Gruber, 28 years old, with a round compass-like face, married to Christian Moser, a mechanic, the housewife and mother, the ingenuous member of the gang, and who is just short of asking herself by what unjust stroke of fate she finds herself here, in this vast courtroom of the Vienna assizes, with its walls of marble and high windows and where the voice of the attorney general Kloyber resounds with a frightening echo.]

It is therefore tempting to claim that all indirect (i.e. non-coreferential) demonstratives are but a particular case of ‘empathetic’ uses for which the discursive context provides – almost by chance – a premise allowing an *a posteriori* confirmation of the referent that was aimed at. Thus, the ‘associative’ demonstratives in (13) and (14) appear in a part of the discourse that is in direct reported speech (and is thus typographically and syntactically autonomous)\(^\text{11}\). According to the propounded theory, their purpose would then be mainly to convey the indexical character of the thought of the speaker introduced by the text:

(13) *Directeur de l’Hôtel du Rhône à Genève, Marco Torriani a vécu vingt ans à l’étranger. “J’avais commencé à apprécier l’esprit nord-américain. Ces gens-là travaillent toujours ensemble.”* (Le Nouveau Quotidien, 28.1.94)

\(^{11}\) As opposed to what we can observe in example (12), the demonstrative NPs appearing in (13) and (14) are supported by the immediate environment.
Manager of the Hotel du Rhone in Geneva, Marco Torriani, spent twenty years abroad. “I began to appreciate the North American spirit. Those people always pull together.”

Pierre-Yves Maillard, secrétaire de la Fédération des associations d’étudiants (FAE), et fervent défenseur d’une large couverture par les hautes écoles des besoins en logement de leurs étudiants, constate que si ces nouvelles chambres arrivent dans une mauvaise conjoncture, elles n’en perdent pas leur utilité. “Dans les dix prochaines années, la mobilité suisse et internationale va continuer à se développer, il faut avoir des logements pour recevoir cette population.” (Le Nouveau Quotidien, 2.2.1994)

Pierre-Yves Maillard, secretary of the Federation of Student Associations (FAE), and a fervent defender of specialist schools covering the accommodation needs of their students, observes that if these new rooms come at a bad time, they are nonetheless useful. “In the next ten years, Swiss and international mobility will continue to develop; we need the accommodations to house this population.”

In the French example proposed by Charolles (1990: 128)

Nous arrivâmes dans un village. Cette église, tout de même, quelle horreur!

We arrived in a village. THIS church! really! how dreadful!

the recollective character of the reference is also supposed to provide an explanation for the use – both selfish and ‘lazy’ in Berrendonner’s sense (1990) – of the demonstrative NP, rather than calling on the ingredience relation existing between the village and the church (see Kleiber, 1990a: 163-165, in a similar vein).

2.2.2. Before investigating the limitations of this explanation, it might be useful to set up a more precise list of the contexts to which it may be applied. Demonstratives that can be interpreted in the terms indicated above (empathetic deixis, indexical thought, etc.) may appear, not only in such examples as those in the previous paragraph, but also in forms that are more or less clearly marked as free indirect speech, in particular in passages that can be termed stream of consciousness or represented thought:

Il examine une dernière fois sa future récolte avant de rentrer au village. Vendu un bon prix, ce coton devrait lui permettre d’acheter le mil qui manquera. (Presse)

He examines his future harvest for the last time before returning to the village. Sold at a good price, this cotton should allow him to buy millet which will be scarce.]
The perception verb *examiner* may be thought to operate here like a verb triggering a stream of consciousness, introducing the addressee to the representations and the ‘mental space’ of the character instantiated in the text (cf. Fauconnier, 1984). This change in point of view then justifies the fact that a piece of information not previously available in discursive memory may be introduced via the demonstrative NP *ce coton* [this cotton]. From that point of view, this expression is then reduced to a pseudo-anaphoric, even if the NP *sa future récolte* [his future harvest] provides information that can serve as a base for its interpretation.

In the absence of any clue pointing to free indirect speech, the notions of polyphony (Ducrot *et al.*, 1980) or heterogeneity (Authier-Revuz, 1991) may provide an interpretation for some examples. Thus, a possible interpretation for (17) consists in considering that the relative clause refers to a piece of speech reporting facts alleged by the people on strike. In this interpretation, the referring demonstrative NP is not assumed by the speaker.

(17) *Il faut bien nourrir les grévistes, qui n’ont trouvé que ce moyen [i.e. la grève] pour s’opposer au président togolais.* (French TV program, A2, 14.02.1993)

[The strikers, who have found only *this means* (i.e. to strike) of showing their opposition to the President of Togo, must be fed.]

As soon as the point of view assumed by a specific character is sufficiently rooted in the discursive context, using a non-coreferential demonstrative is then likely to signal that it is a case of opaque reference in Quine’s sense (1960). The explicit marker signalling a change of point of view and provided in the most typical cases by operators of perception or represented thought such as *contempler* [contemplate], *penser* [think], *se demander* [wonder], *songer* [envisage], *se souvenir* [remember]... (cf. (12) and (16)), is in no way compulsory; (18), in which they do not appear at all, is a good illustration of this.

(18) *Elle a trois enfants. Elle conduit et élève tout cela avec une activité fiévreuse, elle ne fait qu’aller, venir; habillant l’un, savonnant l’autre, plantant une casquette sur cette binette, un bonnet sur ce bout de crâne, recousant les culottes, repassant les robes, mouchant celui-ci, nettoyant celui-là.* (J. Vallès, L’enfant. Lausanne: Rencontre, 1966, p. 194)

[She has three children. She conducts and brings up all this with feverish activity; relentlessly she comes and goes: dressing one, washing the other, sticking a cap on this little face, a bonnet on this bit of head, mending shorts, ironing dresses, blowing this one's nose, cleaning that one.]
The demonstrative NP, which is perceived primarily as an indicator of indexical thought, may serve secondarily as a marker of reported speech or as a change of perceptual anchoring. This situation may even apply to a first-person relation as in (8), even if it is not a priori so agreeable to an explanation based on a change of point of view. It is sufficient to admit that “this jolt” is a reflection of the point of view assumed by the character-speaker as s/he is described at the time of the related events, rather than the narrator-speaker reporting an autobiographical event (even if other non-exclusive interpretations are possible. Cf. infra 4.3.1.).

2.2.3. The mechanism of deictic or memory exophora is often described as likely to provide a final solution to the associative demonstrative issue. For instance, for Charolles (1990: 129), the associative use of demonstrative NPs must be restricted to examples of in absentia deixis of the above type. In his opinion, such occurrences are possible only “under some specific constraints of co-textual nature: necessary existence of clues (even if very slight) as markers of the stream of consciousness, a call on the addressee’s memories or experience, etc.” (our translation).

However, examples such as (17) and (18) run against the idea that using the associative demonstrative is restricted by the form of the context. In the two examples, the third-person narration with a [+human] agent seems sufficient to get the reader to attribute to this agent the referential operation performed by the demonstrative NP. In these examples, the change of point of view when passing from the perspective of the speaker to that of the character is not made explicit by the verbalised context. The responsibility of this action is, as it were, shifted to the reader. The marker for perception or reported speech which is likely to introduce – in the strongest sense of the term – some heterogeneity in perspective, has at best the status of an underlying piece of information. In (17) and (18), it is finally the demonstrative NP itself which represents the unique trace of polyphony or heterogeneity of viewpoint, i.e. the only marker of subjectivity. Consequently, the appropriate use of an indirect demonstrative depends, not so much on the superficial properties of the verbalised environment – these can be fully listed – but rather on a specific state of the information, i.e. of M. M stores, among other things, the result of the calculation of implicit information, and the assumptions made about the speaker’s intentions.

The potential existence of polyphony effects triggered by isolated referring expressions thus entails the non-trivial conclusion that using a demonstrative NP cannot simply be described in terms of surface distributional constraints (cf. Reichler-Béguelin, 1994). Such a conclusion is supported by the observation of free indirect speech in general; Authier-Revuz (1978: 80) observes that “it is indeed impossible, at language level, to specify the elements introducing it” (our translation).

2.2.4. It has be shown in the previous paragraphs that using a demonstrative NP, due to the instructional features attached to the deictic ce [this/that], refers in most cases to the problem of reported speech, and, more specifically, to that of free indirect speech or represented thought. We have also discussed the important consequences of this observation for the level at which the restrictions applying to the possible occurrence of the demonstrative may operate. There is now another area where this type of reference to free indirect speech may be revealing.
It has been known for a long time that free indirect speech (particularly in French) creates ambiguous statements. Authier-Revuz (1978: 79-80) provides the following illustration.

(19)  
Pau 1 vient de téléphoner. Il est très déprimé.  
[Paul has just called. He is very depressed.]

In such a sequence, the second sentence may be perceived either as free indirect speech (“Paul has just called. He said he is depressed”) or as a continuation of a monological discourse (“Paul has just called. I think he is very depressed”). There is obviously no reason to decide between the two interpretations.

As a consequence, it is not surprising to observe that demonstratives are submitted to the same kind of ambiguous interpretation, as numerous occurrences that are potentially polyphonic may remain obscure to a large number of addresses. Thus, many readers will not perceive – at least not spontaneously – the polyphonic interpretations proposed above for examples (17), (18), or (8), or will think that they are somewhat forced. In the same way, when Kleiber, Patry and Ménard (1994: 132) set an asterisk to the following example (their creation)

(20)  
*Il s’abrita sous un vieux tilleul. Ce tronc était craquelé.  
[*He sheltered under an old lime tree. This trunk was all wrinkled.]

they hold the opinion that the demonstrative cannot be used here, and they do not readily accept the idea that an associative demonstrative can represent a change in perceptual anchoring, as it does in this exemple and in (16)\(^\text{12}\). However, the referential action carried out in the second sentence can indeed be considered as assumed by the person referred to by the pronoun il [he] in the first sentence. This is a way to comply with the instruction for a connection to the occurrence context carried by the demonstrative determiner. The addition of one or several subjectivity markers (for example: Ce magnifique tronc était tout craquelé [this magnificent trunk was all wrinkled]) can provide support to this interpretation. However, it was shown above that the presence of clues other than the demonstrative itself is not constraining per se.

2.2.5. In our opinion, any model of the operational mode of the demonstrative NP should provide ways to integrate such variations in the interpretation. These can indeed lead to situations of enunciative or focal metanalysis\(^\text{13}\). The cause of many controversies concerning the well-

\(^{12}\) However, the same authors resort further on to the polyphony argument for occurrences of hyponym anaphora (ibid. 136).

\(^{13}\) ‘Focal’ is used here as an adjective corresponding to ‘point of view’ or ‘perspective’. ‘Metanalysis’, a term coined by Jespersen (1922), is extended here to discursive structures. It applies initially to “this phenomenon proper to the operation and transmission of language according to which the clusters making up the linguistic units can be understood by the hearer
formedness of a given discursive sequence including a demonstrative lies in arguments of this type, where one participant in communication gives preference to the exophoric referential mode, detached from the letter of the verbal context, whereas the other prefers the endophoric mode by turning to prior information provided by the linguistic context, that is, by the antecedent.

2.2.6. Without underplaying the role of empathy and polyphony which can motivate many indirect uses of demonstrative NPs, an interpretation of non-coreferential demonstratives by calling on the speaker’s indexical thought may seem somewhat exaggerated. Demonstratives, which can indeed serve as markers for free indirect speech or represented thought, also appear (as shown above) in direct speech of a monological type, in which case they are perceived as traces of the indexical or egocentric nature of reference (cf. (13) and (14)). Their presence is *ipso facto* predictable in ordinary monological discourse, inasmuch as it is not different from ‘direct speech’, in compliance with the basic sense of the Latin expression *oratio recta*. Examples of this are (15) which is not a case of reported speech, and possibly (9) in which using the demonstrative cannot be simply reduced to a change of point of view (with empathy or polyphony effect). That examples (15) and (9) are close to (13) and (14) is probably not due to chance, as (15) and (9) can be considered as voluntary imitations of the way speakers operate references in spontaneous situations.

3. Indexical thought as a general feature of the encoding procedure

3.1. Interaction between production and reception in referential operations

3.1.1. In reality, deixis applied to mnesic contents (what we called, above, the exophoric mode) is a trivial way to characterize spontaneous encoding of reference. Evidence for this can be found both in the written production of learners and in the texts produced in a context of loosely controlled communication. Thus, the indexicality claim can rescue any indirect use of the demonstrative NP. As occurrence of the demonstrative is not conditioned by definite syntactic contexts, there is always the possibility, in the case of an *in absentia* demonstrative that has no textual antecedent and is not accountable by some heterogeneity factor, to claim that the speaker is operating an indexical reference egocentrically to the content of his/her own thought, without first explicitly committing the referent in question to shared memory (M). The interpretation by way of memory deixis also works beyond the purpose of those who call upon it to deal with the problem of non-coreferential demonstratives, and who cannot give up the idea of doing without certain criteria to differenciate between legitimate – or at least predictable – uses, and illegitimate ones.

differently from the way they were constructed by the speaker” (Blinkenberg, 1950: 42; our translation).

14 An occurrence in which demonstrative NPs are a manifestation of an indexical thought without additionally marking a change of point of view as in other forms of reported speech which are less clearly identified as such.
3.1.2. On the other hand, scholars dealing with demonstratives call on empathy and memory deixis opportunistically, with the sole purpose of accounting for uses that are deemed non-standard. As they are not willing to apply to them a diagnosis of associative anaphora, in an ad hoc explanation they call on the (cognitive) point of view of the author of the referential act, without drawing general theoretical implications.

We have shown elsewhere at some length, by experimenting on various examples out of written texts, that the indexical mode seems to correspond to the general strategic interest of the producer of the referential action. S/he is indeed tempted spontaneously to point – directly and ‘offhandedly’ – to his/her own cognitive representations where referents are by definition embedded (cf. Reichler-Béguelin, 1988, 1989: 310). As to the receiver, who is in charge of identifying the referents, his/her interest lies, on the contrary, especially in a reading situation, in working on clues provided by the linguistic context. For instance, to solve the demonstrative NPs in (8) and (10), the reader – even if s/he is sensitive to empathy and indexical thought – could hardly manage without calling upon the associative inferences described under 2.1.2. This remark shows that empathy, which appropriately emphasizes the production and assumption of the referential operation, cannot account for interpretative procedure in all its complexity.

Even if the analyser, taking on the encoder’s point of view, considers that the latter tends to proceed through autonomous referential acts applied to the contents of his/her own consciousness, the problem of the opposition between ‘coreferential’ and ‘associative’ reference loses some of its theoretical relevance. Consequently, the notion of empathy has been called upon in an attempt to obviate the notion of associativity. But this does not hold for the decoder’s perspective. S/he is naturally tempted, especially in a reading situation, to ‘textualise’ the referential operations (i.e. to look for explicit markers). Indeed it is when systematically linking up prior information (i.e. an antecedent) with its anaphor that the reader-cum-decoder – who responds typically as a learned person – is induced to make a clear-cut distinction between so-called ‘coreferential’ and so-called ‘associative’ anaphora.

The consequence of such observations is a warning against various forms of ill-controlled relations that are set up between certain theoretical terms concerning demonstrative reference, and either of the two opposite strategic positions that we have just described. There is obviously a tendency, in theoretical discourse, to give preference to the decoder’s point of view, and to call upon the encoder’s only as an occasional alibi.

3.1.3. It is therefore necessary, in our opinion – for a comprehensive description of the process at work when producing and interpreting associative demonstrative NPs – to grant strong theoretical status to the notion of indexical reference, and not to be content with the explanation based on indirect demonstratives. By so doing, this notion can be integrated into a pragmatic approach of encoding/decoding referential operations in general, and get beyond the traditional opposition between ‘cognitive’ and the ‘textual’ approaches.
From the cognitive viewpoint, the production and reception of referential acts are indeed basically different and rely on different strategic interests (Horn, 1990):

– On the one hand, it is in the interest of the person producing the referring expression to refer to referents as freely as possible, by calibrating the lexical parameters in an appropriate manner, without feeling constrained by the preceding co-text. Thus it is profitable for him/her to take the most advantage of non-verbal information. It can be pragmatically important for him/her to take advantage of the referential operations to achieve other discursive operations (see, on this topic, Apothéloz, 1995; Maes and Noordman, 1995; Reichler-Béguelin, 1995).

– As opposed to this, the decoder must normally give preference to the identification of the referent. In the case of a written text – a mode of communication which does not take place in real time and is partly de-contextualised – it is particularly advantageous for him/her to be able to interpret anaphoric expressions by textual ‘chaining’, i.e. using, in advance, all elements necessary for the interpretation of the anaphoric expression, on the basis of semantic completeness of prior information (cf. on this topic Reichler-Béguelin, 1988, 1989: 308).

The constraint – of a prescriptive nature – bearing on what we call ‘semantic completeness of prior information’, in writing, and tending to impose the presence of an explicit antecedent in the environment of anaphora, is thus a direct reflection of the interests of the decoder, in particular in a reading situation. However, the application of this rule is rather costly for the encoder, who sees a restriction on his/her freedom to improvise and adapt to circumstances. It is then no surprise to see this rule constantly infringed upon, as is amply evidenced by indirect demonstratives and other anaphora without antecedent. When the speaker operates in an uncooperative way, the addressee has to adjust by calling on background knowledge and calculating implicit information leading him/her, in spite of the informative incompleteness of the text, to provide a correct referential interpretation. In some cases, the casual non cooperative reference is censored or calls for a sanction, but this is not the standard situation. Implementing a psychological encoding model for the purpose of interpretation normally depends on the socio-cultural status and relation between speaking partners, and on the tendency of the addressee.

3.1.4. The consequence of the preceding remarks is that a successful referential operation is but a complex compromise between the strategic interests of the encoder and the decoder, each of them aware of the other party’s interest and of the fact that the other party is aware of his/hers, etc. In this case, a failure is not so much the result of an ‘error’ in language, but rather the consequence of conflicting interests between the participants in communication. This conflict may materialise in certain cases into two distinct and antagonistic textual grammars (Reichler-Béguelin, 1994).

In our opinion, the management of reference consists of a constant regulation between the speaker – who tends toward exophora, but is supposed to facilitate access to the referent to be more easily understood – and the addressee who, in spite of a natural (and perhaps cultural) tendency towards endophora, is continuously supposed to make assumptions about the ‘good reasons’ that might have induced the speaker to actualise the referential operation this way rather than that way, in particular when it is not stereotypical.
In this perspective, two complementary mechanisms must be taken into consideration: on the one hand, the assumptions made by the speaker when anticipating decoding operations, in compliance with Grice’s maxim on cooperation, and on the other hand, hypotheses on the encoding process that the addressee implements symmetrically. These mechanisms obviously have an adaptative function. They operate in interpretative procedures and are often appropriate to explain the use of an under-specified or indirect expression.

3.2. Metonymic interpretations and nominalisations

3.2.1. The differences of opinion emerging among researchers concerning certain demonstratives (for which (20) is an example) should be considered as evidence of competing (but not mutually exclusive) interpretative procedures that may arise with indirect demonstratives. These variations in interpretation are not restricted to the issue of polyphony; they also concern the ‘coreferent’ vs. ‘associative’ opposition. Here is an example of such a difference:

\[(21) \quad \text{Les films documentaires permettent d’enrichir nos connaissances sur de multiples matières. Ces images jouent un rôle instructif. (Student’s paper)}\]

[Documentaries allow us to enrich our knowledge of many subjects. These images play an educational role.]

This occurrence is analysed by Charolles (1990: 125) as a non-coreferential referring expression, an (awkward) case of egocentric reference based on the whole/part relation existing between documentaries and these images. The same occurrence is considered by Wiederspiel (1994: 138) as a recategorising coreferential anaphora “in relation to a presupposition of the ‘these films are images’ type” (our translation).

In cases such as (20) and (21), and in the following example, which cannot be reduced to a case of reported speech:

\[(22) \quad \text{Admirons que les petits-enfants de ceux qui ne voyaient dans les peintures impressionnistes que d’informes barbouillages stationnent maintenant en interminables files d’attente pour aller “admirer” dans les expositions ou les musées les œuvres de ces mêmes barbouilleurs. (C. Simon)}\]

[Let us admire the fact that the grandchildren of those who saw in impressionist paintings only rough scribbling now stand in endless queues to go and “admire” in exhibitions or museums the works of these same scribblers.]

– either the interpreter can spontaneously adopt the point of view of encoding; s/he then admits that the speaker, due to a given state of his/her discourse representations, sets into the focus of attention
a referent which has not been heretofore explicitly mentioned. Given the instruction carried by the demonstrative as to the existence of a connection to the context of occurrence, the decoder will construct the intended referent preferentially by assumptions on the state of the speaker’s representations, or on some of the actors in the story, rather than by the literal linguistic context. Such associative relations as ‘Rockefeller–money’, ‘lime tree–trunk’, ‘films–pictures’, ‘daubs–daubers’ can at least serve as an explanatory support for the encoder’s inferences.

– Or s/he can be content with the decoder’s point of view and makes good use of the lexical and grammatical information supplied by the linguistic material. Empirical elements of knowledge and common associative stereotypes then play a prominent role in identifying the intended referent, rather than assumptions about polyphony, empathy, etc., and resorting to the implicit. The specific meaning of the demonstrative, which brings about the identification of a referent available in the discursive context, is actualised almost topologically, i.e. within the scope of the text, rather than psychologically. The ‘textualising’ decoder might then be tempted either to reject a demonstrative associative anaphor as being ill-formed (see for example (20)), or to resolve it into a metonymic interpretation, as does Wiederspiel with (21).

3.2.2. The interactive conception of referential operations, for which we provided outlines above, offers a method to deal with other examples of demonstratives, such as (23), where it is difficult to declare whether they are coreferential or associative:

(23) On l’a souvent affirmé, Maupassant n’a pas attendu Schopenhauer pour douter des hommes et de la vie, et s’il prit connaissance de cette grande œuvre morose comme on découvre l’Amérique […], il n’eut nul besoin… (Introduction to Contes fantastiques by G. de Maupassant. Paris: Marabout, 1992, p. 29)

[It has often been said that Maupassant did not wait for Schopenhauer to doubt men and life, and if he became aware of this great morose work in the way we discover America […], he had no need to…]

When reading (23), a mode focussing on the literal semantic information provided, leads the reader to construct the referent intended by the proper noun “Schopenhauer” as a person, which is compatible with the selective restrictions related to the verb attendre [wait]. Consequently, the demonstrative NP cette grande œuvre morose [this great morose work] can be interpreted only as an associative anaphor, due to the ingredience relation – in a broad sense of the term – between an author and his/her work. This anaphor can be rendered acceptable in three possible ways in this context: (i) it is considered that there is a change of point of view, and Maupassant is viewed as the source of the referential operation; (ii) the main speaker’s point of view is adopted and the demonstrative is interpreted as a ‘speaker’s deictic’ with recollective/exclamatory type value; (iii) it is considered that the demonstrative leads to re-interpreting the referring expression Schopenhauer as a metonymy (the name of the author instead of his work). Interpretation (iii) seems to be closest
to the textualistic perspective, the one of a reader-decoder who is inclined to look for an antecedent, or even to force the coreference between two expressions. It should be noted that this considering as a case of metonymy affects the interpretation of the first referring expression, whereas it concerns the demonstrative proper in (21).
Example (24) can also be interpreted in at least two ways and there is no reason to give preference to either one:

(24) Il s’était retrouvé au chômage et avait mal accepté cette déchéance. (Journal de Genève, 17.5.1993)
[He found himself on the dole and accepted this decline badly.]

The NP cette déchéance [this decline] here might be interpreted as an associative anaphor identifying the consequence after the cause, as a stereotype of the ‘unemployment causes a decline’ type. This interpretation is all the more satisfactory since the context gives support to the idea of a change of perspective concerning the referent. But it can also be claimed that this “decline” is a coreferential anaphor which renames the process se retrouver au chômage [find oneself on the dole] related to a concurrent stereotype ‘unemployment is a form of decline in status’.

In the following sequence, an associative interpretation of the demonstrative NP seems to be more appropriate, as there is seemingly no pre-established identity relationship between wearing contact lenses and the manipulation involved in the process of putting them on.

(25) Je m’efforçais de m’habiller et de me maquiller correctement, de porter mes lentilles au lieu de mes lunettes, en dépit du courage que me réclamait cette manipulation. (A. Ernaux, Passion simple. Paris: Gallimard, 1991, p. 53-54)
[I forced myself to get dressed and made-up properly, to wear my contact lenses instead of my glasses, in spite of the courage that this manipulation demanded.]

Such an example can be considered as typical of an anaphoric routine in which the strong contextual link cannot be resolved into coreference, and where the associative stereotype prevails for the interpretation.

4. Functions of non-coreferring demonstrative NPs

4.1. The simulation-of-reality effect

4.1.1. The demonstrative NPs analysed above (‘polyphonic’, ‘memory deixis’, ‘represented thought’, etc.) have in common, at least in one of the possible interpretations, the fact that they carry out a kind of reference which has been called ‘opaque’ after Quine (1960). The question to be
raised now is: What interest is there for the speaker to implement this type of referential operation? What are the semantic, pragmatic, and interactive functions of such opaque uses of the demonstrative NP?

Our opinion is that this function or effect may be described very generally as a *simulation of reality* (see also what Lyons (1977: 677) calls “appeal to shared experience”). Following a procedure which is akin to mimetism, the speaker simulates a state of discursive memory which is not the state that had been constructed by the preceding discourse, which cannot, thus, be that of the addressee. This state can refer to a specific character mentioned in the discourse, or to the speaker him/herself, at the time of speaking or at another time and in another place. The addressee is thus fictively placed in the cognitive state of another person. From the point of view of their discursive effect, these uses of demonstrative NPs can be related to the so-called ‘perception’ metonymies, as illustrated in (26).

(26) *Dans un salon de coiffure je me faisais attendre quand une boule de bigoudis apparut à la porte et dit: “Alors, ça va être froid”.* (L’Hebdo – a newspaper)

[In a hairdresser's I had been asked to wait when a ball of curlers appeared at the door and said: “Well, it's going to be cold”].

When a demonstrative NP is used in such a way, it brings out the discrepancies that can exist between the discourse representation (M) of the encoder and the decoder, and the ‘expressive’ advantage that can be derived out of it. Discrepancies are not necessarily dysfunctions; they can also be deliberately caused, ‘played’; this corresponds to a kind of *manoeuvre* on the part of the speaker.

This observation suggests that discourse, while feeding M, offers a certain representation of its successive states (in particular by formatting the referring expressions which, from that point of view, operate like clues). The way the demonstrative NPs examined above work shows that this representation can itself be manipulated, and the selection of referring expressions is precisely one of the loci where this manipulation is both possible and visible.

4.1.2. Putting aside the issue of referential opacity, some non coreferential uses will now be examined. For each example, both negative and positive reasons will be identified as to why the encoder selected a demonstrative. Even if the procedure will consist mostly in comparing the effect of the demonstrative determiner with that of the definite, the purpose is not primarily to oppose these two determiners, but rather to pinpoint the advantages of using a demonstrative in a specific context. This is actually what is to be understood by the *function* (or *effect*) of the expression. As we will see, such functions can be varied in nature.

First of all, in a high number of context types, the definite determiner and the demonstrative are practically in free variation. This holds true for the following examples, which are all cases of associative anaphora (the genuine form has a demonstrative in every case):
C’est l’inquiétude pour les locataires de quelques immeubles à Fribourg. Ils ont bénéficié de la trêve des fêtes, mais les propriétaires entendent vendre ces appartements / les appartements. (La Suisse, 14.1.1992)

[It is a worrisome time for the tenants of some Fribourg buildings. They have benefited from a seasonal respite, but the owners intend to sell these apartments / the apartments.]

La route est à nouveau ouverte entre Fribourg et Neuchâtel. Un accident était à l’origine de cette perturbation du trafic / la perturbation du trafic. (Radio, 11.7.1993)

[The road is once again open between Fribourg and Neuchâtel. An accident was at the origin of this disruption of traffic / the disruption of traffic.]

It can be seen that in every example, the demonstrative and the definite NP refer to the same object and there is no difficulty in identifying this object in either case. Apart from possible expressive effects, it is not really possible to identify any specific function for the demonstrative NP in these examples.

4.2. Avoiding an inappropriate interpretation

Some of the associative NPs in the corpus seem to be semantically indispensable in the sense that they cannot be substituted for a definite NP without altering the referential value of the expression or creating more or less serious difficulties to arrive at some interpretation.

4.2.1. A first case can be identified where the definite – instead of a demonstrative NP – would assume the value of generic reference, for example:

Une future salle [de théâtre], même s’il existait une volonté régionale unanime d’aller de l’avant immédiatement, ne pourrait pas être terminée avant trois ans. Cela signifierait donc trois années sans saison théâtrale puisque le Temple du Bas n’est pas adapté à cet art et nécessiterait des investissements pour un équipement technique adéquat. (L’Express, 7.7.1993)

[A future theatre, even if there were a unanimous regional decision to start on it immediately, could not be finished in less than three years. That would thus mean three years without a theatre season, as the Temple du Bas is not adapted to this art and would necessitate an investment in adequate technical equipment.]
In this example, the anaphoric expression *cet art*, as it were, short-circuits another element (*la saison théâtrale... le théâtre... cet art* [the theatre season ... theatre ... this art]). A pronoun here, instead of the demonstrative NP, would violate the principle of the ‘anaphoric island’ (Postal 1969). But it should be noticed that a definite expression (*l’art* [the art]) would be understood almost inevitably as a generic reference in this context. Consequently, the interpretation of the whole sequence would raise serious problems of consistency. One of the effects produced by the demonstrative here is precisely to obviate these difficulties. But it should be emphasized that these difficulties are related only to the selection of the word *art* (choosing the word *art* [art] rather than *théâtre* [theatre]). Why did the speaker select this word? The most probable hypothesis is that the selecting procedure, in this specific case, aims first and foremost at avoiding a short-distance repetition, as suggested by (30). It should be borne in mind that French textual standards impose rather stringent stylistic constraints in this respect.

(30) *Cela signifierait donc trois années sans saison théâtrale puisque le Temple du Bas n’est pas adapté au théâtre et nécessiterait...*  

[That would mean then three years without a theatre season since the Temple du Bas is not adapted to theatre and would necessitate...]

This analysis shows that two factors, or two constraints, must have been applied successively: first, a purely normative constraint, a sort of ‘external’ pressure with no relation to the meaning produced, with the selection of a hyperonym as a consequence; second, a purely semantic and ‘internal’ constraint, following the selection of the hyperonym. The latter constraint entails that no definite determiner could be used, as the intended referent could not otherwise have been identified. This example is remarkable in that the resolution of one problem (avoiding a repetition) leads to another problem. From a pragmatic point of view, the difficulties encountered to reach the referent with the definite determiner, and the fact that the demonstrative was used to solve the problem are, in this specific case, the *indirect cost* paid for the pressure exerted by the norm against repetitions. The following example is an occurrence where banning the repetition seems likewise to have played a part in favour of a hyperonym and, consequently, in favour of a demonstrative determiner.

(31) *Le TCS [= motorists’ club], né en 1896 à Genève de l’union d’une poignée de cyclistes, compte aujourd’hui une majorité d’automobilistes, tant il est vrai que ce moyen de déplacement n’a jamais été égalé.* (La Suisse, 9.1.1989)  

[The TCS [automobile club], born in 1896 in Geneva from a union of a handful of cyclists, is made up today of a majority of car owners, since this means of travel has never been equalled.]
It would indeed be rather difficult to provide an interpretation via a definite NP here. If the decoder tried at any cost to find a referent in the definite form, s/he would come to the result that two objects are eligible for the hyperonymic expression *moyen de déplacement* [means of travel], ‘cars’ and ‘bicycles’. However, a ‘car’ would be more the more salient object in M, for two reasons. On the one hand, because the topic of the text, an automobile club, is introduced at the beginning of the text by the acronym TCS. On the other hand, because the closest segment providing the information supporting the anaphor is *une majorité d’automobilistes* [a majority of car owners] rather than *une poignée de cyclistes* [a handful of cyclists]\(^\text{15}\).

4.2.2. According to Marandin (1986), one of the effects produced by the demonstrative determiner is to retrieve information from the co-text on the left side of the anaphor. Consequently, demonstrative NPs can easily be paraphrased by a definite NP followed by an adnominal adjunct or a determinate relative clause actualising this information. The phenomenon appears clearly when the head noun of the anaphoric NP is a predicative substantive in the sense given by Gross and Vivès (1986), i.e. a process noun (or ‘abstract’ noun). Marandin considers that these nouns are semantically under-categorised. In other words, their denotational value is incomplete, so that they are intrinsically anaphoric. When they are introduced by a demonstrative determiner, the latter causes arguments in the process to be captured by the reference. That is why there is referential equivalence between *cette vue* [this sight] and *la vue de cette femme / de ce spectacle* [the sight (=seeing) of this woman / of this scene] in the following examples\(^\text{16}\):

\(^{16}\) It can be shown in examples of this type that there is a certain correlation between the type of determiner (definite or demonstrative) and a tendency to interpret the referring expression metonymically (i.e. as referring metonymically to an argument rather than to a process). In this respect see Apothéloz (1995b), and Apothéloz and Chanet (1997).

\(^{15}\) Berrendonner (1992) calls these two types of salience ‘cognitive’ and ‘local’ salience respectively. For an empirical investigation of the impact of these two types of salience on the selection process of referring expressions, see Apothéloz (1995a).
All this shows that the lexicon is indeed one of the factors that can induce the selection of a demonstrative: the selection of a hyperonym in (29) and (31), a predicative noun in (32). In our opinion, insufficient emphasis is laid on the fact that the presence of a demonstrative can be related to the type of lexical material selected.

4.3. Problematic reference and catalyse of presuppositions

4.3.1. In all the examples examined so far, the referent of the anaphoric expression always has a relatively high degree of predictability, and therefore of accessibility. The referent can easily be inferred in relation to the prior information and/or the utterance context, so that its presence in discursive memory can be considered to be latent at the moment the anaphor points to it. The referent is mainly:

– an argument involved in a process:

   _Je lui écrivis... la lettre_ [I wrote to her... the letter];

– an object which is part of the meaning of a word used earlier:

   _la saison théâtrale... (le théâtre)... cet art_ [the theatre season... (theatre)... this art], _une majorité d’automobilistes... (l’automobile)... ce moyen de déplacement_ [a majority of car owners... (the car).... this mode of travel]

– two referents presupposing each other as being the ingredients of the same process or the same script:

   _les locataires de quelques immeubles... les propriétaires... ces appartements_ [the tenants of some buildings... the owners... these apartments]

– a referent which is understood implicitly in the speaking situation:

   (after a break in a radio concert)... _cet entracte_ [this interval]

However, this referent might be less predictable or even unpredictable, and the expression referring to it would then work by a kind of ‘forcible’ reference. The decoder must then simultaneously introduce a new object into M, and construct such contextual information that makes this introduction both consistent and compatible with the present state of M. In short, the expression chosen induces the decoder to operate a catalysis of presuppositions (the word ‘catalysis’ is used here in the sense of Hjelmslev (1953)). Only when this operation is achieved can the new object be fully integrated into M and reference be ‘restored’. The following example and (8) above illustrate this mechanism:

(34)  _Ils [les écologistes] ont su mettre en évidence certaines dérives qui pouvaient se révéler dangereuses, amené les gens à réfléchir, à ne pas se laisser emporter par la fascination du progrès à tout prix. Cette prise de conscience se serait-elle faite sans eux?_ (Le Monde, 27.4.1994)
[They (= ecologists) were able to bring to the fore certain tendencies which could prove dangerous, getting people to think, not to let themselves get carried away by the fascination of progress at any price. Would this realisation have come about without them?]

The pre-text in (34) does not mention whether the environmentalists achieved their goal and managed to rouse a response that could be termed ‘awareness’ or ‘realisation’ in people. The demonstrative NP here does implement a change of perspective concerning the process. In the first sentence, there are two arguments: les défenseurs de l’environnement [ecologists] (= agent) and les gens [people] (= patient), and a process: AMENER A RÉFLÉCHIR [get to think]. The anaphoric expression, which refers to a process, transfers the agentivity over to les gens [people] (i.e. the latter referent, which was a patient, becomes an agent). This change of perspective concerning the process is specifically one of the causes of the low level of predictability of the objet referred to by the demonstrative NP. It is indeed what the decoder has to retrieve, to ‘catalyse’, to integrate this new object into M. The semantic effect produced by such discursive configuration is akin to the figure of metalepsis.

As for (8) – commented on in 2.1.2. – this example can be interpreted in two ways. Either the expression cette secousse [this jolt] can be considered as referring to a result, i.e. a consequence of the leap mentioned earlier; or secousse can be interpreted as a noun with a truly predicative value, in which case the demonstrative NP refers to a process and therefore presupposes an agent. In the former case, the referring expression cette secousse induces the catalysation of a cause-effect relation. In the latter case, this demonstrative NP does not seem to be so very different from a nominalisation (cf. the paraphrase: the fact of having caused a jolt), though bearing in mind that the process, first being categorised lexically as a leap, is later re-categorised as a jolt. Selecting a demonstrative could then be accounted for by the nominalisation itself. As is known, nominalised processes are, for the most part, preceded by a demonstrative determiner, due, in particular, to the fact that this form of anaphoric expression implicitly recaptures the arguments (cf. 4.2.2).

Our observations show that this kind of reference leads to using a demonstrative rather than a definite determiner. But this is only a tendency which is probably reinforced in the above examples by the fact that the noun has predicative value. As opposed to this, (35) is an example where the reference concerns a definite NP.

(35) Un groupe de sourds qui faisait la nouba s’est heurté à un groupe de policiers lors d’un contrôle. Les papiers du véhicule n’étaient pas en règle. L’un des quatre occupants, ivre, a balancé un caillou en direction du fourgon des policiers.. (La Grosse Bertha, 15.10.1992)

[A group of deaf people on a binge clashed with a group of police officers when they were stopped during a routine check. The papers of the vehicle were not in order. One of the four occupants, drunk, threw a stone in the direction of the police van.]
4.3.2. The facts examined under 4.2. and 4.3.1. call for an investigation into how representations are structured in M, in particular the representations of objects. The observations made above lead to the hypothesis that speakers process objects introduced into discourse, not as entities with univocal, stable, ‘discrete’ boundaries, but rather as heterogeneous entities, as referential aggregates whose boundaries are fuzzy and can be moulded to suit the needs of discourse. This hypothesis has already been mentioned above (cf. 2.1.3) in relation to the link between extensional reference to a class of objects, and generic reference to the intension of the class (or vice-versa). Such examples suggest that thought can move among these referential aggregates, so that several referents may be identified on the basis of one specific object. Berrendonner (1994b) has established that this hypothesis is very useful to account for certain discursive structures, in particular some metonymic or pseudo-syntactic formulations. Whatever the case may be, examples (34) and (35) offer an excellent illustration of disconnectiveness, a property which in our opinion is fundamental, providing as it were a definition of discursive sequences.

4.4. Reference in interaction: the Problem

It is a well-known fact that referential acts can be the cause of numerous difficulties in face-to-face interactions. The problem may rise, for instance, from a wrong assessment of the addressee’s knowledge and representations, or from an insufficiently cooperative attitude in the selection of a referring expression. These ‘shortcomings’ of communication sometimes call for repairs, which proves that participants are indeed conscious of the activity they perform. The procedure to repair the reference often consists of a retrieval of the presupposition, as in (36).

(36)  A l’époque elle a pas réussi à terminer ses études\ sa mère lui demandait toujours d’aller travailler au magasin\ parce que sa mère elle tenait un magasin\ (Oral, conversation, 1994)

[At that time/ she did not manage to finish her studies\ her mother was always asking her to work in the shop\ because her mother/ she had a shop\ (‘/’ = rising tone, ‘\’ = falling tone)]

The sequence parce que sa mère elle tenait un magasin [because her mother, she had a shop] indicates that the speaker considers the a priori attribution of a presupposition of existence as being somewhat forced (possibly as a reaction to some form of mimicry of the addressee, or any other feedback). S/he has retrospectively understood that the referent of the expression au magasin [in the shop] should have been submitted to an explicit introduction into M, by means, for instance, of an utterance of the type sa mère elle avait un magasin [her mother, she had a shop], with an indefinite NP. The sequence underlined in (36) aims at correcting what has been ‘unduly’ presupposed: the
existence of this shop. There is no trace of such correction in a similar example as (35). All this shows that reference, in the course of conversation, is a procedure possessing an interactional dimension; a referring expression may be the object of negotiation (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). In studying conversational corpora in German, Auer (1984) adopted an ethno-methodological and conversationalistic stance and examined the way participants turn referential work into a problem in its own right. He observed that demonstrative NPs have a specific function among the procedures used. Auer considers that the demonstrative determiner is basically an indexicality marker, in the sense that its interpretation depends on the context (the word ‘indexicality’ should be understood here with the meaning given by ethno-methodologists and not as a synonym of ‘deixis’). When using a demonstrative, the speaker “underlines that what he or she says verbally is not enough and that additional information has to be taken from the context” (Auer, 1984: 636).

According to Auer, the demonstrative NP can be used in conversational interaction to signal to the addressee that the task of referent identification is likely to be somewhat difficult. The demonstrative is then a marker letting the addressee know that the introduction of a repair sequence initiated, for instance, by a question from the addressee and referring directly to the identity of the referent would not be considered as superfluous. If the interpretation of the expression is really difficult, the addressee then has the possibility, either to take advantage of this implicit offer to ask for more information, as in (37), or to turn the offer down.

(37) Ta.: what did you read then (0.2)
X.: well that paper by Olson (1.5)
Ta.: which one is that (0.4)
oh I see: (0.2) I still don’t know anything about that one
(Auer, 1984: 637)

Furthermore, Auer observes that, from the point of view of the mechanism of conversation, a speaker may enhance the efficiency of this technique, either by introducing a pause after the demonstrative segment or by slowing down the pace of speech, or by inserting it as close as possible to a transition place. The effect of this technique is to facilitate turn-taking; the next speaker might then initiate a repairing sequence.

It seems that the pragmatic function of demonstratives, in the examples described above as catalysis of presuppositions (cf. 4.3.1), could be interpreted in a similar way; they could be understood as kind of instructions to ‘restore’ a referential value. These examples are not conversational, but it can be assumed that the speaker's use of a demonstrative is a way to signal, (i) that s/he is aware of the problematic reference s/he is performing, and (ii) a call for cooperation is being sent to the listener. It appears in all cases that demonstrative NPs play a pivotal role in the management of reference, particularly in face-to-face interaction. It also appears that speakers take advantage of the duality of the semiotic dimension of demonstrative NPs to be successful: on the one hand on their significatum (the way they refer, their indexicality, and the specific status of the lexical component
they determine), and on the other hand, their dimension as a signal (what Sperber and Wilson (1986) call ‘ostension’).

4.5. Negative function and positive function

The functions or effects of referential demonstrative NPs as listed below can be divided into two groups. The first set is made up of various forms of avoidance:
– avoiding a generic interpretation;
– avoiding a problematic interpretation;
– avoiding repetition;
– avoiding an embarrassing expression.
In all these cases, the demonstrative NP is selected mainly because it allows the difficulties involved in the definite to be evaded. The function can then be considered negative.

The second set is made up of the following functions:
– giving a simulation-of-reality effect (for example a ‘perception’ metonymy);
– capturing the arguments in the process while referring to this process;
– signalling a problematic reference;
– signalling an invitation to initiate a repairing sequence in the course of the conversational interaction.
The demonstrative is selected here in relation to one or several of its specific properties. Its function may then be termed positive.

These two classes of functions do not obey the same kind of logic. Selecting a ‘solution’ (i.e. here selecting a referring expression) may result, either from a process of elimination (by eliminating other solutions which are considered inappropriate for some reason), or from a process of direct choice. In the former case, the solution is adopted due to a negative function; in the latter case, it is taken up for its positive function or effect. These two processes of selection do not have the same significance for the user; they obey distinct pragmatic rules.

5. Conclusion

Three points should be emphasized in conclusion:

1. Demonstrative associative NPs do exist

Various forms of non-coreferential demonstrative NPs have been examined at some length in this paper. Such NPs are relatively frequent, both in oral and written language. The point was to determine whether these are associative anaphors, i.e. expressions whose interpretation calls on background knowledge and representations, and therefore some inferential activity, or are just
‘indirect’ anaphora. As was observed by numerous authors, the demonstrative tends to ‘short-circuit’ lexical meanings as a way to access the intended referent, and to replace these meanings with contextual information. This observation is indeed the main argument put forward by those who think that only definite NPs can operate associatively. However, numerous examples show that the short-circuiting procedure is not complete, and background information can be called upon during the decoding phase of non-coreferential demonstrative NPs. In other words, there is indeed inferential activity. Incidentally, the definition most widely used for the operating mode of associative anaphora (non-coreferential and yet anaphoric expression) does not allow demonstrative NPs to be eliminated from associative phenomena. Consequently, when it comes to evaluating the interpretation of such demonstrative NPs, based on the claim that they aim at creating an effect of ‘empathy’, or ‘represented thought’, etc., this evaluation provides an acceptable explanation for certain cases only, while leaving numerous examples without satisfactory interpretation. Consequently, we hold the opinion that, in the present state of knowledge, the issue of the status of demonstrative associative NPs calls for further documentation and minute investigation into the semantics and pragmatics of non-coreferential expressions. This has been initiated in this paper, by bringing two aspects to the fore: (i) asymmetry, discrepancies and divergences between encoder and decoder perspectives (sections 2 and 3); and (ii) the semantic, pragmatic and interactive functions or effects of associative demonstrative NPs (section 4).

2. Disconnectiveness is a basic property of discursive structures

The mechanism of associative anaphora involves an inferential activity performed by speakers. But this characteristic does not belong exclusively to associative anaphora; it is also at work in various forms of discursive sequences. In this respect, associative anaphora are no more than a manifestation of a more general tendency. Discursive sequences tend to operate on the basis of information that is implicit, not literally stated, without which these sequences could not be interpreted (Conte, 1994).

This propensity to refer to information which has not been explicitly verbalised is a typical feature of macro-syntax. Contrary to micro-syntax (or syntax stricto sensu), macro-syntax links up speech acts and not linguistic segments (Berrendonner and Reichler-Béguelin, 1989). Between two successive speech acts, the information introduced into discursive memory is open to various forms of inferential treatment. Discursive disconnectiveness is the result of this tacit activity. Certain discursive structures are blatantly disconnected. They sometimes trigger a censoring response, in particular in situations in which communication has to comply with strict standards. This holds true, for instance, for contemporary French, in the highly standardised forms of the written language disseminated by the school system. Experienced writers are well aware of this and like to use associative demonstrative anaphora when it comes to mimicking the features of face-to-face conversation. The following example, from *Du côté de Guermantes* by Marcel Proust, testifies to this:
It is pointless to speak of Marie-Gilbert's soirée in front of Swann, the duke said to me. I don't know if he is invited. Gilbert likes him very much, because he thinks he is the natural grandson of the Duke of Berri; it is quite a story. (Otherwise, just imagine! my cousin who has a fit when he sees a Jew at a hundred metres away). But now it is more serious given the Dreyfus affair, Swann should have understood that he, above anyone, should sever all connections with those people [i.e. Jews and Dreyfus sympathizers].

This example, which can be compared to (13), can be considered as an excellent imitation of the way speakers tend to use the expression *ces gens-là* [those people] associatively.

It should also be emphasized in this respect that it is somewhat risky to consider anaphoric items as expressions that are selected only by linguistic context (conceived either as supplying the ‘antecedent’, or determining the degree of accessibility of objects). Observation shows that, most of the time, the purpose of referring expressions is not exclusively to refer. They also contribute to elaborating meaning, indicating points of view, marking off argumentative intentions, signalling that access to the referent is difficult, calling implicitly for a request for more information, etc. All these analyses reveal that these parallel functions may have an impact on the selection of the determiner when an expression is lexical.

3. Any study of the pragmatics of anaphora should follow three perspectives

It appears that any study of associative anaphora, as of reference in general, claiming to account for the linguistic behaviour of speakers, should follow three lines of description to avoid the pitfall of oversimplification.

The first line is that of the logic underlying the inferential activity implied by anaphora of any type. The point here is to account for the cognitive aspects of the production and understanding of referential operations.

The second follows the pragmatics of the ‘encoding/decoding’ system of referring expressions. The point is thus to account for the discrepancies between the speaker’s and the listener’s interests, and the attitudes of participants in communication (in particular the two conflicting positions: i.e.
willingness to cooperate and propensity to carelessness\textsuperscript{17}). Interactional and social factors are at play at this stage. A hyper-cooperative attitude might be felt by the addressee as a kind of threat, as s/he may lose face and be rejected (cf. in this respect Auer, 1984). Or if the addressee has to admit that s/he has some difficulty identifying the referent on the basis of the expression produced by the speaker, s/he may become upset. In the pragmatics of the ‘encoding/decoding’ system, all these elements operate both as competence for production and as guidelines in the interpretation process. When set in such a perspective, the solutions adopted by participants appear as the product of all sorts of compromises.

The third line concerns the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the linguistic expression of reference. Care has been taken not to reduce referring expressions \textit{a priori} solely to the ‘referential function’. Most of the observations reported in this paper show that, on the contrary, these expressions perform all sorts of associated functions, so that their formulation is not guided exclusively by the identification of an object. This pluri-functionality implies a process of internal regulation (optimal management of meaningful sequences), or external regulation (preventing unwanted interpretation). It may give rise to more or less complex discursive operations which evolve around the referential act proper that, consequently, becomes \textit{overdetermined} (Apothéloz, 1995a; Apothéloz and Reichler-Béguelin, 1995).

References


\textsuperscript{17}What Leech (1983) calls the ‘clarity principle’ and the ‘economy principle’.


