The Analysis of Proper Names. The Views of Paninian Grammarians

Emilie Aussant

To cite this version:

<hal-00786524>
The Analysis of Proper Names:
The Views of Pāṇinian Grammarians

Émilie AUSSANT

Introduction

This paper is meant to give a presentation of three different analyses elaborated by Pāṇinian grammarians concerning the referential functioning of proper names. As far as I know, analyses of proper names undertaken in the domain of Vyākaraṇa—the classical Sanskrit grammar—have never been studied before; most works concerning this topic have been done in the philosophy sphere (cf. Shaw 1985, Bhattacharya 1994, Ganeri 1995, 1996a, 1996b).

The key concept of the present study is the one of pravṛtti-nimitta ‘cause of application’. Deshpande, in his work titled The meaning of Nouns – Semantic Theory in Classical and Medieval India (1992, 56), defines it as follows:

It (i.e., the term pravṛtti-nimitta) refers to a property whose possession by an entity is the necessary and sufficient condition for a given word being used to refer to that entity.

To a certain extent, this notion is very akin to what we call, in the Western tradition, connotation. I refer particularly to the term such as it has been used by Mill within his classification of nouns (1988, 26-46) and to the interpretation of this use by the French linguist Kleiber (1981, 16):

Chez Mill, dénotation et connotation sont les deux rapports qui relient les noms aux choses. […] Avec G. A. Miller, on peut appeler

1 This is the publication of a communication given on the occasion of the 13th World Sanskrit Conference (Vyākaraṇa Panel), held in Edinburgh, Scotland, 10th-14th July 2006. I thank Maria-Piera Candotti, Arlo Griffiths, Malhar A. Kulkarni, Peter M. Scharf and Vincenzo Vergiani for their remarks, criticisms and suggestions. The Indian authors and works which are quoted or mentioned in this paper are listed below.

Onoma 45 (2010), 41-59. doi: 10.2143/ONO.45.0.2182815. © Onoma. All rights reserved.
dénotation la définition en extension qui « catalogue ou indique chaque objet que le symbole représente ». La dénotation du mot cheval revient à nommer tous les individus pouvant être désignés par ce mot. La connotation, au contraire, est une « définition en compréhension » ou définition intensionnelle : un nom général concret dénote et connote à la fois ; il dénote les objets dans les conditions décrites ci-dessus et connote les attributs de ces objets. Blanc dénote tous les objets qui sont blancs et connote la qualité ‘blancheur’ ; cheval connote les attributs des êtres qu’il dénote, à savoir les traits ‘mammifère’, ‘quadrupède’, etc.

I am inclined to think that the notions of cause of application and of connotation can be connected on the basis of their function. Both, indeed, explain why a given linguistic item refers to a given object and thus are opposed to the notions of artha ‘object’ and of denotation respectively, which concern that to which the item refers. There is a striking similarity, in fact, between the Indian conception according to which śukla (‘white’) denotes an object because this object is qualified by śuklatva (‘whiteness’), on the one hand, and the Millian conception, reinterpreted by Kleiber (1981, 17-18),2 according to which white denotes all the objects which are white because it connotes the whiteness quality, on the other.3

The notion of cause of application is fundamental in the context of this study because the three analyses of proper names which I am going to examine must be distinguished precisely at this level.

---

2 Mill distinguishes, in his classification of nouns, 1) connotative nouns, which denote one or several objects and imply, for these objects, one or several properties, 2) non-connotative nouns, which denote a single object (ex. the proper name Paul) or an attribute (ex. the abstract noun whiteness). Now, as Kleiber notes (1981, 17-18), if one can accept that white denotes and connotes, it is much more difficult to accept the idea according to which whiteness denotes without connoting (i.e., refers without having a semantic content). He says: “L’erreur de Mill, sur ce point, est de n’avoir pas vu que les noms dénotent, c’est-à-dire peuvent référer à des individus particuliers, parce qu’ils connotent, c’est-à-dire parce qu’ils ont un sens. Cette considération lui aurait permis d’établir que la connotation de blancheur est sa dénotation. Nous proposons donc de remplacer la coordination dénotent ET connotent par la subordination dénotent, PARCE QU’ils connotent.”

3 For a more detailed argument about this parallel, cf. Aussant 2009, 55-68.
1. Generic property as the cause of application of proper names

I will start with the presentation of the analysis according to which a generic property is the cause of application of proper names. The idea is that a name like Rāma can be considered as a generic one in so far as it refers to a body which, from birth to death, goes through different states. Since the name Rāma alone is used to designate the set of innumerable instances of this body which is never the same, one cannot say that this name is an individual one. It can be only a generic name and then has ‘the fact of being Rāma’ or ‘rāma-hood’ (rāmatva) as its cause of application.

This analysis of the semantico-referential functioning of proper names seems to be very well-known to the different Indian schools that have dealt with this topic. It is mentioned by logicians like Jagadīśa (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, kārikā 22-23 and vṛtti, 117-124), by Buddhists like Śantarākṣita (Tattvasaṃgraha, śloka 1226, 370) and Kamalaśīla (Pañjikā, 370), and by specialists of poetry such as Jhalakikā, author of the Bālabodhinī which is a commentary on Mammaṭa’s Kāvyaprakāśa (Bālabodhinī, 37-38). Concerning the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, one can find this analysis in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (M) as well as in Bhartrhari’s Mahābhāṣyadipikā (MD).

1.1. Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya

The generic property thesis is mentioned under the Vārttika (V) 6 on the Pāṇinian rule no1.1.1:

\[
anākṛtiḥ //
\]
\[
(V 6 ad A^{4} 1.1.1, vol. 1, 167)
[A technical name is] devoid of class property.
\]
\[
athavā_anākṛtiḥ samjña / ākṛtimantaḥ samjñinaḥ / loke ’pi hy ākṛtimato māṃsapinḍasya devadatta iti samjña kriyate //^{5}
\]
\[
(M on V 6 ad A 1.1.1, vol. 1, 167)
Or [let us say that] the [technical] name (samjña) is devoid of any class property (anākṛtiḥ); it is its bearers (samjñinaḥ) who share a

---

4 A stands for Aṣṭādhyāyī (title of Pāṇini’s grammar).
5 _ and - (in translations) are used to make the reading easier. The first one separates two sandhi-joined words and the second one two morphemes or two members of compound.
common property (ākṛtimantah). In common usage also, the [proper] name (saṃjñā) Devadatta is given to the lump of flesh[-ball] possessing a class property (ākṛtimato).\(^6\)

In this passage, the uniqueness of the name\(^7\) is opposed to the multiplicity of its referent which is the particular individual. Let us have a look at how commentators explain this idea of individual multiplicity with the Pradīpa (P) of Kaiyata first:

\[
\text{ākṛtimanta iti / avasthābhedēsv api sa eva}_\text{ayam iti pratyabhijñānimittam devadattatvādikam sāmānyam asti_ity ākṛtimata ity uktam} //
\]

(P on M on V 6 \textit{ad} A 1.1.1, vol. 1, 168)

ākṛtimantah – it is said: “possessing a class property”. [This signifies that] the fact of being Devadatta etc. (devadattatva-ādikam), is a general property (sāmānyam) which causes the recognition (pratyabhijñā): “that is this same [Devadatta]” (sa eva_ayam iti), though [the particular individual is] considered at different life stages.

The recognition phenomenon (pratyabhijñā) that is mentioned here, associates the direct perception, indicated by the use of the proximal deictic ayam ‘this’, to the memory, indicated by the use of the distal deictic tad ‘that’. As it is presented here, the existence of a general property (sāmānya) common to the manifold instances of a single entity allows the recognition phenomenon and explains that one can refer to that ever-changing entity by means of one and the same name.

This analysis assumes a special representation of the individual. The opposition between uniqueness of name and multiplicity of referent indicates that it is from the multiplicity of the individual that his unity is constructed, by abstraction.

Nāgeśa, in his Uddyota (U), comments on the same passage as follows:

\[
vastuto bhāṣya ākṛtimata ity asya bhedavata ity arthaḥ / avasthābhedena ca tatra_āropitah saḥ / āropitabhedena ca jātisattve na mānam / ata eva devadatta_ity ādau na niṣ īti kaś cit //
\]

---

\(^6\) Units between square brackets are added to make the translation understandable. Those between brackets are either corresponding Sanskrit words or personal comments.

\(^7\) Note that, in the grammatical domain, saṃjñā mainly denotes technical terms, proper names and autonyms. Cf. Aussant 2009, 17-23.
Someone [says]: actually, the meaning of अक्षिमताः in the Bhāṣya is ‘that which possesses self varieties (asya bhedavata)’. And that [self variety] is superimposed (āropitah) on that [single individual Devadatta] because of the diversity of life stages. And that superimposed variety (āropita-bhedena) does not prove the existence of a generic property (जाती). This is why there is no निष suffix in devadatta etc.

This commentary is interesting in so far as Nāgeśa relates a point of view which differs from the one exposed in the Mahābhāṣya and commented on in the Pradīpa: according to the view reported by Nāgeśa, the particular individual who bears the name Devadatta does not constitute a gender, for his multiplicity is not inherent in him, it is solely superimposed.

1.2. Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya-dipīka

Bhartṛhari mentions the thesis of a generic property as the cause of application of proper names in the following extract of the Mahābhāṣya-dipīka:

```
yathā bhramāṇatvam anekakarmaviśayaṁ bhramāṇam ity ucyate /
evam dītho ‘pi yadupattiprabhṛtyā vināśād eva tad bhavaty ayaṁ
dītho ‘yaṁ dīthha iti / bālyakaumārayauvanasthāvireṣv abhinnaḥ
da eva _ayam iti saṃpratayāḥ sā ākṛtiḥ śabdavācyā / [...] / tasmāt
sāmānyam atra _apy asti /
```

(MD on Paspaśā,9 1987, 15)

Just as the fact of turning (bhramāṇatvam), which concerns manifold actions, is called bhramāṇam (‘turning’), so in the case of [the individual named] Dīthha, [there is something] which evolves from birth to death, [that’s why] one says “this is Dīthha, this [again] is Dīthha”. The conviction, [expressed by the sentence:] “this is the same [Dīthha]” (sa eva _ayam iti), that [this Dīthha remains] unchanged [through] childhood, early youth, maturity and old age [is provided

8 Required by jāter astri-viśayād aya-upadhāt // (A 4.1.63) “[The निष suffix is introduced] after a generic [nominal stem] which is not feminine by origin and does not contain the phoneme y as penultimate [to derive a feminine stem].” If devadatta were a generic term, the feminine form would be *devadattī but it is the form devadattā which is attested.

9 Paspaśā is the name of Mahābhāṣya’s introduction (first अहnika).
by] the class property (ākṛtiḥ), which is expressed by the word (śabda-vācyā). […]. That’s why there is a general property (sāmānyam) in that case also.

In this passage, Bhartṛhari’s words are unequivocal: proper names are generic terms. If it is possible to refer to an individual, who is still changing from birth to death, by means of one and the same name, it is because the name signifies the generic property of the individual.

2. The own form (sva-rūpa) as the cause of application of proper names

I will now present the thesis of the own form of the name (sva-rūpa) as its cause of application. This thesis seems to have been mentioned for the first time by Bhartṛhari. It has been also defended by Kaiyāṭa.

2.1. Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya ṛādipikā and Vākyapadiya

The passage of the Mahābhāṣya ṛādipikā is the following:

```
yadṛcchāśaktijānukanarāṇaplutyyādyarthaḥ / […] / yadṛcchā nāma / yā-asati pravṛttinimitte 'ṛtha-gatam pravarta-kaṁ nivarta-kaṁ vā niyama-hetum antareṇa pravartate nivartate vah sā yadṛcchā / dīthaśabdo hi svarūpaṁmātra-nibandhano yatra yatra prayujyate idaṁ távad asya nāmadheyaṁ karomi _iti tatra tatra nivartate /
```

(MD on M on V 1 ad A r[K, 1988, 11-12)

```
yadṛcchāśaktijānukanarāṇaplutyyādyarthaḥ – […] yadṛcchā: a name (nāma). That which applies or does not apply [to its object] in the absence of a limitative cause (niyama-hetum), [that is] in the absence of a cause of application (pravṛtti-nimitte) pertaining to the object (artha-gatam), [a cause of application] which motivates or prevents [the application of the word], is an arbitrary [name] (yadṛcchā). The word dīthā (dittha-sabdo), indeed, which is based on its mere own form (sva-rūpa-mātra-nibandhano), refers to whomever/whatever (yatra yatra) I make it the name of (nāma-dheyaṁ karomī) [and] does not refer to anyone/anything else (tatra tatra nivartate).
```

As far as I know, it is in this passage that for the first time in the Pāñinian tradition one finds an occurrence of the expression pravṛtti-nimitta.10 But it is also the only occurrence that I have noted in both

---

10 Patañjali only uses pravṛtti.
of Bhartrihari’s texts. He actually uses the expression *sva-rūpa(mātra) nibandhana* ‘which has its (mere) own form as its basis’ much more frequently, an expression which can be considered as a synonym of *sva-rūpa-pravṛtti-nimitta*. So, according to this passage, arbitrary names such as *Dīthita* have their own form as their cause of application. But it is equally true in the case of words whose etymology is quite well-known, as the following stanza of the *Vākyapadīya* (VP) shows:

```
agnisomādayaḥ śabdā ye svarūpanibandhanāḥ /
 samjñībhiḥ samprayuyjante 'prasiddhes teṣu gauṇatā //
(VP II.281, 84)
```

Words (*śabdā*) such as *agni*, *soma* etc. which have their own form as their basis (*sva-rūpa-nibandhanāḥ*), are used in connection with some name-bearers (*samjñībhiḥ*); since [their use in relation to these name-bearers] is not established, there is a secondary [use of these names] (*gauṇatā*) in relation to these [name-bearers].

This stanza is concerned with words such as *agni* and *soma* used as names for people. Because this kind of usage is not well-established, it is regarded as secondary (*gauṇatā*). Like the proper name *Dīthita*, they connote their own form (*sva-rūpa-nibandhanāḥ*) and denote a particular bearer (*samjñīn*).

2.2. Kaiyaṭa’s *Pradīpa*

Several passages of the *Pradīpa* could be quoted to illustrate the thesis of the own form as the cause of application; the passage selected here as well as its context happen to be of great interest for our purpose.

---

12 *agni* denotes the fire element as well as the Fire deity; *soma* denotes the juice of a plant used in Vedic rituals as well as the divine personification of this juice/plant.
13 In Rau’s edition (as well as in Hinüber’s), one reads: *agnisomādayaḥ śabdā ye svarūpapadārthakāḥ […]*. According to this version, the words *agni* and *soma*, used as proper names, would denote (*pada-arthakāḥ* their own form (*sva-rūpa*) [agni] and [soma] respectively, as if they were autonyms. But it is not the case: as proper names, the words *agni* and *soma* connote their own form and denote the boys thus named. Peter M. Scharf kindly indicated me the different reading found in the version of Raghunātha Sharmā’s edition (which is followed here).
14 Cf. especially: P on M on V 1 *ad A r|K*, vol. 1, 99; P on M on V 2 *ad A r|K*, vol. 1, 102-103; P on M on A 1.1.1, vol. 1, 159; P on M on V 6 *ad A 1.1.27*, vol. 1, 329.
Here is the passage of the Mahābhāṣya commented upon:

\[ditthādiṣu tarhi vartyabhāvād vṛttir na prāpnoti / ditthavatam ditthātā dāmbhiṣṭatvaṁ iti / atra_api kaś cit prāthamakalpiko dittho dāmbhiṣṭa ca tena kṛtāṁ kriyāṁ guṇaṁ và yāḥ kaś cit karoti sa uc-
yate ditthatvaṁ ta etat dāmbhiṣṭatvaṁ ta etat / evaṁ dīthāh kurtanty evaṁ dāmbhiṣṭāh kurtantī / yathā eva tasya kāthāṃcitkāḥ prayoga evaṁ vṛttir api bhaviṣyati /
(M on V 5 ad A 5.1.119, vol. 4, 348)

In the case of \(ditthā\) etc., the use [of the \(bhāva\) suffix] is not realised because no [characteristic feature] resides [in this substratum].

– [However one finds the following terms:] \(ditthatva\) (‘fact of being \(Dīthha\’), \(ditthat\) (idem), \(dāmbhiṣṭatva\) (‘fact of being \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\’).

In this case also [the use of the \(bhāva\) suffix is realised]: there was, [at the very beginning of time] a first [individual named] \(Dīthha\) and [a first individual named] \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\). This [first \(Dīthha\), this first \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\)] performed an action (\(kriyāṁ\)) or possessed a quality (\(guṇaṁ\)) and one will say about an individual [named \(Dīthha\) or \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\) today] who performs [the same action or who possesses the same quality as the first \(Dīthha\) or \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\)]: this (this action or this quality) is your \(ditthatva\), this is your \(dāmbhiṣṭatva\). The [individuals named] \(Dīthha\) act in this way, the [individuals named] \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\) act in this way.

– [But] in the case of the first \(Dīthha\) or of [the first] \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\) [who lived at the very beginning of time], the use [of the \(bhāva\) suffix] is not realised because no [characteristic feature] resides [in this substratum].

– There is no such a defect. This [name \(Dīthha\) or \(Dāmbhiṭṭha\)] is used somehow; the use [of the \(bhāva\) suffix] will also be realised in the same way.

Before examining Kaiyaṭa’s \(Pradīpa\), I would like to make a few observations on this extract of the \(Mahābhāṣya\). The problem mentioned here consists in explaining the existence of such forms as \(ditthatva\), that is to say derivatives composed of a proper name and an abstract suffix called “\(bhāva\) suffix”. A suffix such as \(-tva\) refers to the essence of a thing, to its \(bhāva\).\(^{15}\) In the case of a generic term such

\(^{15}\) On the notion of \(bhāva\), cf. Filliozat 1998.
as go ‘cow’, for example, one can form the derivative gotva which signifies the ‘fact of being a cow’ or ‘cowness’. Likewise, in the case of a quality name such as śukla ‘white’, one can form the derivative śuklatva ‘fact of being white/whiteness’. These two examples show that the essence of things constitutes the cause of application of the terms that denote them: śukla will be used in relationship with such object because of its śuklatva ‘whiteness’, likewise, the word go will be used in relationship with such animal because of its gotva ‘cowness’. It seems then that the suffix -tva refers to the cause of application of the lexical base to which it is added. The case of items such as ḍīthatva is problematic since the base does not have the essence of the object to which it refers as its cause of application. In this case, how to explain the use of the suffix -tva?

The first solution proposed in the Mahābhāṣya to justify the existence of forms such as ḍīthatva consists in considering that at the beginning there was an individual who was the initial bearer of the name Ḍīthha. Let us assume that this individual was particularly thoughtful and that this quality constituted one of his essential characteristics. If, after him, one observes that some other individuals named Ḍīthha possess thoughtfulness as well, this typical quality of Ḍīthha’s becomes closely associated to the name itself and becomes its semantic content, as it were. Thus one will say about an individual named Ḍīthha who appears to be thoughtful as well: “this is really a Ḍīthha”. Thoughtfulness in fact becomes the cause of application of the name Ḍīthha. In this context, the ḍīthatva is a quality (here, thoughtfulness) or a characteristic activity of the bearer of the name Ḍīthha.

This analysis of the functioning of the name which is, at the beginning, assigned to a single individual and in the end designates a class constructed from the properties of the initially designated individual is diametrically opposed to the analysis which is the basis of the generic property thesis previously mentioned. Whereas in the first analysis one started from the multiplicity of the individual to construct its unity by abstraction, in the present analysis it is the individual conceived as a unity which constitutes the starting point and which allows to construct, from its properties, a class of individuals. One point however needs to be highlighted: in the context of the first thesis, the multiplicity is internal (one and the same individual is in question); in the
context of the second thesis, the multiplicity is external (the initial bearer of the name is ontologically distinct from the other bearers).\(^\text{16}\)

Each of these analyses therefore gives a special representation of the individual which makes clear that the latter is not at all a mere entity still identical to himself.\(^\text{17}\)

To this first solution proposed to justify items such as ditthatva, the following objection is made: in the case of the first individual named Dittha, one cannot invoke the action made by or the quality possessed by a previous Dittha. Then a second solution is proposed which seems to be the final one in so far as it closes the discussion: because names such as Dittha etc. cannot be used without a cause of application, one is compelled to assume that something else plays this role as much in the case of the initial bearer as in that of subsequent bearers. This something else is not explicitly named. Let us have a look at the commentaries.

Kaiyāṭa comments as follows:

\[
dītthādiṣy āti / dītthādayo yadṛccchāśabdā arthagataḥ na kim cīt pravṛttinimittam apecṣante puruṣecchāvaśena pravartanāḥ / [...] / śabdasvarūpam arthe 'dhyaṣya_ ayaṁ dīthā iti saṃjñāsāṃjñīsambandhāḥ kriyate / tataḥ śabdasvarūpāśaṅgāḥ yathā dīthhaśabdasya_arthe prayogas tathā_eva śabdasvarūpe 'ṛthe 'dhyaṣte pratyayaḥ ity arthaḥ / (P on M on V 5 ad A 5.1.119, vol. 4, 348-349)
\]

\[
dītthādiṣu – arbitrary words (yadṛcccha-śabdā) such as dīthha etc. do not depend on any cause of application (pravṛtti-nimittam) pertaining to the object (artha-gataḥ) in so far as [these words] come into use because of the free choice of the speaker (puruṣa-icchā-avaśena). [...] Having superimposed (adhyasya) the own form of the word (śabda-sva-rūpam) on the object (arthe), the name–named relationship (saṃjñā-saṃjñī-sambandhā) is instituted [by the utterance:] “this is Dittha”. The meaning is: thus, because of the connection with the own form of the word (śabda-sva-rūpa-āśaṅgād)
\]

\(^{16}\) When one says “this is a Devadatta” one assumes that the individual spoken of is not precisely Devadatta, it is someone who is like the initial bearer of the name Devadatta because of this or that quality or this or that activity.

\(^{17}\) The French linguist Gary-Prieur (1996), basing herself on a study of the use of proper names in French, shows how these two representations of the individual exist in the French language as well.
[of the individual name bearer], just as the word διτθα is used in relation to [such] object (arloth), so the suffix is used for the own form of the word (ṣabda-ṣva-rūpe) which is superimposed (adhyaste) on the object (arloth).

In order to explain the existence of forms such as διτθατ्वα, Kaiyāṭa defends the following thesis: the cause of application of a term such as διτθα is the own form of the word which is (mentally) superimposed on the particular individual denoted. And this thesis allows the functioning of the proper name to be explained even in the case of the very first individual named Διτθα. In the context of this thesis, the -tva suffix of διτθατ्वα is used in relationship to the own form of the word, which is the cause of the word’s application.

The later commentaries of Anamībhaṭṭa (Uddyotana, Una) and Nārāyaṇa Śaṭrī (Nārāyaṇīya, N) confirm this interpretation:

ṣaṃjñāśabdeṣuṣaṃjñā_eva pravṛttinimittam devadatta ity ukte devadattasamjñāka iti praṇīteḥ / tato ca ṛtho ṛopitasvaruṇapani-mittakoyadṛccchāśabda ity arthah /
(Una on P on M on V 1 ad A ṛKI, vol. 1, 137)
The meaning is: in the case of words called saṃjñā, the cause of application (pravṛttinimittam) is the name itself (saṃjñā_eva) since when devadatta is uttered [one understands: “person] named Devadatta” (devadatta-saṃjñāka). And that is why an arbitrary word (yadṛccchā-ṣabda) has its own form (°sva-rūpa°) which is superimposed (°āropita°) on the object (arloth) as its cause [of application] (°nimmittak).

arthagatam iti / jāttigunakriyādravyasaṃbandharūpaṃ arthagatani-mittam anādṛtya_arthāropitasvaruṇapanimittakatayā saṃjñāśabdapravṛttir ity arthah /
(N on P on M on V 1 ad A ṛKI, vol. 1, 139)
arthagatam – the meaning is: the application of a word called saṃjñā [is done] by means of the cause (°nimmittakatayā) which is its own form (°sva-rūpa°) superimposed (°āropita°) on the object (arloth), without consideration for any cause [of application] (°nimmittam) pertaining to the object (arloth-gata°) whether it be a generic property (jāti°), a quality (°guṇa°), an action (°kriyā°), an individual (°dravya°) or a relation (°saṃbandha°).
This thesis of the own form as the cause of application is particularly interesting because it lays stress on the reflexive dimension of proper names, that is to say, on the fact that they reflect a part of themselves. I am indeed inclined to think that when such grammarians such as Bhartṛhari and Kaiyāṭa state that some terms have their own form as their cause of application, we are very close to the idea according to which some terms signify their phonological shape. This conception of proper names as signifying a part of themselves has been defended by contemporary linguists such as Rey-Debove (1997, 270 and following) and Kleiber (1981, 385 and following). I will not explain their analyses in detail. I would just like to underline the major role attributed to the significant of proper names by some language specialists of different times and cultures.

3. The individual as the cause of application of proper names

I will close this paper with the presentation of the thesis according to which the particular individual is the cause of application of the name. As far as I know, this thesis seems to have been defended, in the grammatical domain, only by Nägeśa.

Here is the passage of the Mahābhāṣya commented upon:

catuṣṭhayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ / jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadṛccāśabdāḥ caturthāḥ //
(M on V 1 ad A ṛ/K, vol. 1, 99)
The application (pravṛttiḥ) of words (śabdānāṃ) is quadripartite: [there are] generic terms (jāti-śabdā), quality words (guṇa-śabdāḥ) [and] action words (kriyā-śabdā); arbitrary words (yadṛccā-śabdāḥ) [are the] fourth [type].

This is commented upon in the Pradīpa as follows:

yadṛccāḥ_itī / arthagatam pravṛttinimittam anapekṣya yah śabdāḥ pravoktrabhhiprāyena_eva pravartate sa yadṛccāśabdo diṭṭhādīḥ //
(P on M on V 1 ad A ṛ/K, vol. 1, 99)
yadṛccāḥ – A word (śabdāḥ) which applies only according to the intention of the speaker (pravokt-abhhiprāyena_eva), without being dependent on any cause of application (pravṛtti-nimittam) pertaining to the object (arthagataḥ), is an arbitrary word (yadṛccā-śabdo) such as diṭṭha, etc.
Here is the relevant passage of the *Uddyota*:

arthagatam iti / śabdātiriktaṃ arthaśāpam ity arthaḥ / yad vā vyaktaṃ / eva vācyatā / tasyāṃ ca prakṛtatvāviśesyatākhyaviśayatādvayaṃgīkārāc chaktīgrahopapattīḥ savikalpakopapattiḥ ca tata iti bhāvaḥ / prayoktrabhīprāyaṇaṃ ēvaṃ iti / śaktībodhaṇam prayoktraddhīnam iti bhāvaḥ / anyathā śabdārthasambandhasya anityatāpattiḥ / evaṃ ca svecchayā ekasyāṃ vyaktāṃ samketyamāṇāh śābo yadṛcchāśābo / iti bodhyam / [...] / tatra yadṛcchāśābo nāma vaktṛa svecchayā saṃnīveśiḥ / sa ca anekavidhāḥ ekavyaktīsāṃnīveśiḥ dīthādīr ekaḥ / tatra na kiṃcidatiriktaṃ pravṛttiṇimittam anāntyavyabhicārayor abhāvāt / kim tu sakyasya ēvaṃ arthaḥ svasavyādavyayaṃ bhānām / taduttaravādēḥ prakāṛatvāvachinināḥ sa ēvaṃ arthaḥ / (U on P on M on V 1 ad A ṛtIK, vol. 1, 99-100)

arthagatam — the meaning is: [without taking into account the cause of application] which consists in an object (arthā°) other than the form (śabda°) [of the word]. Or the individual (vyakta) itself is expressed (vācyatā). The idea is: by accepting that the two properties of objecthood (vīṣayatā°), called ‘property to determinate’ (prakṛtā°) and ‘property of being determined’ (vīṣeṣyatā°), are located in the [individual], it is possible to understand the expressive capacity (chakti°) [of the word] and consequently it is possible to get a differentiated cognition (savikalpaka°). prayoktrabhīprāyaṇaṃ ēva — the idea is: making known the expressive capacity (sakti°) [of the word] depends on the speaker (prayoktr°). Otherwise, the word (śabda°), the object (arthā°) and their relationship (sambandhasya) would become non-eternal. Thus one has to understand that an arbitrary word (yadṛcchā-śābo) is a word conventionally assigned to (samketyamāṇah) [the designation of] an individual (vyaktau) according to the desire [of the speaker]. [...] Then an arbitrary word (yadṛcchā-śābo) is applied by the speaker (vaktṛa) according to his own desire (sva-icchayā). [These arbitrary words are] of several kinds: dīthā etc. which is applied to a single individual (vyakti°), is one of them. In this case, the cause of application (pravṛtti-nimittam) [of the word dīthā] is none other than this [single individual] because there is no infinite regress (anāntyay°) and because there is no transgression (vyabhicārayor).18 Rather, the determined

---

18 The two notions of anāntyay and vyabhicārayor contradict the particularist thesis according to which the object of words is a particular. According to the first notion,
object appears with the two properties of objecthood (viṣayatā°). The meaning of the [suffix] -tva etc. [added] to this [word] is the [individual] himself considered as qualificand (prakāratva°).  

Here Nāgeśa expounds his own conception of the semantico-referential functioning of individual proper names: a name such as Dīthha has the individual himself both as its object and as its cause of application.

Conclusion

If one accepts the idea mentioned in the introduction according to which the cause of application of a word is its connotation, one can say that for the grammarians quoted here the individual proper name denotes BECAUSE it connotes. In other words, the proper name does not directly denote the individual entity (as some Neo-logicians would say, using the expression śrṅgagrāhikā); for the grammarians, the referential process takes place by virtue of connotation.

Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Aṣṭādhyaśī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣyadīpikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Nārāyaṇiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Pradīpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Uddyota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Una</td>
<td>Uddyotana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vākyapadīya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Vārttika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

one cannot say that go refers to a single cow for the number of cows is infinite and infinity of teachings would be necessary to know the meaning/object of go. According to the second notion, if the meaning/object of the word go consists only in a single individual without any reference to cowness, the word go will be assigned to individuals of different species. On the one hand, go does not refer to all the individuals that it would have to designate and, on the other, it can refer to individuals that it should not designate. On this topic, cf. especially Filliozat 1975, 200, n. 1, and Ganeri 1995, 411-412.

19 For a detailed explanation of this passage, cf. Aussant 2009, 129-133.


## List of authors and works mentioned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pāṇini</td>
<td>5th c. B.C.?</td>
<td><em>Aṣṭādhyāyī</em> (‘The Eight Chapters’) Grammatical treatise providing the generation of correct Sanskrit forms; basic text of the Pāṇinian school, composed in <em>sūtras</em> (‘aphorisms’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kātyāyana</td>
<td>3rd c. B.C.</td>
<td><em>Vārttika</em> (‘Remarks on the procedure’) Commentary on a part of Pāṇinian’s <em>sūtras</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patañjali</td>
<td>2nd c. B.C.</td>
<td><em>Mahābhāṣya</em> (‘The Great Commentary’) Commentary on Kātyāyana’s <em>Vārttikas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhartrhari</td>
<td>5th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Vākyapadīya</em> (‘Work Dealing with Sentences and Words’) Treatise of grammatical philosophy <em>Mahābhāṣyadīpikā</em> (‘Light on the Great Commentary’), Incomplete commentary on Patañjali’s <em>Mahābhāṣya</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śāntarakṣita</td>
<td>8th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Tattvasamgraha</em> (‘Compendium of Reality’) Survey of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamalaśīla</td>
<td>8th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Tattvasamgrahapañjikā</em> (‘Commentary on the Compendium of Reality’) Commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s <em>Tattvasamgraha</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaiyata</td>
<td>11th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Pradīpa</em> (‘Lamp [of the Great Commentary]’) Complete commentary on Patañjali’s <em>Mahābhāṣya</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagadīśa</td>
<td>16th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā</em> (‘Sun of Words’ Capacity to Express’) Work on New Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhalakkar</td>
<td>17th c. A.D.?</td>
<td><em>Bālabodhini</em> (‘Instruction for Children’) Commentary on Mammatā’s <em>Kāvyaprakāśa</em>, a poetical treatise from the 11th c. A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nārāyaṇa Śastrī</td>
<td>17th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Nārāyaṇiya</em> (‘Nārāyaṇa’s [Commentary]’) Complete commentary on Kaiyata’s <em>Pradīpa</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annambhaṭṭa</td>
<td>17th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Uddyotana</em> (‘Illumination [of the Lamp of the Great Commentary]’) Complete commentary on Kaiyata’s <em>Pradīpa</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nāgeśa</td>
<td>17th-18th c. A.D.</td>
<td><em>Uddyota</em> (‘Light [of the Lamp of the Great Commentary]’) Complete commentary on Kaiyata’s <em>Pradīpa</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References

1. Primary sources

**Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini**


**Bālabodhinī of V.R. Jhalakikar**


**Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, Pradīpa of Kaiyāṭa and Uddyota of Nāgeśa**


**Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari**


**Nārāyaṇīya of Nārāyana Śāstri and Uddyotana of Annambhāṭṭa**


**Śabdaśaktiprakāṣikā of Jagadiśa**

The Views of Pāṇinian Grammarian 57

**Tattvasamgraha of Śāntarakṣita and Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla**


**Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari**


2. **Secondary sources**


Summary: The Analysis of Proper Names: The Views of Pāṇinian Grammarians

This paper attempts to give a presentation of the different analyses which have been elaborated by Indian grammarians of the Pāṇinian school concerning the referential functioning of proper names. After having defined the central notion of ‘cause of application’ (pravṛtti-nimitta), I will review three theses: 1) the thesis of generic property (ākṛti, sāmānya, jāti) as the cause of application of proper names; 2) the thesis of the own form (sva-rūpa) as the cause of application of proper names; 3) the thesis of the individual (vyakti) as the cause of application of proper names. I will take the opportunity to show what kind of representation of the human individual these analyses involve.
Résumé : L’analyse des noms propres : les points de vue des grammairiens pāniniens

L’article tente de présenter les différentes analyses élaborées par les grammairiens indiens de l’école pāniniéenne au sujet du fonctionnement référentiel des noms propres. Après avoir défini la notion centrale de « cause d’application » (pravṛtti-nimitta), je passerai en revue trois thèses : 1) la thèse de la propriété générique comme cause d’application du nom propre (ākṛti, sāmānya, jāti) ; 2) celle de la forme propre (sva-rūpa) ; 3) celle de l’individu (vyakti). Je profiterai de l’occasion pour montrer quel type de représentation de la personne humaine est impliqué par ces analyses.

Zusammenfassung: Die Analyse von Eigennamen: Die Sichtweisen der Pānini-Grammatiker

Der Artikel versucht, die verschiedenen Analysen über die referentielle Funktion von Eigennamen vorzustellen, die von indischen Grammatikern der Pānini-Schule erarbeitet wurden. Nach der Definition des zentralen Begriffs der „Anwendungsursache“ (pravṛtti-nimitta) werden drei Thesen besprochen: 1) die These der generischen Eigenschaft (ākṛti, sāmānya, jāti) als Benennungsursache; 2) die These von der eigenen Form (sva-rūpa) und schließlich 3) die These vom Individuum (vyakti) als Anlass für die Vergabe von Eigennamen. Ich möchte die Gelegenheit wahrnehmen und aufzeigen, welche Darstellungsweisen des menschlichen Individuums sich aus diesen Analysen ergeben.