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<CT>Integrate, yes, but what and how? A computational approach of perceptuo-motor fusion in speech perception

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Abstract: We consider a computational model comparing the possible roles of “association” and “simulation” in phonetic decoding, demonstrating that these two routes can contain similar information in some “perfect” communication situations and highlighting situations where their decoding performance differs. We conclude that optimal decoding should involve some sort of fusion of association and simulation in the human brain.
In their target article, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) propose an ambitious model of language perception and production. It is centered on three main ingredients. First, it considers the complete hierarchy of layers of language processing, from message to semantics to syntax to phonology and finally, to speech. Second, it features predictive forward models, so that temporally extended sequences, such as whole sentences and dialogues, can be processed. Third, it features dual processing routes, the “association” route and “simulation” route, so that auditory and motor knowledge can be involved simultaneously, rejecting the classic dichotomy between perception and action processes.

In this commentary, we set aside the temporal and hierarchical aspects, and focus on the domain of speech perception and production, where sequences are typically short (e.g., syllable perception and production), and processing limited to phonological decoding. Even in this more restricted field, the age-old debate between purely motor-based accounts and purely sensory-based accounts of perception and production now appears to be a false dilemma (Schwartz et al. 2012). Indeed, neurophysiological and behavioral evidence strongly suggests a dual route account of information processing in the central nervous system, with both a direct, associative route and an indirect, simulation route. The target article amply documents the evidence, we do not repeat examples here.

In our view, the debate is now shifting toward the issue of the functional role of each route and their integration. That is to say, a central question of the debate is to ask what is integrated and how integration proceeds in the human brain.

We would argue that conceptual models such as proposed in the target article would unfortunately have a difficult time bringing light to these questions. To support this argument, we consider the question of perceptual decoding of phonetic units, for which we have developed a computational framework (Moulin-Frier et al. 2012) based on Bayesian programming (Bessière et al. 2008; Colas et al. 2010; Lebeltel et al. 2004). With this framework, various models of speech perception can be simulated and quantitatively compared. One model is purely auditory, exploiting what P&G call “association.” A second model is purely motor, exploiting what they call “simulation.” A third one is sensory-motor, integrating the association and simulation processes.
All of these models can then be implemented and compared in various experimental configurations. Three major results emerge from such comparisons.

(1) Under some hypotheses, with perfectly identified communication noise and no difference between motor repertoires of the speaker and the listener (i.e., when conditions for speech communication are “perfect”), motor and auditory theories are indistinguishable. Therefore, the “association” and “simulation” routes provide exactly the same information in these perfect communication conditions. The reason is that, in our learning scenario, the auditory classifier is learned by association from data obtained through a motor production process, and possesses enough mathematical power of expression.

This casts an interesting light on the question of what information is encoded in the association and simulation routes: Labeling a box as an “association” route, in a conceptual model, is not enough to be certain that it is different, from an information processing point of view, from another box of the model. Computational descriptions however, by virtue of rigorous mathematical notation, have to be precisely defined, and their content can be systematically assessed. This also explains why behavioral evidence has historically not been able to discriminate between motor and auditory theories of perception and production: They are sometimes simply indistinguishable. Unfortunately, we believe this difficulty was not avoided in the target article, in particular when P&G detail experimental evidence for their model (e.g., target article, sect. 3.2.1, para. 7, “these four studies support forward modeling, but they do not discriminate between prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-association”; and sect. 3.2.3, para. 6, “all of these findings provide support for the model of prediction-by-simulation [...]. Of course, comprehenders may also perform prediction-by-association [...].”).

(2) In the general case where “perfect conditions” for communication are not met, mathematical comparison of the models emphasizes the respective roles of motor and auditory knowledge in various conditions of speech perception in adverse conditions. Therefore, the information provided by the “association” and “simulation” routes is more or less distinct and prominent depending on the communication conditions. In other words, this demonstrates that adverse conditions provide leverage for discriminating hypotheses about the perceptual and motor processes involved. This is convergent with
recent findings from neuroimaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies (d’Ausilio et al. 2012; Meister et al. 2007; Zekveld et al. 2006), as well as computational studies (Castellini et al. 2011).

(3) In any case, sensory-motor fusion provides better perceptual performance than pure auditory or motor processes. Therefore, complementarities of information provided by the “association” and “simulation” routes could be efficiently exploited in the framework of integrative theories such as those hinted at in the discussion of the target article. It is now obvious in the field of audiovisual perception that auditory and visual cues are complementary, with a great deal of work already done on sensor fusion. In our opinion, comparable work can now be done on how to integrate auditory and motor processes in speech perception. In this view, the proposal by P&G that “comprehenders emphasize whichever route is likely to be more accurate” (sect. 4, para. 6) can be regarded as a first candidate model, which would have to be made mathematically precise and compared with alternative explanations, possibly driven by neuroanatomical findings (e.g., both auditory and motor processes are performed automatically in parallel and compete, or they both bring information in an ongoing fusion process, etc.).

An obvious challenge, of course, is to bridge the gap between computational approaches such as ours, which are usually restricted to isolated syllable production and perception, and conceptual models as proposed in the target article, that tackle continuous flows of speech and consider semantic, syntactic and phonology layers of processing. However, in our view, the main challenge for future studies is first to assess what kind of information is present in “association” and “simulation” routes, and second, to better understand how computational fusion models, describing the integration of these two routes, can account for experimental neurocognitive data.

References


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