Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach

Abstract : In this paper, we formulate a noncooperative game to model a non-life insurance market. The aim is to analyze the e ects of competition between insurers through di erent indicators: the market premium, the solvency level, the market share and the underwriting results. Resulting premium Nash equilibria are discussed and numerically illustrated.
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Christophe Dutang, Hansjoerg Albrecher, Stéphane Loisel. Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach. European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, 2013, 231 (3), pp.702-711. ⟨hal-00746245⟩

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