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A formal analysis of the Norwegian E-voting protocol

Véronique Cortier 1 Cyrille Wiedling 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Norway has used e-voting in its last political election in September 2011, with more than 25 000 voters using the e-voting option. The underlying protocol is a new protocol designed by the ERGO group, involving several actors (a bulletin box but also a receipt generator, a decryption service, and an auditor). Of course, trusting the correctness and security of e-voting protocols is crucial in that context. Formal definitions of properties such as privacy, coercion-resistance or verifiability have been recently proposed, based on equivalence properties. \par In this paper, we propose a formal analysis of the protocol used in Norway, w.r.t. privacy, considering several corruption scenarios. Part of this study has conducted using the ProVerif tool, on a simplified model.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00732907
Contributor : Véronique Cortier <>
Submitted on : Monday, September 17, 2012 - 1:27:39 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, December 18, 2018 - 4:38:25 PM

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Véronique Cortier, Cyrille Wiedling. A formal analysis of the Norwegian E-voting protocol. 1st International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12), Mar 2012, Tallinn, Estonia. pp.109--128, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_7⟩. ⟨hal-00732907⟩

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