Learning in the trust game

Claude Meidinger (1) , Antoine Terracol (2, 1)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics

We use experimental data from a repeated trust game to estimate structural learning models that allow a differentiation of the learning processes of the two players. We find that the two players cannot be described by the same learning process. Long run simulations then show that the interaction of the two estimated types of players can lead to contrasted outcomes.

Mots clés: simulations; Learning; beliefs; reinforcment; simulations.

Domaines: Economies et finances

Claude Meidinger, Antoine Terracol. Learning in the trust game. Revue de Philosophie Economique / Review of Economic Philosophy, 2012, 13 (1), pp.155-174. ⟨hal-00728296⟩