Who is the other to me? Levinas, Asymmetrical Ethics, and Social-Political Equality
Résumé
In response to critics of asymmetrical ethics, in particular Habermas and Honneth, I consider whether social-political equality necessarily requires presupposing the moral symmetry of subjects of classical liberalism. Drawing on the works of Emmanuel Levinas, I argue that social-political equality is compatible with and, more radically, can only be adequately developed in relation to the moral asymmetries between self and other. Levinas reframed questions of equality, justice, and solidarity in relation to the interruptive encounters between inherently asymmetrical subjects, which he articulated through the ethical rupture of the same through the other in the face, height, sacrifice, and substitution. It is precisely such an asymmetrical ethics and humanism proceeding from the other person that is most appropriate for confronting contemporary moral and social issues involving unequal situations, opportunities, and resources between pluralities of non-identical concrete individuals by calling and awakening me to my inescapable responsibility to the other--regardless of and prior to any relation of mutual exchange, expectation, negotiation, or recognition.
Mono Kurgusuz Labirent