RSM: a Small and Fast Countermeasure for AES, Secure against 1st and 2nd-order Zero-Offset SCAs

Abstract : Amongst the many existing countermeasures against Side Channel Attacks (SCA) on symmetrical cryptographic algorithms, masking is one of the most widespread, thanks to its relatively low overhead, its low performance loss and its robustness against first-order attacks. However, several articles have recently pinpointed the limitations of this countermeasure when matched with variance-based and other high-order analyses. In this article, we present a new form of Boolean masking for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) called ''RSM'', which shows the same level in performances as the state-of-the-art, while being less area consuming, and secure against Variance-based Power Analysis (VPA) and second-order zero-offset CPA. Our theoretical security evaluation is then validated with simulations as well as real-life CPA and VPA on an AES 256 implemented on FPGA.
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Maxime Nassar, Youssef Souissi, Sylvain Guilley, Jean-Luc Danger. RSM: a Small and Fast Countermeasure for AES, Secure against 1st and 2nd-order Zero-Offset SCAs. Design Automation and Test in Europe, Mar 2012, Desden, Germany. pp.1173-1178. ⟨hal-00666337⟩

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