Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known

Guillaume Carlier (1) , Rose-Anne Dana (1)

1 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision

An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions.

Domaines: Optimisation et contrôle [math.OC]; Gestion des risques [q-fin.RM]

Guillaume Carlier, Rose-Anne Dana. Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known. Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148 (4), pp.1606-1623. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.014⟩. ⟨hal-00661903⟩