Entropy-based Power Attack

Abstract : Recent works have shown that the mutual information is a generic side-channel distinguisher, since it detects any kind of statistical dependency between leakage observations and hypotheses on the secret. In this study the mutual information analysis (MIA) is tested in a noisy real world design. It indeed appears to be a powerful approach to break unprotected implementations. However, we observe that the MIA fails when applied on a DES cryptoprocessor with masked substitution boxes (Sboxes) in ROM. Nevertheless, this masking implementation remains sensitive to Higher-Order Differential Power Analysis (HO-DPA). For instance, an attack based on a variance analysis clearly shows the vulnerabilities of a first order masking countermeasure. We propose a novel approach to information-theoretic HO attacks, called the Entropy-based Power Analysis (EPA). This new attack gives a greatest importance to highly informative partitions and in the meantime better distinguishes between the key hypotheses. A thorough empirical evaluation of the proposed attack confirms the overwhelming advantage of this new approach when compared with MIA.
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Communication dans un congrès
IEEE. Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Jun 2010, Anaheim, CA, United States. IEEE, pp.1-6, 2010, Computer Society. <10.1109/HST.2010.5513124>


https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00618482
Contributeur : Sylvain Guilley <>
Soumis le : mercredi 14 mars 2012 - 01:13:06
Dernière modification le : mercredi 14 mars 2012 - 09:48:22

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Houssem Maghrebi, Sylvain Guilley, Jean-Luc Danger, Florent Flament. Entropy-based Power Attack. IEEE. Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Jun 2010, Anaheim, CA, United States. IEEE, pp.1-6, 2010, Computer Society. <10.1109/HST.2010.5513124>. <hal-00618482v2>

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