Le sceptique cherche-t-il vraiment la vérité ?

Abstract : Sextus Empiricus presents neo-Pyrrhonian scepticism as a philosophy in search of truth (PH I, 1-3). However, it is difficult to believe him considering the long series of arguments he sets against one another in order to produce equipollence (isostheneia), the equal force of opposing arguments that leads to suspension of judgement. How to interpret this apparent discrepancy between the theory and practice of scepticism ? Rather than conclude that scepticism is inconsistent, (i) this paper proposes to examine anew the texts in which Sextus characterizes scepticism as a search for truth. To do so, it will be necessary on the one hand (ii) to show the links between Sextus' presentation of Pyrrhonian scepticism and his project of distinguishing it from that of the New Academy, and on the other hand (iii) to reexamine the neo-Pyrrhonians' practice of scepticism. Far from being a philosophy in search for truth, Sextan Pyrrhonism is in search of the uncertainty which lies at the origin of the sceptic's happiness.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, February 2, 2011 - 3:41:46 PM
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Stéphane Marchand. Le sceptique cherche-t-il vraiment la vérité ?. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Presses Universitaires de France, 2010, 1 (65), pp.125-141. ⟨10.3917/rmm.101.0125⟩. ⟨hal-00562008⟩



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