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A Repeated Game Formulation of Energy-Efficient Decentralized Power Control

Abstract : Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energy-efficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the corresponding conflict of interest can have a predictable outcome, namely a finitely or discounted repeated game equilibrium. Remarkably, it is shown that this equilibrium is Pareto-efficient under reasonable sufficient conditions and the corresponding decentralized power control policies can be implemented under realistic information assumptions: only individual channel state information and a public signal are required to implement the equilibrium strategies. Explicit equilibrium conditions are derived in terms of minimum number of game stages or maximum discount factor. Both analytical and simulation results are provided to compare the performance of the proposed power control policies with those already existing and exploiting the same information assumptions namely, those derived for the one-shot and Stackelberg games.
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Contributor : Maël Le Treust <>
Submitted on : Monday, November 13, 2017 - 1:38:30 PM
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Mael Le Treust, Samson Lasaulce. A Repeated Game Formulation of Energy-Efficient Decentralized Power Control. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2010, 9 (9), pp. 2860 - 2869 ISSN : 1536-1276. ⟨10.1109/TWC.2010.072610.091472⟩. ⟨hal-00537026⟩



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