Computing the Leakage of Information-Hiding Systems

Miguel E. Andrés (1) , Catuscia Palamidessi (2) , Peter van Rossum (1) , Geoffrey Smith (3)

1 CS - Computing Science Department
2 COMETE - Concurrency, Mobility and Transactions
3 FIU | CIS - Knight Foundation - School of Computing and Information Sciences [Miami]

We address the problem of computing the information leakage of a system in an efficient way. We propose two methods: one based on reducing the problem to reachability, and the other based on techniques from quantitative counterexample generation. The second approach can be used either for exact or approximate computation, and provides feedback for debugging. These methods can be applied also in the case in which the input distribution is unknown. We then consider the interactive case and we point out that the definition of associated channel proposed in literature is not sound. We show however that the leakage can still be defined consistently, and that our methods extend smoothly.

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Miguel E. Andrés, Catuscia Palamidessi, Peter van Rossum, Geoffrey Smith. Computing the Leakage of Information-Hiding Systems. 16th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS 2010), Mar 2010, Paphos, Cyprus. pp.373-389, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-12002-2_32⟩. ⟨hal-00445445v2⟩