Pure and Stationary Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Global Preferences

Abstract : We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategies in two-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions. We show that the existence of such strategies follows from the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategies for some derived one-player games. Thus we reduce the problem from two-player to one-player games (Markov decision problems), where usually it is much easier to tackle. The reduction is very general, it holds not only for all possible payoff mappings but also in more a general situations where players' preferences are not expressed by payoffs.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
2009


https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00438359
Contributor : Hugo Gimbert <>
Submitted on : Friday, November 25, 2016 - 7:30:44 AM
Last modification on : Sunday, November 27, 2016 - 1:04:19 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00438359, version 2
  • ARXIV : 1611.08487

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Hugo Gimbert, Wieslaw Zielonka. Pure and Stationary Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Global Preferences. 2009. <hal-00438359v2>

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