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Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2009

Pure and Stationary Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Global Preferences

Abstract

We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategies in two-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions. We show that the existence of such strategies follows from the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategies for some derived one-player games. Thus we reduce the problem from two-player to one-player games (Markov decision problems), where usually it is much easier to tackle. The reduction is very general, it holds not only for all possible payoff mappings but also in more a general situations where players' preferences are not expressed by payoffs.
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Dates and versions

hal-00438359 , version 1 (03-12-2009)
hal-00438359 , version 2 (25-11-2016)

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Hugo Gimbert, Wieslaw Zielonka. Pure and Stationary Optimal Strategies in Perfect-Information Stochastic Games with Global Preferences. 2009. ⟨hal-00438359v2⟩

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UNIV-PARIS7 CNRS
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