Analytical Study of Adversarial Strategies in Cluster-based Overlays

Emmanuelle Anceaume 1 Romaric Ludinard 1 Frédéric Tronel 2 F. Brasiliero 3 Bruno Sericola 4
1 ADEPT - Algorithms for Dynamic Dependable Systems
IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, INRIA Rennes
4 DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS
Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES
Abstract : Scheideler has shown that peer-to-peer overlays networks can only survive Byzantine attacks if malicious nodes are not able to predict what is going to be the topology of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations. In this paper we investigate adversarial strategies by following specific games. Our analysis demonstrates first that an adversary can very quickly subvert DHT-based overlays by simply never triggering leave operations. We then show that when all nodes (honest and malicious ones) are imposed on a limited lifetime, the system eventually reaches a stationary regime where the ratio of polluted clusters is bounded, independently from the initial amount of corruption in the system.
Keywords : Byzantine attack
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [14 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00408871
Contributor : Emmanuelle Anceaume <>
Submitted on : Monday, August 3, 2009 - 6:24:13 PM
Last modification on : Friday, November 16, 2018 - 1:31:23 AM
Long-term archiving on : Thursday, June 30, 2011 - 10:57:40 AM

Files

WRAS-full-version.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Citation

Emmanuelle Anceaume, Romaric Ludinard, Frédéric Tronel, F. Brasiliero, Bruno Sericola. Analytical Study of Adversarial Strategies in Cluster-based Overlays. 2nd International Workshop on Reliability, Availability, and Security, 2009, Hiroshima, Japan. pp.12, ⟨10.1109/PDCAT.2009.62⟩. ⟨hal-00408871⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

868

Files downloads

332